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INDIAN SECTS OR SCHOOLS IN THE TIME OF BUDDHA

T. W. Rhys Davids

I have ventured to collect some facts and to draw some inferences as to schools of Buddhist thought in India in Asoka's time (J. R. A. S., 1891, pp. 409-413) and in the time of the Chinese Pilgrims (ib., pp. 414-420). Mr. Hardy's new volume of the Aṅguttara brings us an interesting list of various schools of sophists, ascetics, and teachers in India in the Buddha's own time. It is unfortunately only a bare list, and Buddhaghosa on the passage does not give much help. But the list is interesting. It runs (p. 276) as follows :—

1. Ājīvako.	6. Māgaṇḍiko.
2. Nigaṇṭho.	7. Tedaṇḍiko.
3. Muṇḍa-sāvako.	8. Aviruddhako.
4. Jaṭilako.	9. Gotamako.
5. Paribbājako.	10. Devadhamiko.

On this Buddhaghosa has the following note :

"*ājīvako* ti nagga-pabbajito, *nigaṇṭho* ti purima-bhāga-paṭichanno, *muṇḍa-sāvaka*[1] ti nigaṇṭha-sāvako, *jaṭilako* ti tāpaso, *paribbājako* ti channa-paribbājako, *māgandikādaya*[2] pi titthiyā eva. Nesaṃ pana sīlesu paripūra-kāritāya abbāvena sukka-pakkho na gahito".

It seems probable that if the last five names had conveyed to Buddhaghosa clear and certain connotations he would have told us more, just as he explains that the ambiguous No. 3 means specifically a Nigaṇṭha disciple, a Jain. The Tedaṇḍiko (No. 7) is clear enough— that school of Brahmin beggars who carried three staves bound up as one I can make nothing certain of Nos. 6 and 8, in both of which cases the readings are doubtful. No. 9 is most

1. MS. *buḍḍha-savako.*
2. So MS. (*nd*).

interesting. Of course it cannot mean a follower of our Gotama. So there must have existed another school founded by another Gotama. And does No. 10 mean merely a deve-worshipper ? Or should we not rather suppose a special meaning was attached to *devā-dhammiko*, such as "follower of the system of *the* god" (perhaps Śiva ; it surely could not be Indra) ?

(JRAS, 1898)

ANCIENT INDIAN SECTS AND ORDERS MENTIONED BY BUDDHIST WRITERS

C. Bendall

In the volume for 1898 of our Journal (p. 197) Professor Rhys Davids calls attention to the *Indian Sects or Schools in the time of the Buddha* as enumerated in the passage of the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (pt. iii, p. 276, ed. P.T.S). It is hardly necessary to point out the interest of the investigation ; for scholars at least have for some time past recognized the fact that Buddhism, though raised to the dignity of an occumenical religion, doubtless owing to the genius of its founder, was nevertheless only one of a number of schools of more or less free and independent thought in a country too often regarded as the mere domain of a monotonous sacerdotalism. Professor Davids has reverted to the subject in his version of the *Dīghanikāya* ("Dialogues", p. 220), and quite recently Monsieur Barth has pointed out that further details "d'un pittoresque achève" await the readers of the Majjhima and other Pali *nikāyas*[1]. Leaving those to scholars more specially engaged on Pali literature, I now subjoin two passages from the literature of other schools of Buddhist thought written in that form of speech, variously known as the Gāthā dialect and "le sanskrit mixte", in use during the early centuries of our era, when Pali canonical literature, previously codified, was apparently taking its present literary and dialectic shape and when the great commentaries on it were composed.

The first extract is from the *Ratnolkā-dhāraṇī*,[2] which is not, as its name might imply, a mere charm,[3] but a

1. Bulletin iii, *Bouddhism*, p. 33 (Rev. de l'histoire des Religious, 1900)
2. Quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* ff. 149 sqq. The *Śikṣās*, was first translated into Tibetan by three pandits, all of whom flourished under a Tlbetan king who died A.D. 838.
3. Another parallel case is the *dhāraṇi*-literature forming the basis of the notice of non-Buddhistic sects by Remusat at pp. 145 sqq. of his version of Fa-Hian (English edition). Mr. Watters tells

work of considerable dimensions, inculcating *inter alia* the characteristics Mahāyāna doctrine that the Buddhist should not seek for immediate emancipation, but should "for the good of all creatures" be willing to be born again in various worldly and otherwise undesirable stations of life.

loki alipta jale yatha padmaṃ
prīti-prasādakarā vicaranti

"In the world unsmirched like the lily in the water, winning grace and favour is their conversation".

After enumerating various professions and calling in which they may be "reuowned in the world", the author mentions the *ṛṣis* and ascetics. Then occur the following lines :—

te carakāḥ parivrājaka tīrthyāḥ
tāpasa Gotamamonacarānaṃ
nagna acelaguruśramaṇānāṃ
tīrthika ācariyā hi bhavanti
te tu ājīvika dharmacarāṇāṃ
uttarikāṇa anuttarikāṇāṃ
dīrghajaṭāna kumāravratānāṃ
teṣv (api) ācariyā hi bhavanti
sūryanuvartaka-pañcatapānām
kukkuragovratikā, mṛgacaryā
cārika tīrthya daśa tirtayānāṃ
teṣv apī ācariyā hi bhavanti
devata jñāna praveśa ratānam
tīrth'-upadarśana deśacarāṇām
mūlaphalāmbucarā api bhūtvā
dharma acintiya to paramāgrāḥ
utkuṭasthāyina-ekacarāṇāṃ
kaṇṭakabhasmatṛṇaśśayenānāṃ
ye muṣale śaya yukti vihāri
teṣv api ācariyā hi bhavanti

me that Nos. 84 and 422 (*Mahādharmolkā-dhāraṇī*) in Nanjio's form further cases in point.

"They become sectaries, Caraka or Parivrājaka ; for the observers of the vow of silence of Gotama the ascetic or for the *śramaṇas* of the naked, unclothed Guru. They become sectarian leaders (either)[4] those who have or those who have not a higher (aim ?), those with long coils of hair, those who took their vow a youths, amongst these they become leaders. Among ascetics who endure the five fires, turning to the sun (and the other four, there are) those who have the dog and cattle vows, and those who act as beasts of the chase, followers of some of the thirty observances (?) and sects, amongst these, too, they become leaders. For such as delight in initiation into the knowledge of the deity, for such as wonder through (many) countries to observe closely the sects, they live on roots, fruits, and water, and at last become masters in systems beyond thought. For those who remain squatting on their heads or who wander alone, whose bed is on thorns, ashes, or grass who rest on a pestle-pole and so live, amongst them, too, they become leaders."

It may be first observed the list is partly traditional "Carakas, Parivrājakas, Ājīvakas, and Nirgranthas" head a list at the beginning of ch. 13 of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[5], in which *kāvyaśāsiraprasṛtaḥ* and other persons of worldly pursuits like those in the passage preceding the present occur. The chief interest, however, of the passage seems to be that it supplies an independent commentary which from its language must be at least as old as Buddhaghoṣa on the list preserved in the Aṅguttaranikāya.

The next passage is *Mahāvastu*, iii, 412. 7-10 ; "atha khalu anyatīrthika caraka parivrājaka traidaṇḍaka—m—ānandika guru putraka-Gautama dharmacintika vṛddhaśrāvaka-tṛtīyā ulūkapakṣikabhaginī śramaṇā Yaśodhasya......ṛddhi

4. The Tibetan version appears to take these words as denoting subdivisions of the Ājīvikas.
5. Probably one of the very oldest Mahāyāna-books. I propose shortly to publish fragments of a Ms of it assignable to the fourth or fifth century.

prātibaryāṇi dṛṣṭvā .. ... saṃhṛṣṭa romajātā abhūnsuh yāvat svākhyāto bhagavato Gautamasya dharmavinayo vivṛto ..." The difficulty of this passage is pointed out in M. Senart's notes. I may observe, however, that the Carakas and Parivrājakas as general terms[6] head the list of sectaries, as before; and that the two persons who accompanied the nun may have been (as indicated by my hyphens) (1) a Traidaṇḍika, and (2) an aged disciple of Gautama, Ānandi-kaguruputıaka. I take it that this last expression is an epithet intended to distinguish this Gautama from Bhagavān Gautama (Buddha) mentioned just below. As to the expression ulūkapakṣika, it must refer at least primarily to the ascetic body who were owls'—wings (*ulūkapakkhaṃ dhareti*; Dīgha-n.,[7] i, p. 167). There seems at present hardly evidence enough to connect them definitely with the Aulukya Vaiśeṣikas of Hemcandra and Mādhava.

The interest of the passage first quoted seems to be that it forms a kind of commentary on the passage from the Aṅguttara. Thus line 2 refers to class 9 (Gotamakāḥ) of the Pali list. They had a vow of silence and followed a Gotama distinguished from Gotama Buddha. The *acela guru* of lines 3 is the teacher called Gosāla Gośalīputra, and surnamed Maskar[8] in (Skt.). Makkhali (Pali), or Maṅkhali (Jain Pkt.) See Buddhaghoṣa's *Sumaṅgala-v.*, i. p. 162, translated by Dr. Hornle, Uvās.-d. Appendix., p. 22. Once a Jain according to Jain tradition, he founded the Ājīvikas, No. I in the Pali list. The subdivision of the school here given possibly refers to the lay and monastic adherents[9]

Dīrghajaṭā corresponds to Jaṭilakā, No. 4 in the list. One cannot be sure that these, any more than the Parivıājaka (who come next in the Pali list), formed a separate body.

6. So, too, *Lalitav.*, 2. 22: *anyatīrthika sramaṇa-brāhmaṇa-caraka-parivrājakā.*
7. *Apānako* in the same passage would seem to suggest that *apipāsā* is the right reading in *M illinda*-p., p. 191, n. 7.
8. *M. Vyutp.*, 170, Av., Cat. Tale 40.
9. Separately mentioned by Buddhaghoṣa, *loc. cit.* Compare Hurnle's amusing note (1).

Kumāravr, refers rather to the age at which the vow was taken than to *brahmacaryā* or chastity; so at least the Tibetan version implies.

Line 9 refers to a fairly well-known practice of Brahmanical ascetics (Manu, vi. 28). Line 10 is illustrated by Majjhima-n, *sutta* 57.[10] The next stanza conveys an antithesis between two classes of *religieux*, such as specialized in the theology and ritual and such as wandered forth to seek new teachings. The former correspond to No. 10 (Devadhammıkā) of the Pali list. Seven of the ten are thus referred to.

The last stanza refers to miscellaneous ascetic practices such as are often referred in the Pali scriptures.[11] It will of course be noted that these passages are independent of the 'six *tīrthakas*', who form part of the common tradition of Buddhism.[12]

The list in the Aṅguttara-nikāya is independent of this tradition. It is a less precise and formal series, partly overlapping the shorter one, and having the disadvantage of confusing orders of ascetics with differences of religion. Still, as the passages adduced show, it has its historical value.

10. Reference given to me by Professor Davids. Now translated by Dr. Neumanu. For the *go-vrata* see also *Mahābh.* Udyogap, xcix, 14. Mṛgacaryā is referred to *ibid.*, cxxi, 20.

11. Rhys Davids' tr. *Dīghanikāya*, p. 227, n. 1. Some of the practices referred to in lines 18, 19, are also attributed to the Ājīvikas in Jātaka, Vol. i. p. 493. If the rather obscure language of 1. 19 can be understood to mean that the man slept and lived in a kind of cage or contrivance of poles, some of the difficulties in the Pali passage referred to by Professor Davids, *op. cit.*, p. 228, n. 1, would disappear. The Tib. is g*tun-śiṅ* 'pestle-wood' : and Jaschke, 8. v. *gtun*, satisfactorily explains the kind of large instrument intended.

12. Echoed in a similar Jain tradition (*Bhagavatī*, translated by Hornle, Appendix to Uvrs. ed., p. 4 med.). In the shipwreck described in Av., Cat. Tale 81, it is curious to find invocations offered, first to the 'six doctors', then to the Hindu gods. and lastly to Buddha.

It would be interesting to find whether the set of thirty *tīrthyas*' mentioned in the line 11 of the *Ratnolkā*-extract could be similarly confirmed from other Buddhist literature.

(JRAS, 1901)

A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE EARLY HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

H. Jacobi

(Tr. V. A. Sukthankar[1])

The Indians have no historical tradition regarding the origin of their six philosophical systems; the general belief that they are very ancient has been most effectively strengthened, if not occasioned, by the circumstance that their originators, who are believed to be the authors of the *Sūtras*, are called Ṛṣis, i.e., "Seers of olden days". Being free from such prejudices, philosophical research has arrived, on the ground of general considerations, at a relative chronology of the six systems, or rather, of three pairs of systems, as each two of them have always been closely allied with each other. The two *Mīmāṃsās*, as regards their contents, are closely associated with the Revelation; their followers are the Vedic theologians, the representatives of Śruti. Sāṅkhya and Yoga hold the later religious ideal; asceticism and contemplation instead of sacrifice; their followers are representatives of the Smṛti.[2] Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya do not stand in an intimate relation to any strata of the older literature, neither the Revelation nor the Tradition. They form the Philosophy of the learned man of the world, the Paṇḍit.[3] Thus three chief directions of Philosophy get clearly marked, each of which has for its representa-

1. The translator is a former pupil of Prof. Jacobi.
2. This assertion will be proved more thoroughly in the course of this Essay. For the present it should be remmebered that in works which are religious but do not belong to the *Veda*, such as the Purāṇas, the Sāṅkhya ideas constitute the philosophical back-ground.
3. The oldest work of a non-religious character which has the doctrines of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya for its philosophical basis is the *Caraksaṃhitā*; for Vaiśeṣika see. 1. 1. 43 ff.; for Nyāya see III. 8. 24 ff.

tive, one of the classes of the Brahman community. The first draws its concepts and ideas from the Revelation ; the second propounds a rational scheme of the world through bold speculation ; and the third tries to bring it into systematic coherence through the examination of the facts of experience. As Śruti, Smṛti and Śāstra are the three successive stages of the development of the Indian spiritual life, the chief philosophical schools belonging to each of them, stand also in a similar relation of time to each other.

This much can be gathered from general considerations with a fair degree of certainty. Recently, however, we have acquired a positive starting point for constructing the history of Indian philosophy, and to expound it is the object of these lines. It is found in *Kauṭilyam*, a treatise on state-craft by Kauṭilya or Viṣṇugupta, which has very lately become accessible.[4] The author is best known by the name of Cāṇakya ; he was the first Imperial Chancellor of the Mauryas, and overthrew the last of the Nanda Princes and helped Candragupta, the CANAPAKOTTOC of the Greeks, to the throne, as he himself says in the last verse of his work :—

Yena śāstraṃ ca śastraṃ ca Nandarājagatā ca bhūḥ /
amarṣeno 'ddhṛtāny āśu tena śāstram idaṃ kṛtam //

Thus the composition of the *Kauṭilyam* must be placed about 300 B. C., so long as no proof is brought forward to show that it is old forgery.[5]

4. The *Artha-Śāstra* of Kauṭilya, edited by R. Shama Sastri, Mysore, 1909. Cf. the valuable contribution by Von Alfred Hillebrandt ; On the *Kauṭilya-Sāstra* and Allied Subjects in the 86th Annual Report of the Schlesischen GeseHschaft for Vaterlandische Kultur ; and J. Hertel, *Literary Matters from the Kautiliya Sastra, WZKM.*, 24 p. 416 ff.
5. Hillebrandt has identified the quotations and references in Classical Literature (*Loc. cit.*, p. 4 H.) To these evidences of the genuineness of the work may be added, as we shall immediately see, those from the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana of the 4th or 5th Century A.D. Further indications will be given in the course of this essay.

Kauṭilya treats in the first Adhikaraṇa (Vidyāsamuddeśa) of the four branches of learning (Vidyās) :— 1. Ānvīṣikī, Philosophy ; 2. Trayī, Theology ; 3. Vārttā, Science of Industries, and 4. Daṇḍanīti, State-craft. The second Adhyāya gives the views of different authorities regarding the number of the Vidyās (the Mānavas accept three (2-4), the Bārhaspatyas two (3 & 4), the Auśanasas only one (4), and then explains that under Philosophy are to be understood Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata *(Sāṃkhyaṃ Yogo Lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī).*

Then the text continues :

dharmādharmau trayyām, arthānarthau vārttāyāṃ nayānayau daṇḍanītyāṃ balābale caitāsāṃ hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyo-'pakaroti vyasane' bhyudaye ca buddhim avasthāpayati, prajñāvākyakriyā-vaiśāradyaṃ ca karoti :

pradīpas sacvavidyānām upāyas sarvakarmaṇām /
āśrayas sarvadharmāṇāṃ śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā //

"In as much as philosophy examines (religious) merit and demerit in Theology, profit and loss in the Science of Industries, right and wrong policies in State-craft, and also discusses, with reasons, the relative importance of these (three sciences), it serves mankind, gives correct insight into prosperity and adversity and lends sharpness of intellect and cleverness in business and speech :—

Philosophy has always been considered to be the lamp of all the sciences, a means of performing all the works, and the support of all the duties".

According to Kauṭilya the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical demonstration ; in his judgement these conditions are satisfied only (*iti*) by Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata.

Now it will be of interest to place by the side of the above remark of Kauṭilya concerning the essence of *ānvīkṣikī*, Vātsyāyana's exposition of the same subject as given in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (I. 1, 1). I shall give here the passage, together with a few comments by Uddyotakara (6th century

A.D.) on the same in his *Vārttika.*[6] The occasion for the exposition of this subject in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* is the question why in the *Nyāya-sūtra* sixteen categories, *pramāṇa prameya, saṃśaya,* etc., should be introduced when *saṃśaya* and the rest are included in the first two, viz. :—"the means of knowledge" and the "right knowledge". Vātsyāyana admits it and then continues : "But these (i.e., the well-known) sciences, of which this philosophy or the science of Nyāya is one,[7] are taught for the benefit of men, or so far as each of them has its special subject". On this Uddyotakara comments : "These sciences are four in number and each has its separate subjects ; those of Theology are *agnihotra,* sacrifices, etc ; those of the Science of Industries are plough, cart etc. those of State-craft are Prince, Minister etc. ; Philosophy treats of "Doubt and the remaining (categories)," Vātsyāyana continues after the passage just translated : *tasyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ saṃśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ ; teṣām pṛthagvacanam antareṇā 'tmavidyāmātram*[8] *iyaṃ syād, yatho 'paniṣadaḥ.* "Its (i.e., of philosophy) special subjects are the categories '*Doubt*' etc. If these are not taught separately it would be nothing more than a doctrine of Ātman (or redemption) like the *Upaniṣads*''. Uddyotakara says : *tasyāḥ saṃsayādiprasthānam antareṇā 'tmavīdyāmātrem iyaṃ syāt, tataḥ kiṃ syāt ? adhyātmavidyāmātratvād, Upaniṣadvidyāvat trayyām evā 'ntarbhāva iti. catuṣṭvaṃ nivarteta.* Without these special subjects "Doubts", etc., "it (philosophy) would be nothing more than a doctrine of the Ātman, like the *Upaniṣads.* What would that come to ? It would then be, like the doctrine of *Upaniṣads,*

6. *Bibl. Ind.,* p. 13.
7. *Caturthī* is to be understood in the sense of the Indian Grammar (*Pāṇini,* V. 2, 48) as *Purāṇa,* and not to determine the order of enumeration ; because, according to Kauṭilya, the Ānvīkṣikī stands in the first place, and Vātsyāyana, as we shall see, follows Kauṭilya. Hence *Caturthī* means here the Vidyā which completes the number four.
8. Some MSS. read *adhyātmavidyā.* Both words are used synonymously ; cf. the next passages from the *Vārttika.*

included in Theology, as it would be nothing more than a doctrine of redemption; and the number of *Vidyās* would not be four." A few lines after the passage we have discussed, Vātsyāyana defines the Ānvīkṣikī in this way: "The examination of a subject by means of the right means of knowledge is called demonstration (*nyāyas*). The inference depends upon sense-perception and communication; it is reflection (*anvīkṣā*), i.e., subsequent knowledge obtained from what one has already learnt through perception and communication; the Ānvīkṣikī has to do with this reflection and is thus the science of demonstration, the *Nyāya-śastra*". And Vātsyāyana concludes the *Bhāṣya* in the following way: "This our Philosophy arranged according to "categories", "means of knowledge", etc. is praised by (Kauṭilya in the Adhyāya)[9] Vidyoddeśa" as a lamp of all the sciences, a means of performing all the works, and the support of all the duties. One has to ascertain in the case of the different sciences wherein the knowledge of truth that is said to lead to the proposed goal lies. But here in this science of redemption (*Adhyātma Vidyā*) the knowledge of truth refers to the soul, etc. (1. 1. 9) and the attainment of the highest goal is the acquisition of salvation."

In this exposition of Vātsyāyana, there are three points which are of importance for our investigation: (1) The statement of Kauṭilya that there are *four* sciences, not more and not less, has acquired unquestioned currency; the views which disagreed with his and were mentioned by him seem to have been definitely set aside.

(2) Vātsyāyana makes the claim for the Nyāya Philosophy to be the true *Anvīkṣikī* in the sense which Kauṭilya gives to it.

9. In another place also Vātsyāyana shows his indebtedness to *Kauṭiliyam*. At the end of his Bhāṣya on I. 1. 4. he says: *paramatam apratiṣiddham anumatam iti tantrayuktiḥ*. The last *adhyāya* of *Kauṭilyam* discusses the 33 "Rules of Me hod" (*tantrayuktayaḥ*) after which the chapter is named. The 19th *tantrayukti* reads: *paravākyam apratiṣidcham anumatam* (*qui tacet consentire videtur*), hence Vātsyāyana has borrowed this maxium.

(3) He expressly designates it as an *Adhyātma Vidyā*, i.e., as a Philosophy which recognises the *ātman* and would help it to its redemption.

Now as regards the second point, the claim of the Nyāya Philosophy to be the true Ānvīkṣikī is, as a fact, matter of thoroughly justified, as it, together with the Vaiśeṣika, fulfils the conditions demanded by Kauṭilya in a higher degree than other philosophical systems. And this is recognised also by others. The commentator to Kāmandaki's *Nītisāra* 2, 7 (*ānvīkṣiky ātmavijñānam*) says that *Ānvīkṣikī* is *anumānavidyā Nyāyadarśanavaiśeṣikādikā* ; and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī explains *ānvīkṣikī* to be Nyāya (*Nyāya ānvīkṣikī pañcādhyāyī Gautamena praṇītā*). All the more it is therefore of importance that Kauṭilaya does not mention by name Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, while enumerating the systems recognized by him as *Ānvīkṣikī.* From this we can draw the inference with certainty that at his time i.e., 300 B.C., Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika had not yet received the recognition as philosophical systems, not to speak of the existence of the *sūtras* of Gautama[10] and Kaṇāda in the form in which they are now bcfore us.

In his enumeration of the philosophical systems recognised by him as Ānvīkṣikī Kauṭilya mentions after Saṃkhya and Yoga and Lokāyata (Sāṃkhyaṃ Yogo Lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī). The Lokāyata system is known to us only from references to it in Brahmanical, Buddhistic and Jaina

10. Gautama is, of course, not the founder of the Nyāya system, but he only helped one school of the Naiyāyikas to obtain general recognition. Thus Vātsyāyana mentions in I, 1. 32 that some Naiyāyikas maintain that the inference consisted of ten parts instead of five as taught in the *sūtra.* Perhaps also the true explanation of the three kinds of inference, which Vātsyāyana gives in I. 1. 5. did not arise for the first time after the composition of the *sūtra* but had existed before. It is worth noticing that Caraka, III, 8, 24 ff. gives for the use of physicians a short of compendium of Nyāya which in part entirely agrees with our Nyāya ; but in details differs considerably from it. Have we perhaps here to trace a collateral school of Nyāya which existed by the side of that of Gautama ?

Philosophies, all of which are agreed in their abhorrence of this infided philosophy. Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* devotes the first chapter to it and calls its founder, Cārvāka as *nāstika-śiromaṇi*, "an arch-heretic". The Lokāyata doctrine is a gross materialism :—The senses alone give correct knowledge, the material things alone (the four elements, Earth, Water, Fire, and Wind) are real ; there is no immaterial soul but the spirit arises from a certain mixture of these elements just as the intoxicating effect of a drink is produced by the fermenting ingredients of the same ; the Vedas are a fraud just as everything they teach. These are the fundamental principles of the system and on this point all the records are in complete agreement.

Now it is difficult to believe that Kauṭilya, who acknowledge the entire social order founded on the Vedas, meant this grossly materialistic system by that Lokāyata which he puts on the same line together with Sāṃkhya and Yoga as a representative of *Ānvīkṣikī*. And still there is no doubt about it, because the Lokāyata doctrine is ascribed to Bṛhaspati, the teacher of the gods, and many of the verses handed down to us are put in his mouth. There was also a *Nīti-śāstra* which was likewise ascribed to Bṛhaspati. Kauṭilya refers to his teaching in the second *adhyāya* : *vārttā daṇḍanītiṣ ceti Bārhaspatyāḥ* ; *samvaraṇamātraṃ hi trayī lokayātrāvida iti.* "The followers of Bṛhaspati recognise only two sciences ; the science of Industries and the science of State-craft, while Theology is seen to be only a fraud[11] by him who understands life." Here we have evidently to do with the same repudiator of the Revelation

11. Here *samvaraṇa* must have the same meaning as the Mahayanistic *saṃvṛti* which corresponds to Māyā of the Vedāntins. It will be to the purpose to compare the saying (*ābhāṇaka*) quoted by Mādhava (*loc. cit.* p. 2) *agnihotraṃ trayo vedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīvike'ti Bṛhaspatiḥ.* This verse has been quoted in *Prabodhacandrodaya* II., 26 - Kauṭilya mentions the Bārhaspatyas several times, e.g., pp. 29. 63, 177, 192. The *Nīti*-teachings of Bṛhaspati which Draupadī expounds in *Mahābhārata* III. 32, are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish !

as is known to be the founder of this materialism. And that this Bṛhaspati was known to be the teacher of gods can be seen from the fact that a School,[12] which was rival to the Bārhaspatyas, that of the Auśanasas, is traced back to Uśanas, i.e., Śukra or Kavya Uśanas, the teacher of the Asuras. The Bārhaspatyas were not merely a school of philosophy but also a school of Smṛti, like the Mānavas the Pārāśaras and Auśanasas, whom also Kauṭilya mentions.

We thus understand how he comes to place the Lokāyata in the same line with Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Because these systems are also considered to be Smṛtis, Śaṃkara expressly designates them as Smṛtis in *Brahma-Sūtra*, II I, 1-3 and Bādarāyaṇa was of the same view, as can be seen from the wording of the *sūtras*,[13] even though he mentions only the Yoga by name.[14] That the old Sāṃkhya had the character of Smṛti is seen also from its method of teaching, of which it was so characteristic to expound its principles through similes and parables, that the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra*, which is certainly a pretty modern work, devotes to them the whole of its fourth chapter, the *Ākhyāikādhyāya*.

12. The notorious *Śukranīti*, from which ones G. Oppert proved that the ancient Indians possessed guns, is certainly a latter fabrication.
13. *Smṛty-anavakāśa-doṣaprasaṅga iti cen na 'nyasmṛty-anavakāśa doṣaprasaṅgāt (1) : itareṣāṃ ca'nupalabdheḥ (2) ; etena yogaḥ pratyuktaḥ (3).*
14. He did not need to mention the Sāṃkhya as the whole of the first Adhyāya in its polemical part is directed against it. Thibaut explains (SBE., Vol. XXXIV, p. VI): "It is perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire 1st Adhyāya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sūtrakāra, to guard his doctrine against Sāṃkhya attacks." Only on the supposition can the beginning of the 2nd Adhyāya be understood :—in the 1st Adhyāya the attempts of the Sāṃkhyas to interpret individual passages from the Scriptures as a proof of their teachings, were rejected. The first *Sūtra* of the 2nd Adhyāya rejects the claim of the Sāṃkhya to be considered authoritative as Smṛti, and the 2nd Sūtra says that the rest of its teachings found no support in the Holy Scriptures.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa similarly testifies that the *Ākhyāyikās* were an integral part of the old Sāṃkhya ; Kārikā 72 runs :

saptatyām kila ye 'rthās te'rthāḥ kṛtsnasya ṣaṣṭitantrasya /
ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ paravādavivarjitāś cāpi //

Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Lokāyata thus belong to the same stratum of ancient Indian Literature and hence Kauṭilya could mention them together. We know, indeed, that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are two ancient systems—*sanātane dve* (*mate*), the *Mahābhārata* says of them, XII, 349, 72—nevertheless the positive testimony of Kauṭilya is not to be underestimated. We now know for certain that Sāṃkhya and Yoga existed at least 300 B.C. and indeed as philosophical systems which were based on logical demonstration (*ānvīkṣikī*), and not only in the form of intuitive speculation, as the so-called "Epic Sāṃkhya" which is only a popularised variety of the real Sāṃkhya.[15]

All the same we cannot assert that the Sāṃkhya and Yoga of Kauṭilya's time are identical in the details of their teaching with these systems as they are known to us in the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* and the *Yoga Sūtra.* These are rather the last stages of their development and as there intervened between the beginning and the end of this development from seven to eight centuries, if not more, changes in detail cannot but occur, as indeed we can see from the fact that the teachings characteristic of Sāṃkhya and Yoga (*pratitantrasidahānta*) as explained by Vātsyāyana in Nyāyadarśana I, 1. 29 do not quite correspond with our knowledge of these systems.[16]

We saw above that Kauṭilya in his enumeration of Philosophical systems passes over Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya ; this must evidently be due to their not existing at his time. He does not mention the Mīmāṃsā, because he must have considered it not as a systematic Philosophy (*Ānvīkṣikī*), but as a branch of study belonging to Theology. He does not indeed mention it expressly in his concise survey of

15, Compare W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, p. 97 ff.
16. Cf. P. Tuxen, *Yoga* : Copenhagen, 1911, p. 10. ff.

Theology (*Trayī*) in Adhyāya, 3 : "The four Vedas and the Itihāsaveda along with the six Vedāṅgas". But we may assume that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Adhvara-Mīmāṃsā) was included as a subsidiary branch of Kalpa (especially of the Śrauta Sūtras)[17] under this Vedāṅga. Kāmandaki who belongs to the school of Kauṭilya mentions the Mīmāṃsā by name.

aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyayāvistaraḥ /
dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇaṃ ca trayī 'daṃ sarvam ucyate //

One thus sees that Kauṭilya's enumeration of what belongs to Theology did not go much into details : that even the *Purāṇa* and *Dharmaśāstra* belong to it, follows from his explanation of *Itihāsa*, p. 10. Had he given a similar account of the Vedāṅgas he would certainly have mentioned the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. But whether the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta existed as a school of Philosophy is doubtful. Because the *Sūtra*, as I have shown elsewhere,[18] can scarcely be older than the 3rd Century A. D. But on the other hand it mentions a succession of teachers[19] from which we can conclude that a school of the exegesis of the *Upaniṣads* already existed in early times. This be as it may, there was for Kauṭilya no occasion to mention the Uttara Mīmāṃsā as this also must be reckoned as pertaining to Theology.

Still a few words regarding the Buddhistic Philosophy by which I here understand, of course, not the dogmatic speculations of the canon[20] but metaphysical and epistemological theorising such as the Kṣaṇikavāda or the doctrine

17. *SBE*.. XXXIV, p. XII.
18. *JAOS.*, XXXI., p. 29.
19. Deussen, *System des Vedānta*, p. 24.
20. If Kauṭilya had considered these worth his trouble to know he must have regarded them as different branches of heretical Theology. He, however, recognised the Brahmanical Theology, the *trayī*, as a *vidyā* worthy of study. Cf. Manu, XII, 95.
ya Vedabāhyāḥ śrutayo yāś ca kāś ca kudṛṣṭayaḥ
sarvās tā niṣphalāḥ pretya tamoniṣṭhā hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ

of the momentariness of existence, against which the whole Philosophy of later times had to wage a bitter war. Had this doctrine, which must have required at least as much acuteness for being maintained, as its opponetns evinced in refuting it, been in existence at the time of Kauṭilya, it is quite conceivable that he, having recognised the infidel Lokāyata as a systematic Philosophy, would not have denied the same recognition to a heretical system, if it only had deserved the name of Philosophy (*Ānvīkṣikī*). Such an inference, however, must not be drawn. Because a real statesman like Kauṭilya could easily come to terms with the theoretical unbelief of Bṛhaspati as long as there were no practical consequences to follow from it. It is not, however, reported that Bṛhaspati wanted to set aside the political and social institutions resting on Brahmanical groundwork, to maintain which was according to Kauṭilya, the highest duty of a prince. But the Buddhists and Jainas took up another standpoint with regard to this important question ; and that must have been the reason why this Brahman writer on state craft ignored their Philosophy.

We have seen that according to Kauṭilya the number of Vidyās is four. He lays great emphasis on this number. For he first puts forth the views of the three schools, which differ from him. Those of the Mānavas, Bārhaspatyas and Auśanasas, who maintain that the number of *vidyās* is respectively 3, 2 and 1 ; and he continues ; *catasra eva vidyā iti Kauṭilyaḥ, tābhir dharmārthau yad vidyāt, tad vidyānāṃ vidyātvam.* "Kauṭilya teaches that there are four Vidyās not more and not less. They are called *vidyās* because through them one learns (*vidyāt*) Dharma and Artha". From these words one can gather that he was the first, who not only taught that the number of the *vidyās* was four, but also recognized the Ānvīkṣikī as a special Vidyā. For he says about the Mānavas that they included Ānvīkṣikī in Theology.[21] It is not that they denied the Ānvīkṣikī but they did not admit it to the rank of an

21. Trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti Mānavāḥ, trayīviśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikī'ti.

independent Vidyā and hence connected it with Theology. As far as two Mīmāṃsās are concerned, they were perfectly justified in doing so. Sāṃkhya and Yoga, however, could be looked upon as different branches of Theology, because as we have seen they were considered as Smṛtis. That the Mānavas knew both these philosophical systems can be seen from the circumstance that Manu, who certainly is to be considered a later offshoot of this school, makes a considerable use of Sāṃkhya and Yoga ideas in the theoretical part of his work. Kauṭilya's innovation thus consists in the fact that he recognized Philosophy to be a science by itself, inasmuch as it has its own method of treatment. And therefore he can bring in the Lokāyata, the character of whose contents must exclude it from the Trayī. Had the conception of the Ānvīkṣikī, as Kauṭilya grasped it, been current before him, the Bārhaspatyas would have considered the number of the Vidyās not to be two (Varttā and Daṇḍanīti) as we saw above ; but would have mentioned the Ānvīkṣikī as the third Vidyā. Because they themselves were followers of Lokāyata which was recognised by Kauṭilya as the Ānvīkṣikī. Hence when we find in Gautama's Dharma Śāstra (XI. 3) the statement ; *trayyām ānvīkṣikyāṃ cābhivinītaḥ* "(The Prince) should be well schooled in Theology and Philosophy", we may presume that the passage is a later interpolation. J. Jolly classes the work with the revised Dharma Śāstra.[22] The combination referred to by Gautama : of *Trayī and Ānvīkṣikī* is not at all mentioned by Kauṭilya ; probably it arose from the efforts of an enthusiast, who was anxious to emphasise the authority of Vedas and *Brāhmaṇas* for every duty of a prince, as Gautama himself does elsewhere.[23] But all other authors recognise four Vidyās. The passage that has been translated

22. *"Recht und Sitte,"* in *Grundrisz der indoar.* Phil. p. 5.
23. If the tradition (*SBE.*, II., p. XLV) according to which Gautama is supposed to be the grandson or great-grandson of Uśnas, can be taken seriously, Gautama must have belonged to the school of the Auśanasas : but this recognized, according to Kauṭilya, only one Vidyā ; dandanītir ekā vidye 'ty Auśanasāḥ.

above from the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* shows that for Vātsyāyana the number *four* had almost canonical authority, as he bases upon it his argument to prove that the *Nyāya-Śāstra* must be called the true Ānvīkṣikī. I shall soon bring forward further early evidence to show that the view of Kauṭilya that there are four Vidyās, received general recognition. But in one point all the later writers are agreed, as opposed to Kauṭilya, viz., in demanding that the Ānvīkṣikī is at the same time Ātma-vidyā. We saw above that the author of the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* requires of the Ānvīkṣikī that it should not be merely an *Ātmavidyā*; but should have subject-matter peculiar to itself. Nevertheless he claims towards the end of the passage translated above, that the *Nyāya Śāstra* is not only the Ānvīkṣikī but also Adhyātmavidyā, a Philosophy which recognises the existence of the soul and leads it to salvation. The idea obviously is that only that Philosophy which at the same time is *Ātma Vidyā* has a claim for recognition. In this way not only was Lokāyata excluded, which Kauṭilya had recognised, but also the Buddhistic systems which probably arose as dangerous opponents of Brahmanical Philosophy only after Kauṭilya's time, in the centuries immediately before and after the beginning of our era. In order to defend itself, the Brahmanical Philosophy assumed the roll of *Jñānamārga*, "the way of Salvation depending upon Philosophical knowledge." This means exactly the same as the demand that the Philosophy should also be an *Ātma Vidyā*. It shows that in the authoritative circles of Brahman society a decided movement had started in favour of exclusively orthodox views.

This tranformation had already taken place when Kāmandaki belonging to the school of Kauṭilya, wrote his *Nītisāra*. While discussing the four Vidyās in the second Sarga, he says:

ānvīkṣiky ātmavidyā syād īkṣaṇāt sukhaduḥkhayoḥ /
īkṣamānas tayā tattvaṃ harṣaśokau vyudasyati //

"The Philosophy must be an *Ātma Vidyā* inasmuch as

through it one understands the nature of pleasure and pain ; (the prince) realising the truth from it, overcomes exultation and grief."

Prof. C. Formichi discussed the question of the age of Kāmandaki's *Nītisāra* at the XIIth International Congress of Orientalists held at Rome ("Alcune osservazioni sull' epoca del Kāmandakīya Nītisāra," Bologna 1809)—and showed that Kāmandaki was comparatively late (a contemporary of Varāhamihira or a little older). From his arguments, which I supplement in details, the matter seems to stand as follows :—While enumerating the Ministers Kāmandaki mentions, in IV, 33 (*tādṛk samvatsaro 'py asya jyotiḥśāstrārthacintakaḥ praśnābhidhānakuśalo horāgaṇitatattvavit*). The astrologer after the Purohita, whereas Kauṭilya concludes his remarks regarding the Ministers with the latter without referring to the astrologer and does not all mention the *Mauhūrtika* along with the ministers, but places him in the same rank with the Physician and the head-cook (p. 38). During the interval between Kauṭilya and Kāmandaki Greek astrology (*Hora*) came in vogue and the astrologer came to stand high in the esteem of kings as the "Great Seer Garga" testifies [24]

Kṛtsāṅgopāṅgakuśalaṃ horāgaṇitanaiṣṭhikam /
yo na pūjayate rājā sa nāśam upagacchati /
yas tu samyag vijānāti horāgaṇitasaṃhitāḥ /
abhyarcyaḥ sa narendrena svīkartavyo jayaiṣiṇā //

According to this, Kāmandaki must have lived at the earliest in the 3rd or 4th century A.D. The date so determined explains also the fact, that the proof given by Kāmandaki for the existence of the Soul, I. 20 agrees in general with Nyāya Darśana I, 1. 10 and Vaiśeṣika Darśana, III, 2, 1, and his proof for the existence of the 'inner sense' (Manas) I, 30 agrees almost literally with Nyāya Darśana, I. 1, 60 (cf. Vaiśeṣika Darśana, III, 2, 1). For, as I have shown elsewhere,[25] the Nyāya Darśana in the

24. *Bṛhatsaṃhitā adhy.* 2.
25. *JAOS.*, XXXI, p. 9 ff.

form in which it is now before us, cannot well be placed earlier than the 3rd Century A. D. But it may be pointed out that Kāmandaki combines these Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika ideas with those that are borrowed from Sāṃkhya and Yoga (I. 28, 30b to 35), and thus he prepares an eclectic philosophy *in usum delphini.* On the other hand Kauṭilya attaches importance to philosophy in so far as it exercises the princes to logical thinking ; and the contents of the system do not seem to him to matter much, as he recognises even the infidel Lokāyata along with Sāṃkhya and Yoga. This clearly indicates a great difference in point of view between Kauṭilya and his later follower Kāmandaki.

An older witness is Manu. According to Kauṭily the Mānavas recognised only three Sciences, because they included Philosophy in Theology (*trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś* e*eti mānavāḥ* ; *trayīviśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti*). Hence one may expect Manu to recognise only three Vidyās ; but he mentions *four,* just like Kauṭilya, because he, like the latter, separates Philosophy from Theology ; however he demands that the Ānvīkṣikī shall be an *ātmavidyā* (VIII, 43).

traividyebhyas trayīṃ vidyād daṇḍanitiṃ ca śāśvatīm /
ānvikṣikīṃ cātmavidyāṃ vārttārambhāṃśca lokataḥ //

"(The king should lean) from Brahmans well-versed in Vedas, Theology, the everlasting State-craft and Philosophy which teaches the nature of the Soul and learn the works taught in the Science of Industries from People who understand it." We thus find the same views in Manu as in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and in Kāmandaki. They based their teachings on Kauṭilya modifying the latter to suit the orthodox tendencies of the time which set in after Kauṭilya probably after the dissolution of the system of Government introduced by the heretic Emperor, Aśoka. That the account of Philosophy as we find it in *Kauṭilīyam* could not hold good a few generations after the life-time of Cāṇakya speaks for the genuineness of its text that has come down to us.

I may recapitulate the results of our investigation by

saying that the Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata already existed in the 4th Century B. C. whereas Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and probably the Buddhistic Philosophy also came later into existence.

(IA, 1918)

LOKĀYATA

H. P. Sastri

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series in 1858 under the editorship of Pandit Isvar Chandra Vidyasagara. The first chapter of this work contained an account of the Cārvāka Darśana—a System of Philosophy, which believed neither in God nor in a future existence. But the most attractive feature of this account was the bold speculations of the System and the sarcastic tone it assumed against the cherished doctrines of Hindu Orthodoxy. Those were days of translations from Sanskrit into Bengali and the translation of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was undertaken by the most learned man of the time, Pandit Jayanarayana Tarkapancanana, the Professor of Hindu Philosophy in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. But that conscientious scholar soon found that the task was beyond him. He translated the Cārvāka Darśana all right. But the next Darśana the Buddhist and the Arhata proved a stumbling block to him and he gave the work up in despair. But there was a bolder spirit among his pupils. This was Pandit Mahes Candra Nyayaratna then about thirty years of age. He boldly translated the whole work, and issued it in his own name, his Guru writing a foreword on the translation, which gave Mahes Candra a name, and I should say, a fortune.

This book early attracted my attention and I read not only the Bengali but also the Sanskrit. The versified portion of the account of the Cārvākas I soon made my own. Cruriosity impelled me to look to other references to the Cārvākas and I got one in the Seventeenth Canto of the *Naiṣadhacarita*—a work which was very popular in those days. The tone of sarcasm was more bitter, but there was no new information. References were found in the *Rāmāyaṇa*,

in the *Mahābhārata* and in the Kāvyas and Nāṭakas, but the information about the doctrines was very meagre.

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* was written by Mādhavācāryya in the second half of the fourteenth century, and the *Naiṣadha*, according to the Bombay editor in the end of the twelfth century. But the late lamented Pandit Vindhyesvari Prasad Dube, in his Chronology of Nyāya works says that Hira Pandit, the father of the author of *Naiṣadha* was a contemporary and a rival of Udayana early in the eleventh century. The Cārvāka Darśana when it is mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇā* and the *Mahābhārata* must be older than them, and I began my search anew, and the result of the research is given below.

One of the Six Heretical Teachers who were either older than or contemporary of Buddha was Ajitakeśakambali. He held a doctrine which was rank Materialism. He said that there were four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, a combination of these in certain proportions and under certain circumstances produced vitality, and at death earth went to earth, water to water, fire to fire, air to air and and that vitality was gone. Just as, certain ingredients coming together produces the power of intoxication, so the elements came together and produced what is life. Life beyond this is a myth. This body is *ātman*. *Ātman* is nothing beyond this body. Ajitakeśakambali is regarded in some quarters as Cārvāka. But I suspend my judgment for the present until I have exhausted my references in Buddhist and Jaina literature,—the store-houses of information about the most productive period of Indian Thought.

Ajitakeśakambali must have lived either in the end of the seventh or the beginning of the sixth century B. C. according as we take the date of Buddha's *nirvāṇa* in 543 or 483 B.C.

Kauṭilya in the fourth century B.C. speaks of the Lokāyatikas only once in his work; but the connection in which he speaks of them seems to indicate that they had a system like that of the Saṃkhya and Yoga.

In the second century B. C. Patañjali speaks of the Lokāyatas and of Bhāguri as their *Vārttika* or supporter.

In the second century A.D. Vātsyāyana in his *Kamaśāstra* quotes a number of Lokāyata *sūtras* and refutes them. These *sūtras* relate to the desirability or otherwise of the study of Dharmaśāstras. The Lokāyata who believes neither in Dharma nor in Adharma says :

1. Religious rites should not be practised.
2. because their fruition depends upon the future.
3. and is doubtful.
4. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away what belongs to him to others ?
5. A pigeon to-day is better than a peacock tomorrow.
6. A sure *kauḍi* is better than a doubtful gold coin. So says the Lokāyata. These six seem to be genuine aphorisms from the Lokayāta Sūtras.

In the *eighth* century, Haribhadra Sūri, a voluminous writer of the Jainas, writes six verses in his *Ṣaḍdaraśana-samuccaya* noting the fact that the Lokāyatas regard earthly enjoyments as the highest aim of human life. But his commentator, Guṇaratna, gives us a quotation from Vācaspati, which may be synonymous with Vṛhaspati—*Pṛthivyap-tejo vāyuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye śarīraviṣayendriyasaṃjñās tebhyaś caitanyam.*

The ordinary derivation of the word Cārvāka is *cāru* and vāk, charming, alluring, entertaining speech. But the commentator gives another and more attractive derivation. He says that the word is derived from *carva*, chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating, swallowing Virtue and Vice. Those who take no notice of virtue and vice are Cārvākas. He also says that Bṛhaspati is the author of their doctrine and so they are called *Bārhaspatyaḥ.*

From the statements of the commentator, Guṇaratna, it appears that there were Lokāyatikas even in his time, the end of the fifteenth century A.D. that they were given to eating and drinking and that they indulged in all sorts

of sensual excesses; that they were Kāpālikas besmeared with dust, they were Yogins belonging to all castes.

In a work entitled, *Sarvasiddhānta-saṃgraha* attributed to Śaṃkarācāryya in the early part of the ninth century, it is stated that Vārhaspatya, Ārhata and Buddha are non-Vedic systems of Philosophy. The well-known verse *agnihotraṃ trayo vedāḥ* etc. Śaṃkara attributes to Bṛhaspati and he says that the Lokāyatas do not believe in the blessings of the future existence, but only in such blessings, as Agriculture, Commerce, Dairy farming, and *Daṇḍanīti*, which produce tangible results in this world. This is what Kauṭilya also says about the followers of Vṛhaspati, the author of an ancient *Arthaśāstra* before him, who he says believed only in Vārtā (Economics) and Daṇḍanīti (Coersion).

There is another work on the History of Indian Philosophy entitled *Sarvadarśanasamuccaya* written under the patronage of a Rajput Prince, at Delhi by Maladhārī Rājaśekhara Sūri in 1340 A.D. He gives the *ślokas* on the Lokāyatikas as found in Haribhadra's work and attempts to refute their contents.

This is all the information we can pick up from the known literature in Sanskrit. From this it is possible to give a history of the system from the seventh century B.C. to the present day. The Lokāyatas do not believe in Īśvara or in a future existence. Virtue and vice they have none. They believe in the present and not in the past nor in the future. They are Positivists. They have few doctrines to defend but a lot to assail, and in the matter of assailing, they are bold, direct and exceedingly sarcastic. Some of their sarcastic arguments are very enjoyable. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting one or two.

(1) Those who take a dip under the water of the Ganges with a view to rise up to heaven seem to be no better than sheep who in order to advance for a fight in the front always retrace their steps.

(2) If the animal immolated in a sacrifice goes to

heaven why does not the sacrificer kill his father in it and send him to heaven,—a consummation so devoutly to be wished.

(3) A Lokāyata had a very orthodox wife who always dinned into his ears that what learned men say after long deliberation cannot but be true. He said, very good, come. They went at midnight to the city gate. The broad road leading from the gate was full of dust. They made marks with three fingers on both sides imitating the foot-prints of wolves and returned home. Next morning the foot-prints frightened even the best of citizens who were afraid that wolves are frequenting the city. The man now succeeded in bringing his wife completely to his own opinion.

The orthodox Brahmans hated them with a genuine hatred. Hemādri in the 13th century says that they should be expelled from the Śraddhasabhā like dogs.

Recently Dr. F. W. Thomas has published a work entitled *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* which has been eagerly studied by all scholars interested in Indian history, Indian thought and Indian society. The school of Bṛhaspati is older than Kauṭilya who quotes their opinion. Bṛhaspati is said to have been propounder of the doctrine of the Lokāyatikas. He is also the writer of a Smṛti work. Some people think that there were three Bṛhaspatis, the economist, the philosopher and the law-giver. Of the law-giver we have a number of verses printed in the collection of Smṛti works. Of the philosopher we have two quotations. The *Sūtras* now published by Dr. Thomas, written in the form of aphoristic lectures by Bṛhaspati to his pupil, Indra, the Ruler of Heaven, in which form the Smṛti work also is written,—related to Economics. Dr. Thomas is, however, not disposed to consider these *sūtras* as genuine. He thinks there are *sūtras* which relate to things very modern. Rejecting those *sūtras* and their number is large, there is enough in the book which should be as ancient as Bṛhaspati, the economist. These ancient *sūtras* speak of the Lokāyatas with approval, nay, extol them to the skies. After enumerating

the branches of economics then known, namely, agriculture, cattle breeding and commerce, Bṛhaspati says that in the matter of acquisition of wealth Lokāyata is *the* Śāstra. Again Lokāyatikas say that the fruit of Vārtā, if not for the support of an army, soon perishes. Even in those *Sūtras* which Dr. Thomas considers spurious, we get more information about the Lokāyatikas than anywhere else. One *sūtra* says if one not believing in Orthodoxy attempts to attain a human object in the right direction, he is a Lokāyata. Another says that the Lokāyatikas hold the Dharma to be futile. It conduces to wealth (to the priests). It is like stealing irion from a lump. Agnihotra, morning and evening rites, reciting *mantras,*—everything is done for wealth. One reads the Vedas, which are full of earthly desires to hide one's own transgressions. Similarly Agnihotra is performed with the object of drinking wine and enjoying women.

But the most important piece of information the *Bṛhaspati Sūtras* give us is the close connection of the Lokāyatas with the Kāpālikas. He says for the production of wealth Lokāyata is *the* Śāstra ; at the same breath he says, for Kāma or earthly enjoyments Kāpālika is the Śāstra. At the same time he says for religious merit, Ārhata is the Śāstra. If Bṛhaspati says so he is sure to be denounced by the orthodox people as Nāstika. But that is not our present purpose,—our present purpose is the Kāpālika. These are always looked down upon by all classes of people. They are fond of cruel rites. None can forget the fierce Kāpālika bent upon woman sacrifice in Bamkim Chandra's most charming novel, *Kapālakuṇḍalā*. The scenes in that work are laid in the Bengal coast in the early seventeenth century. In the year 1092, Kṛṣṇa Miśra, in his wonderful allegorical drama the *Prabodhacandrodaya* introduces a Kāpālika and a Kāpālikī to test the character for continence of a Buddhist monk and of a Digambara Jaina friar. The pair is bent upon Kāmasādhana. Bhavabhuti speaks of a Kāpālika Aghoraghaṇṭa and a Kāpālikī, Kapālakuṇḍalā bent upon the seduction of Mālatī and upon her destruction. But the *Bṛhaspati Sūtras* tell us

that the Kāpālikas are an ancient sect, at least as ancient as the Lokāyatas, and that as the Lokāyatas with the Materialistic Philosophy made the beginning of the Science of Economics, so the Kāpālikas with what System of Philosophy we do not know, made the beginning of the science of Erotics. Bṛhaspati considers them as distinct sects, but Guṇaratna identifies the Kāpālikas with the Lokāyatikas.

The influence of the Lokāyatikas and of the Kāpālikas is still strong in India. There is a sect and a numerous one too, the followers of which believe that *deha* or the material human body is all that should be cared for, and their religious practices are concerned with the union of men and women and their success (*siddhi*) varies according to the duration of the union. These call themselves Vaiṣṇavas, but they do not believe in Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa or his incarnations. They believe in *deha*. They have another name *Sahajiā* which is the name of a sect of Buddhists which arose from Mahāyāna in the last four centuries of their existence in India. But *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* gives the idea that there are more Kāpālikas bent on Kāmasādhana than Buddhists.

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HISTORY OF MATERIALISM IN INDIA

Th. Stcherbatsky

Amidst the diverse philosophical systems which we find in India, ancient as well as modern, it is quite natural that there must have been some materialistic system too. Their main approach lies in reducing all the psychic processes to physical ones, negating the independent existence of soul, and affirming that the so-called soul is simply one of the properties of organized matter. This is philosophical materialism.

Another approach that we find in India is that of raising the practical question of the aim of human life and of the prevalence of material aims therein. Here, materialism is distinguished from all other trends by the fact that it negates the law of so-called *karma*, i.e., retribution for good or bad works. The greater abstraction of the Indian mind, as compared with other ancient civilizations is expressed in the fact that there the moral law is not embodied in the person of God, the judge, but in the form of impersonal *kārma* which may be characterized as the law of moral progress, as the faith in the fact that the world is ruled by a special mechanism directing its evolution from the forms of low and unjust to good and perfection.

This law is fully negated by the extreme Indian materialists. Nowhere, perhaps, has the spirit of negation of and resentment to the fetters of traditional morals and the religion connected thereto been expressed so clearly as among the Indian materialists. This is evidenced, for instance, by the following verses of Indian materialism.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes,—

Bṛhaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.[1]

The three authors of the Vedas were

The buffoon, the knave and the thief.[2]

All the well-known formulae of the *paṇḍita-s-jarpharī, turpharī,* etc.

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśvamedha

Those were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,

While the eating of flesh was similarly commended by night-prowling demons.[3]

There is no other hell than the mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes as thorns etc ;

The only supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight ;

And the only liberation is the dissolution of the body.[4]

According to the generally accepted system, in ancient India, the human life was regulated by three main aims : the property, love and duty. By the first were meant the various occupations giving means for life,—cultivation, cattle-breeding, trade and industry. The Government control with all its ramifications also came under this category. By the second aim was meant the family life, the children and also extra-family satisfaction of passions. What was meant by the third was mainly the religious duty, control of passions, with a view to secure award in the next life in one form or the other of eternal divinity. The normal life of man, according to the views of the orthodox Hindu,

1. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (Bibl. Ind.) p. 3. cf. *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* ii. 15. [The English translation given here are of Cowell and Gough].
2. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,* p. 6.
3. Ib. p. 6.
4. Ib. p. 4.

must have all these three aims in view. It is his duty to create family and to provide for it: this is interpreted as the service of love even to material aims. Later, having established his family, the Hindu may forsake it, become *sannyāsin*, i.e. a poor homeless wanderer, directing all his thoughts to eternal bliss.

In individual cases, however, this equilibrium among the three aims of life was destroyed in favour of one of them. The materialists, naturally, did not give any importance to the aim of religious duty and openly proclaimed the property and love as the only aims of man.

On the other hand, there were many people in India who fully renounced all property and avowed celibacy, rather complete annihilation of all desires. They formed communities of wandering poor monks. These communities sometimes became so numerous that they became a real calamity for the working population which had to support them somehow or other.

Like all other Indian teachings, Indian materialism was the speciality of a specific school, which preserved its traditions, developed its teachings and put them into practice. Its origin goes back to the hoary antiquity. As early as c.1000 B.C., in the Upaniṣads, there is a reference to the teaching which does not acknowledge anything except matter.[5] Five hundred years before Christ, about the time of Buddha, there were certain schools which did not acknowledge anything except matter, or as put at that time, the four great elements: earth, fire, water and air. There were also some who added a fifth element, ether, thinner than air, and filling the whole space.[6]

Buddhism was, on the one hand, very close to materialism, since it also negated the existence of God and eternal soul. But the two differed sharply in that Buddhism accepted the law of *karma*, i.e. retribution for good and

5. cf. H. Jacobi, Ueber das Verhaeltniss des Vedānta zum Sāṃkhya, E. Kuhn's Festschrift, p. 38.
6. F. O. Schrader, Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie, p. 53.

bad works. In all the proceedings of the initial sermon of Buddha, his hostile and sharp attitude towards all the theories which accepted the existence of soul is clearly manifest. But at the same time, it was with equal resoluteness that Buddha opposed Indian materialism which did not accept the moral law or the so-called *karma*.

Later, at a time when the Mauryas built a large and blossoming empire in Northern India, the materialists worked out a specific philosophical school. Cāṇakya, the Minister to the King Candragupta, has left a treatise on politics,[7] in which he enumerates the existing philosophical systems. There, he refers to materialism as one of the main systems which the future ruler must study.[8]

In this epoch, all the three main aims of man in life—property, love and duty—are treated scientifically. During this period, we have the practical sciences (*arthaśāstra*), the science of love (*kāmaśāstra*) and the science of religious duty (*dharmaśāstra*). Among the practical sciences, that of governing the country occupies the first place. With his teaching, Cāṇakya himself marked the beginning of a special school of politicians. Quite independently of Cāṇakya and probably at the same time, there also was the theoretician Uśanas, whose political teaching differed considerably from that of Cāṇakya. The latter was the representative, so to say, of the official political doctrine, according to which it was necessary to support religion with all force and which was convinced that the temporal power was illuminated with religious basis. Uśanas, on the other hand, did not consider it necessary to found temporal power on religious base. According to him, there is only one science and that is the science of punishment, or literally, the science of rod (*daṇḍanīti*).[9] Bṛhaspati, to whom the main schools of Indian materialists are attributed, also was first a founder of a school of politicians. But his political

7. Kauṭilya, *Arthaśāstra* ed. Shamasastri, Mysore Sanskrit Series.
8. Ib. i. 2.
9. Ib. i.

school diverged from religion still further and remained known in history as the ardent hater of religion and advocate of theoretical materialism. It was called either Bṛhaspati school after the name of its founder, or Cārvāka's school, i.e., of the materialists proper who cared for daily bread alone.[10] Another name for it is Lokāyata, that is, the people who care only about the earth and not about the heaven. No complete texts or works of this school have reached us ; however, several extracts and passages preserved in the works of other schools, enable us to form a notion of its main aspects and the methods by which they are proved. A list (as complete as possible) of the works, in which there are references to the teaching of the Cārvākas and excerpts from their works, will be given below.

Now I shall dwell on two such works in which have been found extracts from the works of Cārvākas unknown till now. The first of them is the *Nyāyamañjarī* by the well-known philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa.[11] Here the materialists have been mentioned twice. Speaking of the number of the sources of valid knowledge he refers to the first main aphorism or *sūtra* of their main work.[12] Some *sūtra*-s had already been restored from various sources by Prof. Hillebrandt.[13] It is now possible for us to restore the first one also. It reads :

athā'tas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti

Here, the word *tattva* is set against the word *dharma*, which is prominent in orthodox schools. This *sūtra* means : In our work, we shall talk of reality and not of duty. From the interpretation of this *sūtra*, it is clear that the materialists then were divided into two camps : those who

10. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, ed. Suali, p. 300.
11. *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. Gangadhara Sastri Tailanga, Benares, 1895. Vizianagram Series, Vol. viii.
12. Ib. p. 64.
13. Hillebrandt, Zur Kenntniss der indischen Materialisten, E. Kuhn's Festschrift, p. 24.

held the extreme view and fully negated consciousness and considered the human body a simple mechanism (*jaḍa*) without any consciousness, and those who were moderate in their views and acknowledged its existence but only in the form of special function of the body. Jayanta calls the former Sophists (*dhūrta*). It is the latter whom he calls the real scholars.[14] And in fact, the discussions of the former appear to be of sophistic nature.

The fact (*tattva*) mentioned in the first *sūtra* cannot be either calculated or classified. Also, even the methods of its cognition cannot be found out, and all the attempts made in this connection proved futile. Thus, for instance, sitting in a dark room, we nevertheless know that there are fingers on our hands and that there is distance between them. We could not have known it by sight because it is dark. We did not know it by sense of touch too, for the skin is the organ of sense of touch and it cannot touch itself. We also cannot know it even from inference. Hence, it is proved by this method that all the accepted teachings about the sources of valid knowledge do not withstand criticism. Once it is seen that the cognition cannot be determined, it follows herefrom that it does not exist and that the processes however conscious, are in reality, mechanical phenomena *(jaḍa)*.[15]

Jayanta distinguishes the highly educated materialists from these materialists-sophists. They claimed as follows : "There is undoubtedly a sole conscious element, localized in the whole living body. We also allow that this consciousness is subject to synthesis and other mental processes. One would hardly argue against this ; but that this continues to exist after death cannot be proved. The consciousness, leaving one body, naturally cannot settle in another. Had this been possible, we would have remembered about those things which we did in our previous births, exactly in the same manner as in this birth, we remember about things

14. *suśikṣita*, cf. op. cit. p. 467.
15. Ib. p. 64.

done in the childhood. We cannot show any reason why the same eternal soul, living now in one and sometimes in another body, has different memory : it remembers what it undergoes in one body and does not what it does in the other bodies. Having been convinced, therefore, that there is no soul after the death of the body it is necessary to do away with any talk of future life, which is traced back to the theory of eternal soul, and to try to live happily, according to the principle :

> "So long as we live, we shall be happy !
> There is none here who will not die ;
> When he dies and is turned to ashes,—
> From where is he to appear again ?"

Another extract, to which we would like to draw attention, occurs in the work of Vācaspatimiśra, in his interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.39.[16] The school of Indian realists supposes that matter consists of particles moving in and combining in the body. Like Aristotle, they assume that the natural motion of all particles is rotatory (*parispanda*). The conscious motion (*kriyā*), i.e. the following up and achievement of aims, is under the influence of impulse from the side of psychic elements. This impulse was represented in semi-anthropomorphic features. The main argument of the materialists was that a conscious act could be fully explained by the motion of particles of matter. The difference between the two motions is only superfluous. Just as the different material elements, connected with each other, may form such a substance as alcohol which does not resemble the substances of which it is made, in the same manner the different material elements, connected in the living body, develop a new quality, a conscious act, which is not similar to them.

But to this, the Naiyāyikas raise the following objection : In a drink, each particle has alcohol whereas in case of

16. *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-tīkā*, Vācaspati Miśra, ed. Gangadhara Sastri Tailanga, Viz. Series, Vol. xiii, p. 400ff.

material elements of the body, each one individually does not have consciousness. Any property of the matter, as for instance weight, must be wherever matter is. If the consciousness and the will were also the qualities of matter, they would then have been everywhere where there was matter. However, we do not see this, for instance, in a pot and similar objects. One cannot, therefore, contend that consciousness and will appertain to matter.

The materialist objects thus :[17] Consciousness and will are not at all such properties as belong to matter in general, as for instance weight. They belong to it only in known combinations. Just as the seed *kiṇva*, mashed and fermented, gives us alcohol, exactly in the same manner, the elements of matter, having formed a body, may be converted into a kind of consciously moving objects.

To this the Naiyāyikas reply[18] that every particle of alcohol, taken individually, has intoxicating effect. This power is not inherent in the known organized whole consisting of parts. Similarly, even the parts of the body would have to think, each taken separately. One cannot affirm arbitrarily that matter thinks as a whole but does not think in parts of the body. It is possible to separate out three or four members, and the thought will continue to work. If it be assumed that thinking is inherent in parts of a body, a whole series of thinkers would have to be there in one body.

"Let it be so", replies the materialist ;[19] "this does not contradict my principle."

"No", the Naiyāyika replies. We see that different people, if they are self-dependent, have different aims and all of them cannot do one work together, for there is no such law that many people accidentally should have one aim and would do one work. Besides, in case of one person, in one body, the separate thoughts are in agreement among

17. Ib. p. 400, line 14.
18. Ib. p. 400. line 17,
19. Ib. p. 400, line 21.

themselves ; this is not the case with different bodies. This can be explained only by the fact that in one body, there is only one organ of thought. After the sensual sensation and its object change, there remains, nevertheless, their cognition in memory and we have a right to conclude that the cognition is not a property of either the organ of feelings or its object. Exactly, in the same manner, although the body changes, as evidenced by changing age—infancy, youth and old age—nevertheless the same memory remains.

Therefore, one cannot affirm that consciousness is a property of body. Besides, speaking of conscious motion, we have in view not merely a motion which is possessed by all particles of matter, but a conscious attainment of aim, achievement of what is desired and avoiding of what is not desired. The materialist, not paying any attention to this difference, founds his thesis on motion, in general, and not on the fact of motion towards aim.

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SOME PROBLEMS OF SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY AND SĀMKHYA LITERATURE

Kalipada Bhattacharya

The subject has been copiously dealt with by the eminent scholars but none of the views offered by them may be accepted as conclusive.

The problems of Sāṅkhya Philosophy are closely connected with those of its literature—so much so, that no treatment of one is possible without the other. For the sake of convenience I am taking up the question of the Sāṅkhya literature first.

The difficulty presents itself mainly with regard to its chronology. That the *Sāṇkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, otherwise known as *Sāṇkhya-saptati* and *Kanaha-saptati*, *Suvarṇa-saptati* or *Hiraṇya-saptati* in its Chinese version, is the earliest available as well as the most popular text-book of the Sāṇkhya school, is beyond any question. It has been commented upon by Gauḍapādācārya (7th century A.D.) and Vācaspati Miśra (9th century A.D.), of whose age and identity there is no contention. But it has got two other well-known commentaries, viz. the *Māṭhara Vṛtti* by *Māṭharācārya* and *Jayamaṅgalā* by Śaṅkarācārya. According to Prof. Gopi Nath Kaviraj the colophon wherein the name Śaṅkarācārya occurs is an interpolation and Śaṅkarācārya is a misnomer for 'Śaṅkarārya', a man of unknown age and identity. Leaving aside, therefore, the question of this last-named commentator for discussion, I may venture to propose that the *Māṭhara-vṛtti* is the earliest known commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, as handed down to us. Prof. Sylvain Levi informs us from Chinese sources that there were three learned men at the court of Kaniṣka[1] in the 2nd century A.D. Thus

1. JBORS., 1923.

Aśvaghoṣa was his Guru, Māṭhara his prime minister and Caraka his chief physician. If that be so, then it is quite plausible to seek an identification of the Vṛttikāra 'Māṭhara', with the prime minister Māṭhara of Kaniṣka, and this identification seems to be somewhat justified when we see that Caraka with whom Māṭhara is said to be contemporaneous, gives a clear exposition of the Sāṅkhya system in his *Śārīra-sthāna.*[2] Not only this : Aśvaghoṣa also in his *Buddha-carita* eulogises and enunciates the Sāṅkhya Philosophy through the mouth of a Sāṅkhya teacher named 'Ārāḍa'.[3] These three learned men, of whom one is an expounder of Śaṅkhya and another its great admirer, flourished at the same court and at one and the same time. It is not possible, therefore, that the third man Māṭhara was no other person but the Vṛttikāra, Māṭhara, himself ? It may be contended, however, that 'Māṭhra' is but a Gotra-name, and not the name of any person, and hence any conclusion of the basis of a Gotra-name would be unjustifiable. In reply it may be said that like Caraka of the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, Māṭhara may be taken as the author of the *Māṭhara-vṛtti,* because the existencc of another Māṭhara is not yet established.

Now this Māṭharācārya refers more than a dozen times to Īśvarakṛṣṇa as 'Bhagavān'. An authority takes a long time before he receives a venerable appellation like 'Bhagavān' from his successors. A century may be taken but the lowest limit. Admitting, therefore, that Maṭhara belonged to the 2nd century A.D. Īśvara-kṛṣṇa can in no way be placed later than the 1st century A.D.[4] ......I proceed to

2. Canto XII.
3. *Buddha-carita* XII. 33
4. Mm. H. P. Shastri—5th C. A. D.
Dr. Keith—4th C. A. D.
Dr. B. Bhattacharya—4th C. A. D.
Prof. Radhakrishnan—3rd C. A. D.
Dr. Belvalkar—2nd C. A. D.
Dr. S. N. Das Gupta—200 A. D.

offer now another evidence by which my previous statement will be corroborated.

That Īśvara-kṛṣṇa received the doctrines of Sāṅkhya by way of succession of disciples, is narrated by himself in *Kārikā* 71. The hierarchy of teachers, however, is given in verse 69 as Muni (i.e., Kapila), Āsuri and Pañcaśikha according to succession. In the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*, however, a succession of Sāṅkhya teachers is mentioned :

Kapilād āsuriṇā .....tataḥ pañcaśikhena tasmād bhārga-volūka vālmīkihārita devalaprabhṛtinā gatam. tatas tebhya iśvarakṛṣṇena prāptam.

Thus altogether we get 8 names. But the word *prabhṛtinā* indicates that there must have been some other teachers anterior to him. Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on verse 71 adds two other teachers 'Garga' and 'Gautama'. Guṇaratna, the famous commentator of *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* by Haribhadra Sūri, while enumerating several authoritative works on the Sāṇkhya philosophy, names among others one *Ātreya-Tantra*, presumably a work of Atri. The number of teachers so far arrived at is 11. Gauḍapāda, in his commenṭary, quotes the *Ṛṣitarpaṇa-Mantra*, a list of Sāṇkhya teachers, though not in a chronological order. Cf. :—*sanakaś'ca sanandaś ca tṛtīyaś ca sanātanaḥ/ āsuriḥ Kapilaś caiva voḍhaḥ pañcaśikhas tathā//.* The number thus increases from 11 to 15 by addition of the names of Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana and Boḍha, who are all mentioned in association with Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha the well-known authorities of Sāṅkhya, whose historicity of personage has never been doubted.

In the *Atharva-veda-pariśiṣṭa*, however, the *Ṛṣitarpaṇa-Mantra* reads thus : *sanakas tṛpyatu sanandanas tṛpyatu sanātanas tṛpyatu kapilas tṛpyatu vaḍhas tṛpyatu āsuris tṛpyatu pañcaśikhas tṛpyatu. sanandanaṃ tarpayāmi sanakaṃ tarpayāmi.....*(43. 3, 1-25). By elimination of the 15 names already mentioned, the total number comes to be 26. The very association of all these names with Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha is very suggestive. We are naturally

tempted to recognise in them the authorities of Sāṅkhya according to succession although it is very difficult to arrange them according to strict chronological order. This temptation is, however, justifiable to a certain extent if we consider the following facts :

The above-quoted Mantra is known as the *Ṛṣitarpaṇa Mantra* : in other words, the persons mentioned therein are all designated as Ṛṣis. And we know that Kapila, to whom the foundation of the Sāṅkhya system is universally attributed, bore some epithets peculiar to him, viz. *Paramarṣi*, *Ādi-vīdvān* and *Muni.* We should naturally expect, therefore, that the followers of his school, too, should in order to distinguish themselves from other schools, bear some such epithets like *Ṛṣi* or *Vidvān*, if not *Paramarṣi* or *Ādi-vidvān* the *paratva* and *āditva* being exclusively reserved for Kapila, the founder of the school, as a mark of veneration. Curiously enough, we know them not only as Ṛṣis but one of them viz. Sanātana has also been clearly styled as *Vidyāṃsaṃ Sanātanam.* In the *Buddhacarita* also the Sāṅkhya teachers are designated as *vīdvāṃsaḥ.*

Secondly, the grouping of all these names together has got a special significance too. In his *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition* Mr. Pargiter has shown that the Ṛṣis of the Mantra just now cited all belonged to different Gotras. From the fact that leaving other Ṛṣis like Durvāsas, Yājñavalkya, Viśvāmitra and others aside, a certain number of Ṛṣis of different Gotras has been mentioned together and that also in association with so well-known teachers as Kapila, Āsuri, and Pañcaśikha, the only significance that can be deduced is that the group of Ṛṣis possibly belonged to a particular school of Phiosophy (which I am inclined to hold as the Sāṅkhya Philosophy) and that the Mantra was composed in order to commemorate and perpetuate the name of that school. If that is so, then we have 26 teachers of Sāṅkhya in succession before the time of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa. Let us allow 30 years at least for each teacher. Then the number of years intervening between

Kapila aud Īśvara Kṛṣṇa must have been 780, if not more. Now, the first mention of Kapila as the founder of the Sāṅkhya school is found to have been made in the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvādhyāya* of the *Śānti-parva* of the *Mahābhārata* and the way in which an account of the Sāṅkhya system is given therein, shows that the system was then well-established and widely accepted and that therefore it must have taken at least a century for its establishment and wide popularity. The date of that portion of the *Mahābhārata* in which the account is given cannot be later than the 6th century B.C. and the scholars like Winternitz are of opinion that it was possibly written by the end of the 8th century B.C. Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, that this period was synchronous with the age of Kapila, let us deduct 780 years (as already deduced) from 700 B.C., and thus we get 80 A.D. or 1st century A.D. as the date of Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa, a date which perfectly accords with the conclusion already arrived at.

The probable age of Kapila may also be deduced in another way. That the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is a pre-Buddhistic one is beyond any controversy. The word Sāṅkhya as a system of Philosophy occurs in the *Lalitavistara*.[5]

The *Visuddhimagga* chap. XVII also refers to Sāṅkhya in the same sense. But if the *Lalitavistara* and the *Visuddhimagga* are works of much later age than the Buddha, we have then another work of about the 6th century B C. I mean the *Mahāvastu Avadāna* which uses the work *Sāṃkhya* a variant of 'Sāṅkhya' in that very sense.

Besides, the fundamental principles on which the Buddha bases his Philosophy are the four well-known *Āryasatya's* viz., *duḥkha, duḥkhasamudāya, duḥkhanirodha* and *duḥkhanirodhopāya*. These four *Āryasatyas* fully accord with the four fundamental principles of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy viz., *heya, heya-sādhanā, hāna* and *hānopāya* or *hānasādhana* and are decidedly admitted by all scholars to have been borrowed

5. *Śilpadarśanaparivarta* (Lefman's ed.) p. 156.

from the latter. The Saṃkhara theory of Buddhism is nothing but the *saṃskāra* of Sāṅkhya.

All these evidences taken together go to show that the Sāṅkhya system of Philosophy was held by Buddha himself as one of much importance and authority, and a system to receive such a high esteem from such a man like Buddha, must have taken a pretty long time—possibly not less than two centuries.

In this way, too, the age of Kapila cannot be placed later than the 8th century B.C. In any case, therefore, the date of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa comes to be the 1st century A.D.

Thus we see that the Sāṅkhya system is a fairly old one with Kapila as its founder who, as is generally held, belonged to an age not later than the 8th century B.C. and that the system, since its very foundation grew to be popular and was widely accepted. It had, since the time of Kapila, continued to retain its popular and universal character in an unbroken line of teachers up to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa who is just now proved to have belonged to an age not later than the 1st century A.D. with 25 teachers intervening between himself and Kapila.

This Īśvara Kṛṣṇa has been identified by some scholars with Vindhyavāsa or Vindhyavāsin on the strength of Dr. Takakasu's account of Paramārtha's life of Vasubandhu (Cf. JRAS., 1905) but this ground has been proved to be extremely fallacious and unacceptable by Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharya in his Introduction to the edition of the *Tattva Saṅgraha*. Dr. Bhattacharya, however, although he knows about Māṭhara, the prime minister of Kaniṣka, denies to the commentator Māṭharācārya, the date of 2nd century A.D. because he places Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in the 4th century A.D. This assignment of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's date is based by him upon the supposition that in his *Kārikā* 5 (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam* etc.) he was influenced by Vatsyāyana, the first commentator on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda. But the date of Vātsyāyana is by itself a mystery that remains yet to be solved. The theory of influence

by Vātsyāyana is nothing more than a mere supposition and does not, therefore, deserve any importance.

About the dates of the predecessors of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, there is no materials available at present to establish them as certain. Any opinion, therefore that may be formed with regard to their age and identity, would be but vague and conjectural. But one thing that may be put forward on the basis of a plausible ground is related to the *Śārīrasthāna* of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* wherein an account of *Sāṅkhya* is given. Just as we have an abstracted view of a certain school of Sāṅkhy Philosophy in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, so we have perhaps another abstracted view of the doctrines of another school of the same Philosophy, in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and this abstraction may be presumed to have been made from the *Ātreya Tantra* already referred to by me, because here in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, the expounder of the system is Atri himself. I say 'another school of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy' purposely because the account differs vitally from the account of Īśvara Kṛṣṇ's *Kārikā*. The categories described in *Caraka*, are said to be 24, whereas, the *Sāṇkhya Kārikā* treats of 25 categories including 'Puruṣa' as a separate entity.

In Caraka's account, however, 'Puruṣa' is not a separate entity at all but is, rather, an aspect of 'Pradhāna' or 'Prakṛti'. According to this view there are as many 'Prakṛtis' as there are 'Puruṣas'; in other words, the plurality of 'Prakṛti' is admitted, and 'Puruṣa' having formed a counter-part of 'Prakṛti' there is no need of admitting 'Puruṣa' as a separate entity. This vital difference between the two accounts naturally gives rise to a grave suspicion as to whether there were different schools of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. Guṇaratna, the famous commentator of the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, distinctly mentions two schools of Sāṅkhya viz., the 'Maulikya' (i.e. the original) and the 'Uttara' (i.e. the later); and what is the differenee between the two schools? He replies that the followers of 'Maulikya' school believe that there is a separate 'Pradhāna' for each 'Ātman' whereas,

those of the 'Uttara' school hold that there is only one 'Pradhana' in different individual souls. It may be contended here that this 'Uttara' is to be taken to refer to the school of Vijñānabhikṣu, the famous commentator of the *Sāṅkhya-sūtra* but then there would be a great error of chronology. Guṇaratna being a commentator of the 14th century A.D. cannot be supposed to refer to Vijñānabhikṣu, a commentator of the 16th century A.D. It follows, therefore, that this 'Maulikya' refers to a certain school of which we get an account in the outline of Caraka, whereas the 'Uttara' school is represented by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and his follower.

Now let us see if we can derive further support to our supposition. In the *Mahābhārata* (XII. 318), three schools of Sāṅkhya are distinctly mentioned viz., first those who admitted 24 categories, secondly those who admitted 25 and finally those who admitted 26. The first school of which a brief outline is obtained in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* even as late as the 2nd century A.D., was propounded by Pañcaśikha as early as the age of the *Mahābhārata* (XII. 219). According to Pañcaśikha, 'Avyakta' is 'Puruṣāvastha' i.e. the ultimate truth is one—the 'Avyakta' in the state of 'Puruṣa'. The second school which is regarded as the orthodox school of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, explained a strict dualism by making 'Puruṣa' and 'Prakṛti' as two separate entities. The last school, however, admitted a Supreme being (Īśvara) in addition to 'Puruṣa' and this was the 26th principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system wherein the existence of 'Īśvara' is admitted.

Another problem here arises about the chronology of these 3 different schools. Now the three schools referred to above can be resolved into two divisions according as they are theistic or atheistic according to the notion of Western Philosophy. Both the schools of 24 and 25 categories as denying the existence of God are to be regarded as atheistic in character while the school propounding 26 categories is purely a theistic one. We are to determine, however, which of these two is earlier. In the *Mahābhārata* we only find that it denounces the atheistic school i.e. the school

of 24 and 25 categories and advocates the existence of god as the 26th principle. But that does not prove anteriority or posteriority of either. The problem would have been more easily solved, had we been in possession of any of the original works of Kapila, Āsuri or Pañcaśikha but unfortunately all their works are, in the language of Vijñānabhikṣu, *kālārka-bhakṣita.* As regards the identity of the author as also the antiquity of the *Sāṇkhya-pravacana-sūtra* otherwise known as *Sūtra-ṣaḍādhyāyī* as also *Tattva-samāsa,* both of which are attributed to Kapila, grave suspicion has been aroused by almost all sections of scholars. So far as Āsuri is concerned we know nothing else than that his name occurs in some ancient works like the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* the *Mahābhārata* etc. and that a verse attributed to him is only found quoted by Guṇaratna in his commentary. Pañcaśikha's *Ṣaṣṭī-tantra* still awaits discovery and who knows that it has not been lost for ever? The only thing we know about him is that several self-contradictory and divergent views are attributed to him by the *Mahābhārata,* the *Ahirvudhnya-saṃhitā,* by Vācaspati Miśra and by the Chinese tradition. We have, therefore, to fall upon and examine the saurce or sources of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy of which the system is a natural synthesis.

The germs of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy are certainly to be traced in the Upaniṣadic literature, if not even earlier. For the origin of the three Guṇas *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy we have to go to the conception of three colours in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* which is repeated also in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad.*[6] Then again we have an interesting specimen of how Sāṇkhya Philosophy was yet in the making at the time of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (1. 3. 10-11) when we compare *indriyebhyaḥ parā hyarthāḥ ......sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ.* In these two verses is to be found an enumeration of Puruṣa Avyakta, Mahān, Buddhi, or Ahaṅkāra, Manas and the Indriyas—the categories which play such an important part in the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

6. *Chāndog.* VI. (4.1. *Śvet.* IV. 5. 1.)

But the *locus classicus* of the Sāṅkhya, however, is the *Śvetāśvatara* which gives us fuller and more detailed account as understood in those days. It waves between the atheistic and the theistic view. In one place, God is described as bringing to maturity 'Prakṛti' or 'Svabhāva'.[7] He is also described as the Lord of 'Pradhāna' or 'Prakṛti' of individual souls as well as of Guṇas.[8] Like a spider that weaves a web out of the material formed within itself, the one Godhead unfolds himself by means of the Guṇas born of 'Prakṛti'.[9] The 'Prakṛti' is merely God's magic power and God is the great magician.[10] God is also described as creating the world, while the individual soul is described as bound in the chains forged for him by God, the Universal Soul.[11]

In this way we get a theistic description of the Godhead who is endowed with all activity and the power of creation and government. The verses quoted above are quite sufficient to show that there was a fusion of the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga schools of thought at the time of the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*. It was about this time that the Sāṅkhya school was started. Kapila is universally known as "Ādividvān" and as such he was the first sage to synthesise and formulate those Upaniṣadic speculations in the form of a definite system, which he called the Sāṅkhya system. He expounded his doctrine in the *Saṣṭi-tantra* and started a school of his own with Āsuri as his first pupil. Whether the doctrine of the *Saṣṭi-tantra* admitted 24 or 25 categories will be discussed presently but it is almost certain that there was no admission of a principle of Godhead in his doctrine. The reason may be this:

Kapila, in his attempt to explain the world-process and the scheme of salvation, tried to make his system as rationalistic as possible. The existence of a personal God was

7. *Yac ca svabhām* etc.
8. *Ibid.* VI. 16.
9. *Ibid.* VI. 10.
10. *Ibid.* VI. 10.
11. *Ibid.* VI. 9.

therefore found inconceivable and incompitable with his theory of Prakṛti and Puruṣa and could not also be proved; for whatever exists must be either bound or free and God can be neither. We cannot think of him as bound and yet he cannot be free like an emancipated soul, for freedom implies absence of desire and hence of the impulse to create. Moreover, the consequences of good and evil deeds are due to Karma and not to the government of any God. Such a ruler is inconceivable, for if he governs the world according to the action of Karma, his existence is superfluous, and if he is affected by selfish motives or desire then he can not be free. And if his motive is kindness, is it reasonable to call into existence, beings, who while non-existent had no suffering, simply in order to show kindness in relieving them from suffering? Granting that to show kindness to the world was the motive of creation, a benevolent deity like God ought to have created only the happy creatures and not a mixed world like the one we see. It follows, therefore, that in no way could a Supreme Being like God be placed in Kapila's system consistently with the theory of Prakṛti, Puruṣa and Karma. Perhaps this was the only departure he made from the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads cited above. Hence an atheistic doctrine was preached and though accepted for a long time by a certain section of the people, it had met with a re-action; the thought of a God-less doctrine, especially in the age of the Upaniṣads, was intolerable with another section of the people who started a rival school of it viz., the Yoga system with God as the Fountain head of the whole creation. The *Mahābhārata* by its repudiation of the former school and advocacy of the latter bears an infallible testimony to this reaction.

The next question is whether the atheistic school of Sāṅkhya admitted of 24 or 25 categories. This is very difficult to make any definite reply. Possibly it was 24; that this was so may be surmised from Guṇaratna's nomenclature—the 'Maulikya' i.e. the 'original', school. I have already pointed out that according to Maulikya school

Puruṣa was but another aspect of Prakṛti and that the two formed but one category. Prakṛti was conceived of having two parts Vyakta and Avyakta. The Vikāra or the evolutionary products of Prakṛti were known as Vyakta or Kṣetra whereas the Avyakta part was regarded as Kṣetrajña. This Avyakta or Kṣetrajña was Cetana or Puruṣa. Now if that was so, and man was the product of a mere combination of the different elements, there could be no question of salvation at all. Every thing would have ended with death—with the cessation of one birth only and hence the introduction of the Śāstra for salvation would have been meaningless, purposeless and unnecessary. When the doctrine of 24 categories came to receive an attack on the line of argument as stated above, a necessity was naturally felt for revising the whole doctrine and the necessity of admitting Puruṣa as a separate entity from Prakṛti was fully realised. The categories then became 25 from 24 thus giving rise to what is characterised by Guṇaratna as the Uttara or the Later school of Sāṅkhya. That there was such an attack in reality may be gathered from the *Mahābhārata* where Pancaśikha sometimes explains 24 categories and sometimes 25. This contradiction can in no way be explained unless we assume that he was wavering between the two problems and could not definitely assert either. Finally, however, the doctrine was revised by Pañcaśikha with the recognition of Puruṣa as the 25th principle and that is why we find in Īśvara's *Kārikā* 70.[12] This revised version of the *Saṣṭi-tantra* came to be known as the *Saṣṭi-tantroddhāra*—a work quoted by Guṇaratna as one of the authoritative works of the Sāṅkhya Philosopy.[13]

Thus viewed the *Kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is to be taken as representing the doctrines of the *Saṣṭi-tantra* as revised by Pañcaśikha and hence belongs to the Uttara or Later school of Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

(IHQ, viii, 1932)

12. *Sena ca bahudhā vṛttaṃtantram.*
13. Guṇaratna's *ṭikā* on *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 109.

THE DATES OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SŪTRAS OF THE BRAHMINS

H. Jacobi

Subject of the investigation.—Some of the *Sūtras* of the six orthodox philosophical systems of the Brahmins[1] refer to Buddhist doctrines and refute them. As we are now sufficiently acquainted with Buddhist philosophy and its history, we can attempt to make out the peculiar school of Buddhist philosophy which is referred to in a passage of a *Sūtra*, and thus to determine the date, or rather *terminus a quo*, of the *Sūtra* in question. Our inquiry will be chiefly concerned with the Śūnyavāda or philosophical nihilism, and with the Vijñānavāda or pure idealism. The former is the philosophy of the Mādhyamikas; the latter is that of the Yogācāras. It may be premised that both these systems admit the Kṣaṇikavāda or the theory of the momentariness of everything, so far at least as is consistent with their peculiar principles; to these I will now briefly advert. The Śūnyavāda maintains that all our ideas, if analysed, contain logical impossibilities or self-contradictions, and that therefore nothing real can underlie them; and that upon which they are based is a nonentity or the void (*śūnya, nirupākhya*). This system[2] was established by Nāgārjuna, who flourished about the end

1. Abbreviations: M.S.—*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*; B.S.—*Brahma Sūtra* (Vedānta); V.D.—*Vaśieṣika Darśana*; N.D.—*Nyāya Darśana*; Y.S.—*Yoga Sūtra*; S.S.—*Sāṅkhya Sūtra.*
2. The Śūnyavāda may be compared with the philosophy of Zeno, who by a similar method tried to refute the common opinion that there exist many things of a changing nature. Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikasūtras* set the example for the dialectical literature of the Hindus which reached its height in Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*. It deserves to be remarked that in this regard also the Vedāntin of Śaṅkara's school follows in the track of Śūnyavādin.

of the second century A.D.[3] The Vijñānavāda contends that only consciousness or *vijñāna* is real. There are two kinds of *vijñāna*: 1. *ālaya-vijñāna* or consciousness proper, which lasts till the individual reaches Nirvāña (*ālaya*); and 2. *pravṛtti-vijñāna* or the thoughts of the same individual concerning objects. The latter is produced from *ālaya-vijṇāna*. The Vijñānavāda was established by Asaṅga and his younger brother Vasubandhu, who seem to have flourished during the latter part of the fifth century A.D.[4] To this school belong Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the greatest Buddhist philosophers and writers on Logic (pramāṇa). Dignāga attacked Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, and was answered by Uddyotakara (6th century A.D.) in the *Nyāyavārttika*. Dharmakīrti, who further developed Dignāga's philosophy appears to have flourished about the middle of the seventh century A.D.

It will be our task to examine closely the Buddhist doctrines controverted in the philosophical *Sūtras* in order to decide whether they belong to the Śūnyavāda or to the Vijñānavada. On the result of our inquiry will depend the presumable date of the *Sūtras* in question. If they refer to the Vijñānavāda, they must be later than the fifth century A.D.; if however this is not the case, and we can assign to them an acquaintance with the Śūnyavāda only, they must date somewhere between 200 and 500 A.D.

Doubt about the conclusiveness of this argumentation.—Even if we should succeed in recognising the true origin of the controverted doctrines, still it might be doubted whether the few passages on which we must rely for proof, form a genuine part of the work in which they occur, or are a later addition. For the aphoristical style of the *Sūtras*, the somewhat desultory way of treating subjects, and the

3. A contemporary of Nāgārjuna was Āryadeva. A poem ascribed to him has been edited in JASB, 1898. As in that poem the zodiacal signs (*rāśi*) and the weekdays (*vāraka*) are mentioned, it can not be earlier than the third century A.D.

4. See Takakusu in Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1904, vol. iv. p. 53f.

loose connexion of the several parts (*adhikaraṇas*) in most of these works make the insertion of a few *Sūtras* as easy as the detection of them is difficult. The text of the *Sūtras* as we have them is at best that which the oldest Scholiast chose to comment upon, and it cannot be safely traced further back. The uncertainty occasioned by the nature of our text is, however, in the present case partly remedied by the repeated allusions in one text to the same doctrines, or by the occurence in two *Sūtra* works of the same discussion with the same arguments. These facts make it probable that the topic in question was one which at that time a Sūtrakāra considered himself bound to discuss.

Another objection may be raised against our chronological argument. It may be said, and not without a considerable amount of plausibility, that even before Nāgārjuna had brought the Śūnyavāda into a system, similar opinions may already have been held by earlier Buddhist thinkers; and the same remark applies to the Vijñānavāda. Therefore, it may be argued, a reference to doctrines of the Śūnyavāda or Vijñānavāda, need not be posterior to the definite establishment of these systems. On the other hand, however, it is almost certain that a Sūtrakāra would not have thought it necessary to refute all opinions opposed to his own, but only such as had successfully passed the ordeal of public disputation. For only in that case would the doctrines themselves and the arguments *pro* and *contra* have been defined with that degree of precision which rendered their discussion in aphorisms possible to the author and intelligible to the student. Now when a philosopher succeeds in upholding his individual opinions against all opponents in public disputations, he is henceforth considered the founder of a new school or sect, and the author of its tenets.[5] Therefore we may be sure that a discussion of Śūnyavāda or Vijñānavāda opinions in a *Sūtra* must be referred to the period after the definite establishment of those schools.

5. Compare my remarks on the Dhvanikāra in ZDMG, 56, 409f.

Origin and development of the views here presented.—I conceived the general ideas set forth above and began to work them out in the summer of 1909. My first impression, supported by the comments of Śaṅkara and Vācaspatimiśra and others, was that the *Sūtras*, especially B. S. and N. D., refer to the Vijñānavāda. On a closer examination, however, of the evidence, I became convinced that they really refer to the Śūnyavāda, and that the later commentators had brought in the Vijñānavāda because that system had in their time risen to paramount importance. I had nearly finished my article when Professor von Stcherbatskoi told me that he had treated the question about the age of the philosophical *Sūtras* in his work *Teopia nosnania u Aozuka no* St. Petersburg, 1909, and had arrived at the conclusion that the *Sūtras* refer to the Vijñānavāda. He kindly sent me an abstract in English of his arguments, which I subjoin for the benefit of those readers who, like the author of this paper, cannot read the Russian original.

In his work "*Epistemology and Logic as taught by the later Buddhists*" Mr. Stcherbatskoi maintains (p. 29) that the *Sūtras* of the chief philosophical systems in their present form do not belong to that high antiquity to which they commonly are assigned, nor to those half-mythical authors to whom tradition ascribes them. The philosophical systems themselves have been evolved at a much earlier period than that in which the *Sūtras* were written. The *Sūtras* in their present form must have been elaborated during the period subsequent to the formation of Yogācāra school (Vijñānavāda), and their authorship has been attributed to writers of a high antiquity in order to invest them with greater authority. In a previous paper (*Notes de literature buddhique, Museon nouv. serie*, vol. vi, p. 144), Mr. Stcherbatskoi had already established, on the authority of the Tibetan historian Bouston, that the Vijñānavāda system (Buddhist idealism), professed by a part of the Yogācāra school, was clearly formulated for the first time by Vasubandhu in his celebrated Five Prakaraṇas. As Vasubandhu could not have lived much earlier than the

fifth century A.D., it follows that those philosophical *Sūtras* which refer to his doctrine, in order to refute it, cannot have been written at an earlier time.

It is well known that Buddhist idealism is mentioned, and that its tenets are refuted, in the *Sūtras* of Badarāyaṇa and of Gotama. Thus B.S. ii. 2. 28 refutes the doctrine of the non-existence of external things. Again, ii. 2. 30 refutes the erroneous opinion of those who admit solely the existence of a series of mental impressions unsupported by external objects, and, arguing from the Buddhist's point of view, demonstrates that a series of mental impressions (internal cognitions) could not exist, unless there were external objects to produce the impression. Once more, B.S. ii. 2. 31 maintains, according to Śaṅkara's interpretation, that, inasmuch as, according to Buddhist doctrine, the stream of internal cognition consists of a series of separate moments, it cannot have actual existence on account of its momentariness.

It appears upon consideration of these *Sūtras* that their author is bent upon refuting the doctrine which proclaims 1. the unreality of the external world, and 2. the actuality of an internal consciousness which consists of a series of cognitional acts. Both these tenets are characteristic of Buddhist idealism which developed subsequently to the nihilistic doctrine of the Mādhyamikas. The latter denied the reality of the internal consciousness as well as that of the external world.

In his commentary, Śaṅkara corroborates our opinion, inasmuch as he avers that the above mentioned *Sūtra* refute the doctrine of those who maintain that the stream of our consciousness is an altogether internal process existing only so far as it is connected with the mind. Now it is well known that the Vijñānavādins alone professed the doctrine that *prameya* and *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* have existence only in so far as they are connected with the mind (cf. p. 418 of vol. i of Thibaut's translation of B.S. ; *Ślokav.* iv. 74 ff. ; *Nyāyabindu* i. 18, ii, 4). Śaṅkara

mentions likewise the scholastic argument against realism of which Dignāga made use at the opening of his work *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (cf. Tanjour, mde v. 95). This work, in which the main tenet of idealism (Vijñānavāda, otherwise termed Nirālambanavāda) is proved, is one of the fundamental works of the school. The argument starts from the antinomic character of the ideas of the whole and of the parts, and states that the external object can be neither the whole nor can it consist of atoms (indivisible partless things : cf. p. 419 in Thibaut's transl. of B.S.).

Further we find in the *Nyāyasūtras* a refutation of Buddhist idealism, namely in iv. 2. 26-35. It is worthy of note that the Buddhist doctrine is referred to in the course of an argument upon the nature of atoms—thus as it were answering the considerations which we likewise find in the work of Dignāga in favour of the Nirālambanavāda. The *Nyāyasūtras* maintain the indivisibility of atoms, and, while refuting the opposed opinions touching this point, they refer to the Buddhists, to the Mādhyamikas (who denied the existence of atoms), and to the idealists (who admitted atoms to be a percept of the mind or an idea). In the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 458. Vācaspatimiśra avers that the *Sūtra*, N.D. iv. 2. 24 implies a refutation of the Mādhyamika doctrine, while the *Sūtras* iv. 2. 26-35 are directed against those who proclaim that all ideas of external things are false (*ibid.* p. 461). It is thus established by the testimony of Vācaspatimiśra and of Vātsyāyana (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p. 233. 6) that *Sūtra* iv. 2. 26 is directed chiefly against the school Vijñānavādins.

Though the philosophical *Sūtras* of the remaining systems do not contain any clear reference to the Vijñanavādins, yet it has been noted that some of the *Sūtras* display a remarkable knowledge of each other. To judge by the whole tone and drift of the philosophical *Sūtras*, they must be the production of one and the same literary epoch.

On the basis of what has been here said, it can be averred with a considerable degree of probability that the

philosophical *Sūtras* of the chief systems belong approximatively to one and to same period, a comparatively late one, and can in no ways be attributed to those venerable authors to whom tradition ascribes them.

Improbability of this view.—As stated before, I too entertained at first the opinion expressed by Professor von Stcherbatskoi, but I was induced to give it up by reason of the following chronological considerations. As the *Nyāyabhāṣya* was criticised by Dignāga, its anthor Vātsyāyana (Pakṣilasvāmin) must be earlier than the latter, by at least ten or twenty years, since it is not Vātsyāyana, but Uddyotakara (Bhāradvāja) who answered Dignāga. He may therefore have flourished in the early part of the sixth century or still earlier. Now Vātsyāyana is not the immediate successor of Akṣapāda Gautama, the author of the *Sūtra* ; for, as Professor Windisch pointed out long ago, Vātsyāyana incorporated in his work, and commented upon them, sentences of the character of *Vārttikas* which apparently give in a condensed form the result of discussions carried on in the school of Gautama. Hence Gautama must have been separated by at least one generation from the Bhāṣyakāra, and can therefore not be placed after the last quarter of the fifth century.[6] Thus if we accept the latest possible date for the composition of the N. D., it would fall in a period when the Vijñānavāda could scarcely have been firmly established. The V.D. is probably as old as the N.D. ; for V.D. iv. 1. 6 is twice quoted by Vātsyāyana, namely in his comment on N. D. iii. 1. 33 and 67, and V. D. iii. 1. 16 is quoted by him[7] in his comment on

6. This result is supported by collateral proofs. 1. When commenting on N.D. i. 1.5, Vātsyāyana gives two different explanations of the terms *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, the names of the three subdivisions of inference, showing thereby that the meaning of these important terms had become doubtful at his time. 2. In his concluding verse, which however, is wanting in some MSS., Vātsyāyana calls Akṣapāda a Ṛṣi, which he would not have done, if he had not considered the Sūtrakāra as an author of the remote past.

7. See Bodas's *Introduction* (p. 23) in *Tarkasaṃgraha* BSS., 1897.

N.D. ii. 2. 34, and Uddyotakara quotes the V.D. several times simply as the *Sūtra* or *Śāstra*, and once calls its author Paramarṣi, a title accorded only to ancient writers of the highest authority.[8] We are therefore almost certain that two *Sūtras* at least, N.D. and V.D., preceded the origin of the Vijñānavāda, or rather its definite establishment: and the same assumption becomes probable with regard to some of the remaining *Sūtras*, because the composition of the *Sūtras* seems to be the work of one period rather than of many. In order to prove the assumption to be true, we must show, as stated above, that the Buddhist doctrines refuted in several *Sūtras* need not be interpreted as belonging to the Vijñānavāda, but that the discussion in the *Sūtra* becomes fully intelligible if understood as directed against the Śūnyavāda.

Difficulty of distinguishing both systems in our case.—The point at issue is whether perception (*pratyakṣa*) is a means of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or not. The realistic view, strictly maintained by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies, is that by perception we become truly cognizant of real objects. The Śūnyavāda, Nihilism or Illusionism, contends that no real objects underlie our perceptions, but that those imagined objects as well as our ideas themselves are intrinsically illusory, in other words, they are nonentities or a mere void. On the other hand, the Vijñānavāda declares that our ideas or mental acts (perception included) are the only reality, and that external objects (since they have no existence) are not really perceived and do not cause our ideas about them, but are produced, so far as our consciousness is concerned, by ideas existing independently of objects. It will thus be seen that both Vijñānavāda and

8. At this point I may mention that Professor von Stcherbatskoi, when passing through Bonn on his way to India in December 1909, told me that he had meanwhile studied the first *pariccheda* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in the Tanjour. Dignāga giving there his definition *pratyakṣa* (perception) and refuting the opinions of the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya, quotes N.D. i. I. 4 and several *Sūtras* of V.D. which treat of *pratyakṣa*.

Śūnyavāda are at one as far as regards the unreality of external objects ; and therefore a refutation of this theory may be directed against the one of these doctrines as well as the other. Commentators chose between them as suited their purpose. Thus Kumārila, commenting on a passage which will be dealt with later, makes the following remarks :[9] "(Among the Bauddhas) the Yogācāras hold that 'Ideas' are without corresponding realities (in the external world), and those that hold the Mādhyamika doctrine deny the reality of the Idea also. To both of these theories, however, the denial of the external object is common.[10] Because it is only after setting aside the reality of the object that they lay down the *Samvṛti* (falsity) of the 'Idea.' Threfore on account of this (denial of the reality of external objects) being common (to both), and on account of (the denial of the reality of the 'Idea') being based upon the aforesaid denial of the external object, the author of the *Bhāṣya* has undertaken to examine the reality and unreality of the external object." And accordingly Kumārila interprets his text in such a way as to make it serve as a basis for the refutation first of the Vijñānavāda and then of the Śūnyavāda. He as well as Śaṅkara and Vācaspatimiśra and later authors who wrote when the Vijñānavāda had become the most famous Buddhist philosophy, felt of course bound to refute it ; and if the text they commented upon still ignored the Vijñānavāda and combated the Śūnyavāda only, they could introduce their refutation of the Vijñānavāda by doing just a little violence to their text. That such was actually the case, is the thesis I want to prove.[11]

9. *Ślokavārtika*, translated by Ganganatha Jha, p. 120, 14-16 (Bibliotheca India).
10. Similarly Śrīdhara and *Praśastapadabhṣāya* p. 229 speaks of *nirālambanam vijñānam icchatāṃ Mahāyānikānām.*
11. *Remarks on the development of the Śūnyavāda.*—Like Kumārila, other brahmanical philosophers treat the Śūnyavāda as the logical sequence of the Vijñānavāda or as a generalization thereof ; but the true or historical relation is just the reverse : the belief in the unreality of external things is a *restriction* of

Mention of the Vijñānavāda in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra.—Before examining those texts which give rise to doubts regarding the particular school combated, I briefly advert to one which beyond doubt discusses the Vijñānavāda doctrine. I refer to the *Sāṇkhya Sūtra.* In that work the principal doctrines of the four philosophical schools of the Buddhists are discussed: those of the Vaibhāṣikas i, 27-33, of the Sautrāntikas i, 34-41, of the Vijñānavādins i, 42, and of the Śūnyavādins i, 43-47. The *Sūtra* referring to the Vijñanavādins reads thus: *na vijñānamātraṃ bāhyapratīteḥ*; 'Not thought alone because of the conception of the external.[12] The next *Sūtra* (43): *tadavhāve tadabhāvac chūnyaṃ tarhī*, 'Since as the one does not exist, the other too does not, there is the void then' is according to Vijñānabhikṣu a refutation of the Vijñānavāda, but according to Aniruddha, the statement of the Sūnyavāda which is discussed in the following *Sūtras.* However, this may be, there can no doubt that here both the Vijñānavāda and the Śūnyavāda

the previously obtaining and more general belief in unreality or illusory nature of everything whatever, consciousness included. Buddhist Nihilism or Illusionism, introduced and supported by a splendid display of the novel dialectic art, seems to have deeply impressed and invaded the Hindu mind of that period. But realistic convictions or habits of thought could not be wholly eradicated; they entered into various kinds of compromise with Illussionism. The belief in the transcendent reality and oneness of Brahman as taught in the Upaniṣads admitted a combination with Illusionism in the Māyāvāda of the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's school, nicknamed Pracchannabauddhas, who maintained that Brahman alone is real and that the phenomenal world is an illusion (see Sukhtankar, *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* in WZKM. vol. xii). On the other hand the '*cogito ergo sum*' proved irresistibly self-evident to many Mahāyānists also, and led them to acknowledge the reality of consciousness. These were the Vijñānavādins or pure Idealists. But the great Logicians of this school seem to have further encroached on its principles; for Dharmakirti, in this particular point also probably following Dignāga, declared the object of perception to be *svlakṣaṇa*, i.e. the catena or series (*santāna*) of *kṣaṇas* to be *paramārthasat*, i.e. really existing.

12. Aniruddha's Commentary, Garbe's translation, in BI., page 23.

are discussed, in that sequence which (as stated in the last note) has become customary for later theoretical writers. Now it is admitted on all sides that the *Śāṅkhya Sūtra* is a very late, or rather a modern, production, and that it does not rank with the genuine philosophical *Sūtra*. Therefore the fact that the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtra* mentions the Vijñānavada does in no way prejudice any one in deciding the question whether the *Sūtras* of the other systems also were acquainted with it. Perhaps it might be said that the directness of reference to the Vijñānavāda in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* shows what we should expect to find in the other *Sūtras* if they did really know and refute that doctrine.

I. *Nyāya*

I begin our inquiry with the examination of the passage N.D. iv. 2, 25 ff., which, according to Vācaspatimiśra, is directed against the Vijñānavādins ; for, as explained above, chronological considerations make it almost certain that our *Sūtra* was composed before the establishment of the Vijñānavāda, and therefore entitle us to doubt, in this matter, the authority of the author of the *Tātparya Ṭīkā*. The subject treated in those *Sūtras*, namely, whether perception is a means of true knowledge, is connected with and comes at the end of a discussion of, other subjects which for the information of the reader must briefly be sketched. First comes the problem of the 'whole and its parts,' iv, 2, 4ff. The adherents of Nyāya (and Vaiśeṣika) maintain that the whole is something different (*arthāntara*) from the parts in which it 'inheres,' an opinion which is strongly combated by other philosophers. Connected with this problem is the atomic theory, which is discussed in 14ff. After *Sūtra* 17, Vātsyāyana introduces as opponent, 'a denier of perception, who thinks that everything is non-existent' (*ānupalambhikaḥ sarvaṃ nastīti manyamānaḥ*). There can be no doubt that an adherent of the Śūnyavāda is meant. He attacks the atomic theory,

18-24, and is refuted in 25 thus: "as your arguments would lead us to admit a *regressus in infinitum* (by acknowledging unlimited divisibility) and as a *regressus in infinitum* is inconsistent with sound reason, your objection is not valid (*anavasthākārītvād anavasthānupapatteś cā 'pratisedhaḥ*). Vātsayāna, after explaining this *Sūtra*, continues: "(An opponent objects) what you say with regard to notions (buddhi), that their objects are really existing things, (that cannot be proved). These notions are intrinsically erroneous (*mithyābuddhayas*); for if they were true notions, (*tattva-buddhayas*) they would, on being analysed by the understanding, teach us the true nature of their objects." The argument of this opponent is stated in *Sūtra* 26 which the above passage serves to introduce, and runs thus: "If we analyse things, we do not (arrive at) perceiving their true nature (or essential): this not-perceiving is just as, when we take away the single thread (of a cloth), we do not perceive an existing things (that is called) the cloth." Vātsyāyana explains: "(This is) just as on distinguishing the single threads (of a cloth): this is a thread, this is a thread, &c. &c. no different thing is perceived that should be the object of the notion cloth. Since we do not perceive the essential, in the absence of its object, the notion of a cloth, that it exists, is an erroneous notion. And so everywhere." *Sūtras* 27 and 28 contain the counter-arguments, and *Sūtra* 29 adds to them the following: "And because by right perception (*pramāṇatas*, viz, *upalabdhyā*) we come to know things (whether and how they are)." *Sūtra* 30 gives a proof for this view: *pramāṇānupapattyupapattibhyām.* Vātsyāyana explains: 'Now then the proposition that nothing exists is against reason; why? (answer): *pramāṇānupapattyupapattibhyām.* If there is proof *pramāṇa* (in favour of the proposition) that nothing exists, (this proposition that) nothing exists, sublates the (existence of) proof as well. And if there is no proof for it, how can it be established without proof, why should (the contrary) that all things do exist, not be regarded as established?" Here it is quite clear that the opponent whom Vatsyāyana refutes, is a Śūnya-

vādin just as in *Sūtra* 17. For there is no indication that Vātsyāyana in the mean time has changed front, and that the opponent in *Sūtra* 26 is not a Śūnyavādin, but a Vijñānavādin. The latter contends that external things do not exist (*bāhyārthā na santi*), while Vātsyāyanā (on 27) makes his opponent uphold *sarvabhāvānāṃ Yāthātmyānupalabdhiḥ*. Moreover, this opponent maintains that "notions about things are erroneous notions (*mithyābuddhayas*)," and this is primarily the view of the Śūnyavāda. The fundamental principle of the Vijñānavāda is that ideas only are really existent, and not that they are erroneous ideas. That Vātsyāyana really has in view the opinions of the Śūnyavādins, may be seen from his concluding words in 36, "therefore erroneous notions too are really existing," and in 37, where he speaks of his opponent as one for whom "everything is without essence and unreal" (*nirātmakaṃ nirupākhyaṃ sarvam*). Nevertheless Vācaspatimiśra,[13] commenting on Vātsyāyana's words in *Sūtra* 25 translated above ("An opponent objects : what you say, " &c.), remarks that the opponent is a Vijñānavādin. That he is mistaken, we have seen, and a general cause of such a mistake on the part of later commentators has been given above. In the present case we can watch the gradual development of this mispresentation. For in his comment on 26 Uddyotakara again introduces the opponent's argument that every part of a thing may be regarded as a (minor) whole consisting of minor parts, and that this analysis may be continued not only down to atoms but in infinitum till everything is dissolved into nothing. Now as Professor von Stcherbatskoi informs us (see above), Dignāga in his work *Ālambanaparikṣā* makes the discussion of the problem of 'the whole and its parts' the basis of his exposition of the Vijñānavāda. Therefore Uddyotakara, who answers Dignāga's attacks on Vātsyāyana, avails himself of an opportunity to undermine the antagonist's basis of argumentation. And Vācaspatimiśra, knowing what was the

13. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (viz. S.S.), p. 460, 3rd line from below.

starting point of Dignāga's speculations, and seeing that it was exhaustively treated by the authors of the *Sūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*, was easily misled to believe that they were defending it against the Vijñānavāda. Being separated from them by 400 years or more, he was ignorant of their historical interrelation, and consequently interpreted the philosophical discussion in the text before him from a merely theoretical point of view. For, as indicated above, a rational refutation of the Śūnyavāda was naturally divided into two parts, the first proving the reality of objects and the second the reality of ideas ; and a theoretical construction could well treat the Śūnyavāda as the logical outcome of the Vijñānavāda, and take the first part of the refutation of the Śūnyavāda as directed against the Vijñānavāda.

We proceed in our analysis of the *Sūtra*. After the last passage translated above, we have another objection of the Illusionist in *Sūtras* 31 and 32. "Like the erroneous belief in the objects seen in a dream is this belief in the means of true knowledge and the things known through them erroneous." Vātsyāyana explains: "Just as in a dream the objects seen in it are not real, while there is belief in them, so the means of knowledge and the things known through them are also not real (*na santi*), though there is belief in either." *Sūtra* 32 completes this argument : "Or like magic, fata morgana, and mirage." As this argument serves to *demonstrate* that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are an illusion, it is evident that the opponent is a Śūnyavādin. The next *Sūtra* 33 answers his objection, in pointing out that 'he has established nothing, as he has given no reason' for declaring (1) that the belief in *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is like that in objects seen in a dream and not like the perception of objects in the waking state, (2) that in a dream non-existing things are perceived. This argument of the *Sūtra* is supplemented in the *Bhāṣya* by another formulated in what looks like a *Vārttika* ; it comes to this. If you say that things seen in a dream do not exist because they are no more seen in the waking state, you must admit that those seen in the waking state do exist ; for the force

of an argument is seen in the contrary case, viz. that things exist because they are seen. Uddyotakara charging upon this argument unmistakably introduces Vijñānavāda views; for he speaks of things independent of the mind (*cittavyatirekin*) and uses the term *Vijñāna*, but there is no trace of all this in the *Bhāṣya*. The *Sūtra* then goes on to explain the belief in things seen in dream and other topics connected with the subject in hand which, however, do not concern us here.

To sum up: our investigation has proved that neither the *Sūtra* nor the *Bhāṣya* refer to the Vijñānavāda, and that the whole discussion is perfectly intelligible if we consider it as meant to refute the Śūnyavāda.[14]

2. *Vedānta* and *Mīmāṃsā*

Brahmasūtra, 2nd *Adhyāya*; 2nd *Pāda*, contains a discussion and refutation of other philosophical systems. The *Sūtras* 18-32 deal with Buddhist philosophy. *Sūtras* 18-27 deal with the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins; and 28-32, according to Śaṅkara, with those of the Vijñānavāda. Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara in so far as he also refers *Sūtras* 28-30 to the Vijñānavāda, but he differs from him in that he interprets the last *Sūtra*[15] as containing a refutation of the Śūnyavāda. For convenience of reference I subjoin the text of the *Sūtras* 28-32 and the translation of them by Thibaut according to Śaṅkara's and Rāmānuja's interpretation:

Nābhāva Upalabdheḥ 28
vaidharmyac ca na svapnādivat 29
na bhāvo nupalabdheḥ 30
kṣaṇikatvāc ca 31
sarvāthanupapatteś ca 32

I. Śaṅkara's interpretation, SBE. Vol. XXXIV, p. 418 ff.:

14. If the Sūtrakara knew the Vijñāvāda, we should expect him to combat it in ii, 1, 8. ff., where *pratyakṣādīnām aprāmāṇyam* is discussed. But in that place even Vācaspatimiśra (p. 249) assigns this opinion to the Mādhyamikas.

15. He omits *Sūtra* 31 of Śaṅkara's text.

The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them), 28.

And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream, 29.

The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Buddhist view) on account of the absence of perception of external things, 30.

And on account of the momentariness (of the *ālayavijñāna* it cannot be the abode of mental impressions), 31.

And on account of its general deficiency in probabilty, 32.

II. Rāmānuja's interpretation, SBE. xiviii, p. 511 ff. :

Not non-existence on account of consciousness, 27.[16]

And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams, 28.

The existence (of more cognitions) is not on account of the absence of perception, 29.

(Here ends the *adhikaraṇa* of perception.)

And on account of its being approved in every way (viz. that the Nothing is the only Reality), 30.

Now it would be rather surprising if the Śūnyavāda had been ignored by the *Brahmasūtra* as Śaṅkara in his treatment of the above *Sūtras* would make us believe ; he says that Śūnyavāda is thoroughly irrational and may therefore be left out of account. But the Śunyavādins were once formidable opponents, and it would have delighted an orthodox dialectician to expound their unreasonableness. Rāmānuja apparently was conscious of this deficiency and therefore introduced the refutation of the Śūnyavāda in the very last *Sūtra*. But this *Sūtra* contains only an argument, and if Rāmānuja be right, we search in vain in the preceding *Sūtras* for the statement, or even a hint, of the doctrine he wishes to refute. However this *Sūtra* reads like a finishing blow dealt to a vanquished opponent whose arguments the author had just been refuting. That this

16. Rāmānuja's numbering here differs from that of Śaṅkara. In order to avoid confusion I shall refer to the latter only.

opponent was a Śūnyavādin becomes probable if we compare the *Sūtars* in question with those in N.D. which we have examined above and, which as we have seen, refer to the Śūnyavāda only. For *Sūtra* 29 : *vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat*, deals with the same argument which is stated in N.D. 31f. : *svapnābhimānavad ayam pramāṇaprameyābhimānaḥ* : *māyāgandharvanagaramṛgatṛṣṇikavad vā.* The *ādi* in *svapnādivat* means according to Śaṅkara *māyādi*, in other words the things fully enumerated in the second of the quoted *Sūtras* of N.D. As the argument in N.D. and B.S. is the same, it is almost certain that the same doctrine is discussed in both works, and as the doctrine refuted in N.D is the Śūnyavāda, it is highly probable that it is meant in B.S. also. Though we have thus very weighty reasons for not trusting Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and all the later commentators in their interpretation of the passage under consideration, still the almost deliberately enigmatical character of the *Sūtras* would make it a hazardous task to explain them without the aid of tradition. Fortunately, however, the same philosophical problem aphoristically discussed in those *Sūtras* has been dealt with at considerable length by another ancient author.

For Śabarasvāmin, the Bhāṣyakāra of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, after having commented on M.S. i. 1. 5 transcribes a long passage from the unknown *Vṛtti*, which begins in the edition of the Bibliotheca India on p. 7, line 7, from below, and ends on p. 18, line 6, as the editor remarks in a footnote p. 18.[17] The whole passage is without doubt by the Vṛttikāra. It gives an explanation of *Sūtras* 3-5, and is

17. Śabarasvāmin introduces this passage by the following words : *Vṛttikāras tv anyathe 'maṃ grantham varṇayāṃcakāra* : *tasya nimittapariṣṭir ity evamādim.* We first have a comment on *Sūtra* 3 ; the comment on *Sūtra* 4 commences p. 8, 1, 2, that on the second pat of *Sūtra* 4 (*animittam.* &c.) on p. 12, 1, 2 from below ; on p. 11, 1, 2 from below, begins the comment on *Sūtra* 5, and that on the last part of the same *Sūtra* on p. 17, 1, 10 (*avyatirekaś ca*) ; *arthe 'nupalabdhe* p. 17, last line ; *tat pramāṇam* (*Bādarāyaṇasya*) *anapekṣatvat*, p. 18, 1. 3.

introduced by Śabarasvāmin at the end of his own comment on *Sūtra* 5. It is therefore a matter of no little surprise to find that Kumārilabhaṭṭa in the *Ślokavārttika* (on *Sūtra* 5) assigns only the first part of this passage, viz. from p. 7, l. 7 from below, down to p. 8, l. 8 from below, to the Vṛttikāra ; and accordingly his comment on this part only bears the title *Vṛttikāragrantha* in the edition on the *Ślokavārttika* in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 212, 216. Kumārila himself refers to the author of this part of the passage as the Vṛttikāra, ib., p. 136 ; but he refers to the author of the following part (which is actually the work of the same author) as Bhāṣyakṛt, p. 221 (v. 16) and Bhāṣyakāra, p. 224 (v. 29), i.e., Śabarasvāmin. That part which Kumārila ascribes to the Vṛttikāra, contains the explanation of *Sūtra* 3 and part of *Sūtra* 4 only. If Kumārila were right, this passage should have been quoted by Śabarasvāmin at the end of his comment on *Sūtra* 4 and not, where he actually introduces it, at the end of his comment on *Sūtra* 5. Kumārila does not notice nor attempt to account for the fact that Śabarasvāmin, on his assumption, twice interprets part of *Sutra* 4 and the *Sūtra* 5, once at the proper place, and then again after what he contends to be the end of the quotation from the Vṛttikāra, and any lingering doubt that also the second part of the passage ending on p. 18, 1.6. is not by Śabarasvāmin, is removed by the passage that comes after it. For there (p. 18, l. 7, 14, 16 ; p. 24, 1.9) he controverts and sets right some assertions in the preceding part which according to Kumārila is not by the Vṛttikāra. Whether Kumārila himself or some predecessor of his was the author of this error, we do not know ; but we can well understand how it crept in. For Śabarasvāmin, whose habit is not to make long quotations, apparenty inserted this passage from the Vṛttikāra because it contains a discussion of peculiar Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, e.g., on the six *pramāṇas*, for which his succinct commentary on the *Sūtras* of Jaimini would not otherwise have offered an opportunity. In quoting, and not criticising, those doctrines, he intimated his acceptance of them ; and Kumārila therefore, misled by

Śabarasvāmin's words *Vṛttikāras tv anyathe'maṃ granthaṃ varṇayāṃcakāra*, ascribed to the Vṛttikāra only that part of his exposition where it obviously differs from Śabarasvāmin's comment, not the remaining part which chiefly contains the additional matter. The second part was so important for the Mīmāṃsaka philosophy, that Kumārila devoted to the discussion of its contents little less than half the volume of his *Ślokavārttika.* He had therefore a strong motive to ascribe this part of the quotation to Śabarasvāmin on whose *Bhāṣya* he wrote his *Vārttika.* But from the fact that he did so, we may perhaps couclude that at his time, or earlier, the original work of the Vṛttikāra had been lost or at least had ceased to be studied at all ; for otherwise he could not have committed or repeated this gross error.

Now the question arises as to who is the author of the *Vṛtti* from which the passage under consideration has been taken. Ganganatha Jha in his admirable translation of the *Ślokavārtitka*, p. 116, note (17) says with regard to this passage : "*Kārikās* 17-26 expound the view of the author of the *Vṛtti* (Bhavadāsa)." However, the name of Bhavadāsa is not given by Pārthasārathi commenting on the passage in question (printed text, p. 212-216) ; but on p. 11, commenting on v. 33, in which Kumārila adverts to a controverted opinion brought forward, 'in other commentaries' *vṛttyantareṣu*, he mentions as the authors 'Bhavadāsa and others,' in accordance with Kumārila's statement in v. 63, p. 21. On these passages, it would seem, Ganganatha based his conjecture, which in my opinion is unacceptable. For if an author is referred to simply by the title Vṛttikāra, an authority of high rank must be intended, as is seen in many other cases ; and it is not at all likely that Kumārila would have ranked such an authority together with other commentators, as he did with regard to Bhavadāsa in the phrase *vṛttyantareṣu.* If there had been more than one *Vṛtti*, then it would have been inaccurate to speak of the Vṛttikāra. And besides, the *Bhāṣya* contains no reference to Bhavadāsa ; Kumārila must therefore have

learned Bhavadāsa's opinion from his work. But as shown above, he most probably did not know the original work of the Vṛttikāra. Hence it would follow that the Vṛttikāra is not to be identified with Bhavadāsa.

The same scholar ascribes, on p. III of the introduction of his work named above, the *Vṛtti* to the revered Upavarṣa. But *bhagavān* Upavarṣa is mentioned in the very passage from the Vṛttikāra, he must be not only different from, but also considerably older than, the latter; for the title *bhagavān* is given only to authors of high authority and some antiquity.[18]

As thus both conjectures of Ganganatha Jha about the author of *Vṛtti* can be shown to be wrong, I venture to advance one of my own. Rāmānuja quotes a *Vṛtti* on the *Brahmasūtra* by Bodhāyana and refers to him as the Vṛttikāra.[19] Now I think it probable that Bodhāyana wrote the *Vṛtti* not only on the Uttara Mīmāṃsā (i.e. B.S.), but also on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, just as Upavarṣa, the predecessor of the Vṛttikāra, commented on both Mīmāṃsās. For, according to Śaṅkara B.S. iii, 3, 53, Upavarṣa in his commentary on M.S. referred to his remarks in the *Śārīraka* i.e. his commentary on B.S. And Śabarasvāmin also was equally versed in the Uttara and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsās; for a lengthy dissertation on the existence of the soul, called Ātmavāda, (p. 19, 1.3-p. 24, 1. 9 of the printed text) in his *Bhāṣya* reads like part of a Vedānta treatise. Śaṅkara ad B.S. iii, 3, 53 says[20] with regard to that passage that the Ācarya Śabarasvāmin took (his subject) from B.S. iii, 3, 53, and treated it in the *pramāṇalakṣaṇa* (i.e. ad M.S. 1, 5). The meaning of this statement is that

18. Hall. Index, p. 167, says with reference to the *Śabarabhāṣya* "Kṛṣṇa Deva states, in the *Tantra Cūḍāmaṇi*, that a *Vṛtti* was composed on this work, by Upavarṣa." If Kṛṣṇa Deva is right, his Upavarṣa must be a different person from our Upavarṣa.
19. Thibaut in SBE. Vol. xxxiv, p. xxi. Sukhtankar, *The Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, p. 7, 9 (WZKM. vol. xii, p. 127, 129)
20. *ita evā"kṛṣyā" cāryeṇa Śabarasvāminā pramāṇalakṣaṇe varṇitam.*

Śabarasvāmin by anticipation discussed the existence of the soul in the *Bhāṣya* on M.S. i, 1, 5, while the proper place for this subject is in a commentary on B.S. iii, 3, 53 ; we cannot safely conclude from Śaṅkara's words, that Śabarasvāmin actually wrote a commentary on B.S., and even less, that he transcribed the passage in question from it (for it is clearly worded with reference to the context in which it now stands). But at any rate it is evident that at Śabarasvāmin's time the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās still formed one philosophical system, while after Kumārila and Śaṅkara they were practically two mutually exclusive philosohpies.

After this necessarily long digression we return to the examination of that part of the passage from the Vṛttikāra which relates to the Bauddha doctrines. It consists of two sections called Nirālambanavāda and Śūnyavāda in the *Ślokavārttika* where the discussion of it is introduced by the remarks translated above. The author. i.e.. the Vṛttikāra, has explained in the preceding part that perception is a means of right knowledge provided that no defect (*doṣa*) vitiates any of the parts or elements which combined constitute perception ; he then goes on as follows :

"(An opponent objects :) 'All cognitions (*pratyaya*) are without foundation (in reality) just like a dream ; for we recognise in a dream that it is the nature of cognition to be without foundation. A waking person also has cognitions, e.g. of a post or a wall and therefore this cognition also is without foundation.' We answer : a waking man's notion (e.g.) "this is a post" is a positively ascertained one ; how is it possible that it should turn out wrong ? 'The notion in a dream also was, just in the same way, a well ascertained one ; previous to the awakening there was no difference between the two.' You are wrong ; for we find that (what we saw) in the other case (i.e. in the waking state), does not turn out wrong. If you say that on account of the class-characteristic (cognition as a genus) (the same predication) will hold good in the other

case, (we reply as follows). If you mean that the cognition in a dream is wrong because it is a cognition, then of course the cognition of a waking man must be wrong too. But if cognition is (taken to be) the reason that something is so as it is cognised (and not different), then it is impossible to say that this cognition (viz. one in a dream) is different (i.e. wrong) because it is a cognition. (Not from the nature of cognition by itself); but from something else we come to know that cognition in a dream is wrong on account of its being opposed to truth. 'How do you ascertain this?' In the following way because a sleepy mind is weak, sleep is the reason for the wrongness (of cognition) in a dream; in dreamless sleep it (the mind) is absent altogether; for one without any consciousness whatever, is said to be in dreamless sleep. Therefore the cognition of a waking man is not wrong. 'But the sensorium of a waking man also may be vitiated by some defect.' If so, the defect may be found out! 'While one dreams, a defect is not found out.' It is; for on awaking we find out that the mind had been vitiated by sleep."

The problem discussed in the preceding passage is the same as that in N.D. iv, 2, 31-33, see above, p. 12. The point at issue is this. Perception in a dream cannot be said to be wrong, unless some other perception is admitted to be true, in contradistinction to which that in a dream could be recognised to be wrong. As the opponent maintains that all cognitions are wrong, his argumentation from dreams is without meaning. I now continue the translation of the passage from the Vṛttikāra:

"(The opponent says: 'The cognition itself) is a void. For we do not perceive a difference of form in the object and the idea of it; our idea is *directly* perceived, and therefore the so called object, which should be different from the idea, is a non-entity.' (Answer:) Well, this would be the case, if the idea had the form (or shape) of its object. But our idea is without form, and it is the external object which has the form; for the object is

directly perceived as being in connexion with a locality outside of ourselves. An idea caused by perception is concerned with an object, and not with another idea; for every idea lasts but one moment, and does not continue to exist while another idea comes up. (The opponent says :) 'While this second idea is originating, it becomes known (to the first idea) and, at the same time, it makes known to it the object just as a lamp (illumines and makes thus known things).' We reply: This is not so. For before the object has become known, nobody is conscious of having the idea, but after the object has become known (to us), we become aware by *inference* that we have an idea concerning it; it is impossible that both these processes should be simultaneous. (The opponent says :) 'We do not contend that we know the object before the idea has originated, but after it has originated; therefore the idea originates first, and afterwards the object becomes known.' (We reply :) Quite right: The idea originates first, but it is not the idea that first becomes known. For as will occur occasionally, we say of an object which we do know, that we do know it.[21] Moreover it is the very nature of every idea to be always and necessarily bound up with the name of (or a word denoting) its object. Therefore an idea is 'intimately connected with a name,' but that which is 'not intimately connected with a name' is termed '*directly perceived.*[22]—And furthermore, if (the object and the idea)

21. We are not conscious of having an idea concerning it.

22. The printed text is wrong. Instead of '*tasmān na vyapadeśyā. buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyaṃ ca nāpratyakṣam*' we must read '*tasmān nāvyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyaṃ ca nāma pratyakṣaṃ.*'
What is meant is this. An abstract idea is always coupled with a word expressing its object; but this is not the case when we directly perceive a thing. Therefore perception is thus defined in N.D. i, 1, 4: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.* Instead of *avyapadeśyam* the Buddhists say more accurately *kalpanāpoḍham.* The definition of *pratyakṣa, Nyāyabindu* I, is *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham* is defined (ibidem) *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā tayā rahitam.*

had the same form, this would sublate the idea and not the object which is directly perceived. But there is no such uniformity (between the object and its idea, as you assume); for by inference we become cognizant of the intrinsically formless idea but we *directly perceive* the object together with its form. Therefore cognition is based on the object.—And furthermore, the notion of (e.g.) a piece of cloth has an individual cause (in this sense, that we have the idea of the cloth) only when threads from the material cause (of the object. viz. the cloth). For if this were not the case, a man of sound senses might have the notion of a jar though threads had been used (in the production of the object in question); but that is not the case.[23] Therefore cognition is not without foundation (in external objects), and consequently direct perception does not convey erroneous knowledge."

In this part of the passage from the Vṛttikāra, the opponent whose arguments are refuted is without doubt a Śūnyavādin. This is not only the opinion of Kumārila (see original, p. 268 to 354, translation, p. 148-182), but it is unmistakably indicated by the word, with which this part opens viz. *Śūnyas tu.* But if we consider the arguments brought forward, by themselves, we might be led to believe that their object is to prove that only the idea has real existence. And on the other hand in the first part the illusory character of all ideas or cognitions is discussed; and this is properly the view of the Śūnyavādins. Nevertheless Kumārila would make us think that the Vijñānavadins are combated in this first part to which he gives the title Nirālambanavāda (see original. p. 217 to 268; translation, p. 119-148). At first sight the text itself seems to speak in favour of his view; for it opens with the opponent's statement that the *pratyayas* are *nirālambana.*

23. The meaning of this argument is that the object is not caused by the idea, but it has a cause which is independent of the idea, viz. the material from which the object or the thing is produced.

But very weighty reasons prove, in my opinion, that Kumārila's view is wrong. (1) As said above, the problem discussed in the first part of our text is the same as in N.D. iv, 2, 31-33, and we have demonstrated above that not only these *Sūtras*, but also Vātsyāyana's comment on them have in view the Śūnyavāda only. (2) The technical terms peculiar to the Vijñānavāda, e.g. *vijñāna*, *ālayavijñāna*, *pravṛttivijñāna*, *vāsanā*, are absent from our passage, and instead of them only such words as *pratyaya*, and *buddhi*, and *jñāna* (which are common to all Indian philosophers) are used. (3) The only argument discussed is that waking-cognitions being like dream-cognitions are likewise illusory, and as has already been said, this is not an opinion which is peculiar to the Vijñānavādins. (4) The division of the whole passage into two parts, of which the first combats the Nirālambanavāda, and the second the Śūnyavāda, is quite arbitrary. There is in truth but one subject of discussion in the whole passage, viz. that which is stated at the beginning of the first part, and which is repeated at the end of the second : *niralambanāḥ pratyayaḥ*. And therefore the whole text must be directed against the Śūnyavāda because this is avowedly the case in the second.[24]

In the introductory remarks it has already been explained how later commentators came to interprete a refutation of the Śūnyavāda as one of the Vijñānavāda. If radical Scepticism, represented by the former, attacked the validity

24. I draw attention to another passage, p. 14f., though it is not conclusive for the question in hand. There the Vṛttikāra discussed the problem about the meaning of words, and touches the problem of the whole and its parts. The opponent denies that there is such a thing as a wood, a herd, &c., and goes on to object to perception as a means of true knowledge 'the trees also are non-existent.' The answer is "If you say this (we need not enter into a renewed discussion), for this view of the Mahāyāni-kas has already been refuted" (*pratynktaḥ sa mahāyānikaḥ pakṣaḥ)*. This is apparently a reference to the passage translated in the text, and the followers of the Mahāyāna are spoken of without the distinction of Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras.

of perception as a means of true knowledge, it is natural that it brought forward arguments which might be used also by pure idealism, represented afterwards by the Vijñānavāda. But it is worthy to note that all those arguments on which the Vijñānavādins based their idealistic system, had already been advanced by the Sūnyavādins. Thus it is evident that the Vijñānavāda was potentially contained in the Sūnyavāda, and that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who founded the idealistic school of Buddhist philosophy, were largely indebted to their predecessors.

The result of the preceding inqury, viz. that the controversy in the passage from the old Vṛttikara is about Sūnyavāda opinions only, *a fortiori* holds good with the Vedānta *Sūtras* also. But that passage may also serve us as a commentary on B.S. ii, 2, 28-32. I have also identified conjecturally our Vṛttikāra with Bodhāyana who wrote a *Vṛtti* on B.S., if this be true, it is most likely that in our passage he should have given the essence of his comment on the quoted *Sūtras* in B.S. which are concerned with the same problem. But if my conjecture is not accepted, then the case is similar to that of Śabarasvāmin, who, when expounding the Ātmavāda in his *Bhāṣyā* on M.S., anticipates the *Sūtras* of B.S. in which this topic is discussed. In the same way our author who wrote the *Vṛtti* on M.S. must have regarded Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā as the two interconnected parts of one uniform system; and when treated a subject which properly belongs to the Uttara Mīmāṃsa, he must have treated it in conformity with the latter. We actually find in the passage from the Vṛttikāra the substance of a commentary on B.S. ii, 2, 28-32, disposed in nearly the same order as that of those *Sūtras*, as will now be proved. The substance of the first part of the passage is epitomised in *Sūtras* 28 and 29: *nā'vhāva upalabdheḥ* ; *vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat.* We may paraphrase these two *Sūtras* in accordance with the explanation of the Vṛttikāra as follows: "The objects of cognition are not nonentities (i.e. cognition is not without foundation in the external world: *na niralambanāḥ pratya-*

yaḥ), because we actually perceive external objects. 28. Nor is our cognition similar to dreams, &c., because there is a real difference of cognition in the state of waking and that of dreaming. 29" The next two *Sūtras* contain in a condensed form the substance of the second part of our passage, *na bhāvo 'nupalabdheḥ*. 30. "(An idea) cannot be the real object (underlying cognition, as proved in *Sūtras* 28 and 29), because (the idea) is not the object of direct perception." In the passage from the Vṛttikāra the opponent maintains ; 'our idea is directly perceived (*pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*), and the author refutes him by showing that an idea is not perceived, but that we become aware of having an idea by inference. This is the substance of *Sūtra* 30. The next *Śūtra* : *kṣaṇikatvāc ca* (31): "And because cognition has but momentary existence" is explained by the Vṛttikāra in the passage beginning : 'for every idea lasts but one moment' (*kṣaṇikā hi sā*). The meaning is of course that one idea cannot perceive another ; for while the first exists, the second has not yet come into existence, the first has ceased to exist. The last *Śūtra* : *sarvathā 'nupapatteś ca* (32) "And because it is unreasonable in every way" gives occasion to the Vṛttikāra's remarks beginning with 'But there is no such uniformity' (*api ca kāmam*, &c.).

Thus it will be seen that with the help of the passage from the Vṛttikāra we can fully and consistently explain the original *Śūtras*. And I venture to presume that this interpretation comes nearer the meaning of the original, than that given either by Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja ; for these commentators living several centuries after the Vṛttikāra did violence to the text because they felt obliged to introduce into their comments the substance of controversies which happened long after the time of the Sūtrakāra.

The preceding enquiry has proved that the Śūnyavāda only has been confuted in the *Brahmasūtras* and in the *Vṛtti* quoted by Śabarasvāmin. These two works must therefore have been composed in the period between 200 and 500 A.D. according to what has been said in the

beginning of this paper. I am inclined to think that Śabarasvāmin also must be assigned to the same period, since he also appears to ignore the Vijñānavāda and to refer to the Śūnyavāda when controverting the Buddhist denial of the soul (p. 20f). There a Buddhist combats the argument that knowledge (*vijñāna*) presupposes a knower (*vijñātṛ*), and explains that knowledge and memory can be accounted for by the assumption of *skandhas* or rather a *santāna* of momentary *skandhas*. He concludes: *tasmāc chūnyaḥ skandhaghanāḥ*, "therefore nothing real is behind the *skandhas*." This doctrine is of course common to all Buddhists, but the expression used here, *śūnya*, seems to betray the Śūnyavādin. And besides, in this controversy, especially where the real meaning of *aham*, is discussed, a Vijñānavādin would have introduced his term *ālayavijñāna*; but no special terms of the Vijñānavāda are used by Śabarasvāmin. It is therefore probable that he wrote before the establishment of the Vijñānavāda. His archaic style also speaks in favour of an early date.[25]

3. *Yoga*

In *Yogasūtra*, iv, 15f., the Buddhist denial of the external world is briefly discussed. *Sūtra* 15: *vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor viviktaḥ panthāḥ*. Since the same object (is perceived by many persons and) causes various impressions on their mind, they (i.e., the objects and the ideas caused by them) must be two different things." This is apparently a refutation of the Nirālambanavāda, but it does not appear whether it is intended against the Śūnyavāda or the Vijñānavāda.[26] *Sūtra* 16: *na cai 'kacittatantraṃ*

25. Buhler in SBE. vol. xxv, p. CXII. After the preceding discussion it is perhaps superfluous to state that I cannot subscribe to the exaggerated chronological estimate of that scholar.

26. In the Bhāṣya on the preceding *sūtra*, we find the same argument about things seen in a dream with which we are already familiar.

vastu, tad apramāṇakaṃ, tadā kiṃ syāt? "Nor can the existence of an object be dependent on the mind of one observer; for when (his mind being absent) it is not observed at all (pray) what would become of the object?" (cf. S.S.i, 43). Here I think, the meaning of the *Sūtra* will be best understood, if we assume the opponent to be an adherent of the Vijñānavada. For in that philosophy the *ālayavijñāna* which represent the self-consciousness of the individual person, contains the *vāsanās* (=*saṃskāras*) which becoming mature (*paripāka*) produce the *pravṛttivijñāna* or the thoughts concerned with objects.[27] According to this theory the object is dependent on *pravṛttivijñāna* or, in common language, on the mind of the observer.[28] If this interpretation is right, Patañjali must be later than the middle of the 5th century A.D. At any rate he cannot be earlier than the 3rd century A.D.

Even the earlier of these two dates is at variance with the prevailing opinion that Patañjali the author of the *Yogasūtra* is the same Patañjali who composed the *Mahābhāṣya*. For Patañjali is said to have written the *Yogasūtra*, the *Mahābhāṣya*, and a work on medicine. This tradition, however, cannot be traced to an ancient source.[29] Never-

Vācaspatimiśra in the *Ṭīkā* ascribes this argument to the Vijñānavādin (cf. above p. 11), but he says expressly that it has been introduced by the Bhāṣyakāra without it being warranted by the *sūtra* (*utsūtra*).

27. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (Anand ed) p. 15.
28. Y.S. iv. 21 might be taken for a reference to Vijñānavāda; but the commentators are apparently right in the referring to the *mānasa-pratyakṣa* or *manovijñāna* which seems to have been acknowledged by the older school also. The definition in the Ṭīkā however agrees nearly verbatim with that in the *Nyāyabindu-ṭīka* (Bibl. Ind. p. I 3; I. 11)
29. It occurs in a traditional verse which is quoted. as Prof. J. H. Woods informs me, in the commentory on the *Vāsavadattā* by Śivarāma. According to Bodas (*Tarkasaṃgraha* B.S.S p. 24) this (?) verse is said to be from Yogabija. It must be said that the passage of the *Vāsavadattā* which refers to Patañjali alludes to his oratorial gifts only. Similarly a verse in the Patañjalicarita v. 25

theless European scholars are inclined to give it credit, e.g. Lassen, Ind. Alt., I, p. 999, Garbe, *Sāṅkhyaphilosophie*, p. 26, note, and *Sāṅkhya und Yoga*, p. 36, and others; and accordingly they place Patañjali in the 2nd century B.C. But it cannot be shown on internal evidence that the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* cannot be identical with the author of the *Yogasūtra*. It is worthwhile definitely to establish this point.

Professor Garbe admits that there are no special coincidences between the language of the *Yogasūtra* and the *Mahābhāṣya*, and accounts for this want of agreement by the difference of the subject of both works. But on the other hand we certainly might expect that the greatest grammarian of his age should have observed the rules of his grammatical work when he wrote another on Yoga. Yet in Y.S. i, 34 he writes *pracchardanavidhāraṇābhyām* instead of *vidhāraṇapracchhardanābhyām* as it ought to be according to the rule *laghvakṣaram* (i.e., *pūrvam*) in *vārttika* 5 of ii, 2, 34; and here the meaning of the two parts of the compound furnishes no reason for altering their grammatical order, as might perhaps be pleaded for the order in *sarvārthataikāgratayoḥ* iii. 11 instead of *ekāgratāsarvārthatayoḥ* as postulated by *Pāṇini's* rule *ajādyadantam* ii, 2, 23. A similar case is *grahītṛgrahṇagrāhyeṣu* in i. 41. Vācaspatimiśra says when commenting on that *Sūtra*:[30] "the order of the members of the compound as given in the *Sūtra* is irrelevant, because it is opposed to the order required by the subject (viz. *grāhyagrahaṇagrahītṛ*)." Now grammar is in favour of that very order which is also required by the subject; for this order is in accordance with Pāṇini's rule: *alpāctaram* ii, 2, 34: "In a Dvandva

by Rāmadhaṭṭadikṣita of the 18th century ascribes to him *sūtrāṇi yogaśāstre vaidyakaśāstre ca vārttikāni.* Here he is identified apparently with Caraka, this is expressly done according to Bodas (*l c.*) by the grammarian Nāgeśa, who lived in the 18th century in the *Vaiyākaraṇa siddhānta-mañjūṣā* (cf. Aufrecht *cat. cat*, s.q.)

30. *tatra grahitṛgrahaṇagrahyeṣv iti sautraḥ paṭhakramo 'rthkramavirodhān nā' daraṇīyaḥ*

the member of fewer syllables should come first." And though a deviation from this rule might be defended, still the grammarians seem to have regarded it as an irregularity better to be avoided.[31] At any rate our case would have given cause to a grammarian to consider the order in which he should place the members of the compound, and he certainly would not have chosen that order which could be impungned for reasons derived from grammar and from the nature of the subject. The reason why the author of the *Sūtra* placed *grahitṛ* first in the *dvandva*, was perhaps a linguistic instinct that words not ending in *a* or *ā* should come first, a rule which grammarians restrict to words ending in *i* and *u* (*dvandve ghi ii. 2. 33*).

On the other hand it can be shown that the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* held philosophical ideas which differed considerably from those of Yoga and Sāṅkhya. Commenting upon *Vārttika* 53 and i. 2. 64. he discusses a *kārikā* on the meaning of gender ; the feminine denotes the congelation (*saṃstyāna*), the masculine the productivity (*prasava*) of the qualities (*guṇas*) : sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. "All individual things (*mūrtyas*) are thus constituted, they are qualified by congelation and productivity, possessing sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell are not everywhere." This is a very crude theory about the qualities and one that is very far removed from the refined speculations of the Sāṅkhyas and Yogas about the *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas*.—Therefore, since the author of the *Yogasūtra* does not conform to the grammatical rules taught by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and because the latter is

31. Patañjali discusses the question whether the rule *alpāctaram* applies to compounds of more than two members, to which alone the comparative *alpāctram* would seem to apply. He adduces two verses which contain three-membered *dvandvas* : *mṛdaṅgaśṅkha-tūṇavāḥ* and *dhanapatirāmakeśavānāṃ*. Kātyāyana in *vartika* 1 accounts for these exceptions by assuming that the two last members are a *dvandva* (*Śaṅkha-tūṇava*) and form the second member of the whole *dvandva* (*atantre taranirdeśe śaṅkhatūṇavaeyr mṛdaṅgena samāsaḥ*).

ignorant of the philosophical views of the former, they cannot be identical, but must be two different persons.

Having shown that the only argument for the great antiquity of the *Yogasūtra* is fallacious, I shall now bring forward internal evidence for a rather late date of that work. The *Yogaśāstra* of Patañjali is described as being part of the Sāṅkhya system (*yogaśāstre śāṅkhyapravacane*); and it is well known that it generally conforms to the Sāṅkhya. But there are some Yoga doctrines which differ from the Sāṅkhya. Yoga admits the Īśvara, while Sāṅkhya is essentially atheistic; and this peculiarity of the Yoga seems to be very old, since it is mentioned in so ancient a work as the *Mahābhārata* (ii. 300. 3ff.). But there are other Yoga doctrines not countenanced by Sāñkhya[32] which are clearly adoptions from other systems. They are the following:

(1) The doctrine of *Sphoṭa* has been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas: it is expounded in the *Bhāṣya* ad iii. 17. This theory is however not directly mentioned in the *Sūtra*, and its introduction rests entirely on the authority of the *Bhāṣya*. (2) The doctrine of the infinite size of the *antaḥkaraṇa* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy (*ātman*). It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on iv. 10 and there ascribed to the Ācarya." (3) The atomic theory which originally belonged to the Vaiśeṣika,[33] is clearly referred to by Patañjali in i. 40 (cf. *Bhāṣya* on iii, 44). (4) The doctrine that time consists of *kṣaṇa*, which was first put forth by the Sautrāntikas, is clearly assumed in iii, 52, though the details are explained in the *Bhāṣya* only. The Sphoṭavāda and the Monovaibhavavāda (1. and 2.) may be later additions to the system, but the Paramāṇuvāda and the Kṣaṇikavāda must be ascribed to Patañjali and cannot be later than him. That he did adopt them, directly or indirectly, from the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists, though of course not in their original form,

32. See Garbe, *Sāṅkhya and Yoga*, p. 49 ff.

33. Cf. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. i, p. 199 ff.

presupposes that these doctrines had somehow ceased to be shibboleths of hostile schools, and that the general idea underlying them had been acknowledged by other philosophers too. We know that this has been the case with regard to the atomic theory which has also been admitted by Buddhists, Jainas, Ājīvakas, and some Mīmāṃsakas.[34] The Kṣaṇikavāda, in an altered and restricted form, has been adopted by the Vaiśeṣikas. For according to them some qualities (*guṇas*) exist for three *kṣaṇas* only, e.g., sound originates in one *kṣaṇa*, persists in the second, and vanishes in the third. This is kind of Kṣaṇikavāda so changed as to avoid the objections to which the original doctrine was exposed. Still it must be remarked that even this altered form of Kṣaṇikavāda is not yet found in the *Sūtra*,[35] but it first taught in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 287. —This adoption of originally heterdox doctrines by Patañjali therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time, and thus it serves to confirm the result at which we arrived by examining the allusions to Buddhist doctrines contained in Y.S. ; namely, that the *Yogasūtra* must be later than the 5th century A.D. It is probably not far removed in time from Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the remodeler of Sāṅkhya.

Nor can an objection be raised against the date from the remaining literature of the Yoga. For the *Bhāṣya* by Vyāsa, which is next in time to the *Sūtra*, contains nothing that would make the assumption of an earlier date necessary. Garbe places Vyāsa in the seventh century (1. c., p. 41) ; and though his estimate is supported only by a legendary account of Vyāsa's pupils, still it is not improbable in itself.

34. See my article quoted in the last footnote.
35. V.D. ii. 2, 31 teaches that sound is produced by conjunction and disjunction and sound. This is the germ of an undulatory theory of the transmission of sound in India ; but the details of this theory, containing the above mentioned doctrine of the three *kṣaṇas*, are not yet worked out in the *Sūtra*.

The results of our researches into the age of the philosophical *Sūtras* may be summarized as follows. N.D. and B.S. were composed between 200 and 450 A.D. During that period lived the old commentators: Vātsyāyana, Upavarṣa, the Vṛttikāra (Bodhāyana ?), and probably Śabarasvāmin. V.D. and M.S. are about as old as, or rather somewhat older than, N.D. and B.S. Y.S. is later than 450 A.D., and S.S. is a modern composition.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRAS

H. P. Sastri

Anyone who carefully reads the *Nyāya-sūtras* will perceive that they are not the work of one man, of one age, of the professors of one science, or even of the professors of one system of religion. It woud seem apparent that at different ages philosophers, logicians and divines have interpolated various sections into an already-existing work on what we may, for the want of a better term, call Logic.

It is evident that such a book would be full of contradictions, inconsistencies and irreconcilable passages. So the *Nyāya-sūtras* are. The Hindu Commentators from Vātsyāyana, in the third century A.D. to Radhamohan Gosvami in the nineteenth, have attempted to evolve a harmonious system of Logic and Philosophy from the *Sūtras.* The task is an impossible one, and so every one of them has failed, and that miserably. They have imported later and more modern ideas into the commentaries, but without success. The acute logicians of Bengal thought it was a difficult work ; and they had recourse to various shifts to explain the *Bhāṣya* and other commentaries. They have changed some passages and imported extraordinary meaning into others.

But unfortunately the idea of studying the *Sūtras* by themselves did not occur to any one of them. Ninety-nine per cent of the manuscripts of this work are accompanied with some commentary or other. Manuscripts giving the *Sūtra* only are extremely rare. I got one from Midnapore, and gave a copy of it to my friend Dr. Venis, and it was published at Benares. It is known as the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra.* My friend Pandit Vindhyesvariprasada Duve got one at Benares, and he published it in the Bibliotheca

Indica as an appendix to his edition of the *Nyāyavārtika*. This is known as *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. But from what I know of the habits of pandits, I am sure nobody has studied the *Sūtras* by themselves. They have been used only as works of reference.

I took up the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* for independent study. On comparing the *Sūtras* as given there with the *Sūtras* in editions accompanied by commentaries, and also with the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, I was struck with the variety of readings which the *Nyāyasūtras* presented. A number of *Sūtras* are regarded as spurious. The readings of a large number of *Sūtras* are irreconcilably different in different editions. This is not the case with the *Vedānta-sūtras*, and with the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, in which various readings are extremely rare, almost non-existent, and interpolated *Sūtras* there are none. I am not speaking of the *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga-sūtras*, which are comparatively modern. The difficulty which I feel in regard to the *Nyāya-sūtras* was also felt about a thousand years ago, when Vācaspati-miśra, who flourished about the end of the tenth century, twice attempted to fix the number of *Sūtras* and their readings, namely, in *Nyāyasūtroddharā*, and in *Nyāyasūchīnībandha*, both of which go by his name. If both are the works of one man, as they profess to be, it is apparent that the author did not feel sure of his ground.

For convenience's sake, I took up the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* dated 898 Śaka, i.e., 976 A.D., and that for three reasons—(1) because it counts the number of *Sūtras*, number of words, and even the number of letters in the *Nyāya-sūtras* ; (2) because it divides the *Sūtras* into sections, each dealing with a single topic ; (3) and because it is dated, and there are internal evidences to show that it was written by the great Vācaspati, the commentator on the six systems. I have made an English translation of the *Sūtras* with as little help from the commentaries as possible.

The study of the *Sūtras* makes it apparent that works of two different sciences have been mixed up. One is a

work on Logic, or rather the science of Reasoning, or, as Sadajiro Sugiura terms it, "science of discriminating true knowledge from the false" ; and the other is a work on system of philosophy. The work on Logic is confined almost exclusively to the first and the fifth chapters. I say almost, because some sections of the second chapter also may belong to the Logic part. The rest of the work with about eight *Sūtras* in the first chapter belong to the philosophical part.

Let us analyse the Logic section. This section seems to ontain three separate treatises. The first chapter, with the exception of the *Sūtras* mentioned above, constitutes the first and the most important treatise. It is complete in itself. The first *Sūtra* enumerates the sixteen topics essential in Debate, and all the sixteen topics are fully treated of in the first chapter. It is fully self-contained, and nothing farther is needed to complete it. The first *Sūtra* gives, so to say, the objects and reasons for the science. It says that anyone who has complete knowledge of the sixteen topics attains the highest proficiency in every walk of life, and the first chapter deals with the complete knowledge of all the sixteen topics.

I may remark in passing that the science embodied in the first chapter of these *Sūtras* is not Logic, in the present signification of the term, but Logic in its primitive and rudimentary stage. It may better be called the Science of Debate. And all the requisites of a well-regulated Debate are included in the sixteen topics. They are not always the requisites of the science of Logic, as known at present. The second treatise on Logic, embodied in the *Sūtras*, is the first "daily lecture" of the fifth chapter. The last *Sūtra* of the first chapter simply says that *Jātis* and Points of Defeat are many, thus leaving no room for any elaborate subdivision of these two topics. But the first lecture of the fifth chapter not only enumerates twenty-four subdivisions of the *Jātis,* but gives careful definitions of every one of them. The author who wrote the first

chapter is not the author of the first Lecture of the fifth chapter. The last section of the first lecture of the fifth chapter, which has nothing to do with definitions of the subdivisions of *Jātis*, but which limits the extent of a fruitless Debate, is no part of the second treatise, and seems to be an addition. The third treatise consists of the second "daily lecture" of the fifth chapter. It enumerates the various Points of Defeat and defines them.

One of the most cogent reasons for considering these treatises as separate, and also for considering them to be composed by different authors, is the fact that the same technical terms have been used and defined in all the three, but in very different senses. The definition of *Jāti*, as given in the first, does not cover all the subdivisions enumerated in the second. The terms *prakaraṇasama* and *sādhyasama* are defined among the "Semblances of Reason" in the first treatise, but these two have been differently defined as subdivisions of *Jātis*. The term *matānujñā* has been defined one way in the second and another way in the third. If all the three had been written by one and the same person, the same technical terms would not receive at his hands two such wide definitions.

It is difficult to say whether the composition of the second and the third treatises preceded or followed that of the first treatise, which is a comprehensive work on the Science of Debate. Many of the scholars hold that such comprehensive treatises generally follow separate and partial treatises on parts, just as the *uṇādi-sūtras* and the *gaṇa-sūtras* preceded Pāṇini, and that these separate treatises after the composition of the comprehensive treatise, formed its appendices.

One would be tempted to believe that all the sections of the first lecture of chapter second, with the exception of the last, and the first and last sections of the second Daily Lecture of that chapter, may be included in the Logical part, because they have a direct bearing on *pramāṇa*

or the instruments of true knowledge, which forms the first essential topic in the Science of Debate.

The commentators and modern paṇḍits, in order to make this incoherent collection of *Sūtras* a harmonious whole, are obliged to say that the *Nyāya-sūtras* consist of the enumeration, the definition and the examination of the sixteen topics. The enumeration is complete in the first *Sūtra*, the definition in the first chapter, and the examination in the other chapters. There would have been no cause of complaint if all these were a fact. The examination is, however, not complete. It does not comprehend all the sixteen topics. The topics examined in fact are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 15th, and 16th. The examination of others have been altogether omitted. If there is any, it is of a very nebulous character. So a complete examination of the sixteen topics is not to be found in the *Sūtras*, and this is exceedingly suspicious. The examinations are, as a rule, examinations of the definitions given in Chapter I, at least so the commentators say. If so, the examination of *Jāti* and of the Points of Defeat are not really the examination intended by the commentators. On the other hand, in the case of *Jāti*, we find that the definition as given in Chapter I, depending simply upon homogeneity and heterogeneity, does not apply to a number of the subdivisions of *Jātis* as given in Chapter V. The examination of other three topics, too, contains so much of heterogeneous matter, besides an examination of the definition, that one is tempted to say that the whole of the examination affair, i.e., ali the chapters II to IV are an addition. So far about the Logic portion.

The Philosophy portion has its beginning in the second *Sūtra* of the first chapter. The first *Sūtra* of Chapter I, as has been already said, gives the objects and reasons of the work. And these objects and reasons seem to be all secular. There was no need for a second enunciation of the objects and reasons. But the second *Sūtra* again enunciates them. And in this case, they are philosophical

and spiritual. Vācaspatimiśra puts the two together in one section, and calls the section "objects and reasons". The commentators have tried to reconcile this double enunciation of objects and reasons, but without success. The only reasonable explanation of this double enunciation seems to be that some later writer has interpolated the second *Sūtra* with a view to add philosophical sections to the work. The second *Sūtra* contains topics which are not enumerated in the first, and the thoughtful reader is struck with the introduction of new matter so early as in the second *Sūtra*. These topics are misery, birth, activity and fault together with *apavarga*. The introduction of these new topics is defended by saying that they fall under the subdivisions of the second topic, in the first *Sūtra*, namely "objects of true knowledge". "The object of true knowledge" is a topic which is so vast that all the topics of the world may come under its subdivisions. And, as a result of this, the interpolator has tampered with the definition of *prameya* (*Sūtra* I. 1.9) which is virtually an enumeration of its subdivisions, and put in five new topics into it. That the *prameyasūtra* at one time was different from what it is now, is apparent from the statement of Haribhadrasūri, a Jain writer.

The order of words is different; *sukha* or happiness seems to have been included in the old *prameyasūtra*. *Sukha* finds no place in that *Sūtra* now and in Chapter IV, *Āhnika* I, the Section 13 on the examination of *duḥkha*, reduces *sukha* into *duḥkha* and is not prepared to admit *sukha* as a separate subdivision of *prameya*. But from Haribhadra's statement we find that *sukha* was there at some early time. Now the question is, who changed the *Sūtras* and why? The answer is not far to seek. In a work on Logic *prameya*, as a topic, must come in. But Logic does not require a long enumeration of *prameyas* and an elaborate examination of their details, which are essential in philosophy. So the author who wanted to convert a logical treatise into a system of philosophy, and who is responsible for the interpolation of the second *Sūtra* is also responsible

for this alteration in the *prameyasūtra.* The logical treatise was an ancient Hindu treatise, and Hindus never took an ultra-pessimistic view of the world. *Sukha* is the ultimate goal of the Mīmāṃsakas, of the Vedāntins, the two really orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. Why should Nyāya be so pessimistic ? There is no reason for it, and it has been shown that the word *sukha* did at one time occur in the *prameyasūtra.* The Buddhists are downright pessimists. To them everything is *duḥkha,* and it is they who believed that *sukha* was, if properly analysed, *duḥkha.* It seems that the Hindu logical treatise underwent the first stage of its philosophical transformation in the hands of some Buddhist philosopher, and became a gloomy and pessimistic science. The second *Sūtra* of the First chapter, destroying so many things successively and reaching to *apavarga,* has the appearance of Buddhistic teaching. They enumerate a long series of effects from false knowledge, and teach us that as we destroy effects, we perceive the causes, that these causes are also effects ; we destroy them and gradually we come to the original cause of all these, namely, false knowledge : when that is destroyed we come to *nirvāṇa.* This is precisely the teaching of the second *Sūtra,* though the enumeration is not so long. The Buddhist tradition, as we know it from China and Japan, distinctly says that the Logic of Akṣapāda was their handbook in logic, and that they added to and subtracted from it. The tradition is positive that Mirok mixed up Nyāya and Yoga, and we find in the present Nyāy-sūtra a long section on Yoga in IV. 2, and one is puzzled to know why it has been introduced. The grounds advanced by Hindu commentators for its introduction are of the flimsiest kind. But the fact comes from China that Mirok mixed the two up. So some other Buddhist philosophers might have introduced the second *Sūtra* and changed the *prayemasūtra* so as to suit his purpose.

That the science (of Akṣapāda was, for a long time, in the hands of Buddhists, and, therefore, not in great favour with the Brahmanist, will appear from the following consi-

derations. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, the Purāṇas, and even the Dharmaśāstras dislike those who studied the Tarkaśāstra. The *Vedāntasūtras* distinctly say that this science was not accepted by the orthodox. They are known as little removed from the Buddhists—the Buddhists are nihilists, they are half nihilists (*ardhavaināśika*). That there was an unholy alliance between the Nyāya and the Buddhists in the early centuries of Buddhism, is not open to grave doubts. The introduction of the second *Sūtra*, the alterations in the *prameyasūtra*, and the definitions of misery, birth or rebirth, activity, faults, and emancipation in the first chapter appear to be the work of Buddhists. The examination of these definitions occupy the whole of the first Lecture of the fourth chapter.

The work underwent another transformation in the hands of a later Hindu sect who vigorously assailed some of the prominent Buddhist doctrines, both Mahāyanist and Hīnayānist. These assailed Sarvaśūnyatāvāda on the one hand, and Sarvāstivāda on the other. To know who they were not, one has simply to cast his eyes on the various theories that have been assailed in connexion with the examination of rebirth.

But this gives us no clue to the identification of the sect, save and except that they were non-Buddhists. Haribhadra, however, tells us that these were Śaivas and Haribhadra belongs to the fifth century of the Christian era.

Haribhadra's statement is borne out by two facts. *Sūtra* 8, chapter I, seems to be out of place. The *pramānas* are defined in the four previous *Sūtras*, and all of a sudden, comes a *Sūtra* subdividing *śabda*; subdivisions of *śabda* are unknown in other systems of philosophy. It is generally translated by the word "dogma". The distinction between the Revealed Word and the Ordinary Word is peculiar to the *Nyāya-sūtras*. It is not Buddhistic, because they did not know of this subdivision. And in the fifth century, they discarded dogma altogether. Moreover, the introduction of this *Sūtra* explains the introduction of the section, on the

authority of the Vedas, and along with it, of a quarrel with the Mīmāṃsakas on the eternity of sound.

All this seems to be the work of a Hindu sect which we take to be the Śaivas at the instance of Haribhadra. These are a compromise between the Hindus and the Buddhists.

So the present *Nyāya-sūtras* consist of three treatises on Logic. And the bit of Hindu systems of philosophy that it contained has been mixed up with two other systems of philosophy, which have been laterly interpolated into the book.

Even after a careful examination, I do not find the Nine Reasons and Fourteen Fallacies attributed to Akṣapāda by the Chinese authorities. There are chapters on fallacies, and 'homogeneity, and heterogeneity' play an important part in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. But yet no "Nine Reasons" and "Fourteen Fallacies". Perhaps the primitive work of Akṣapāda was systematised in very early times by another person named Gotama. But this is diving too deep into the antiquity of Hindu thought, and our appliances are not sufficient for the purpose.

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HISTORY OF NYĀYAŚĀSTRA FROM JAPANESE SOURCES

H. P. Sastri

The bibliography of Nyāyaśāstra of the Orthodox Hindus is a very short one. It consists of:—

1) The *Sūtras* attributed to Gautama of Akṣapāda.
2) *Bhāṣya* attributed to Vātsyāyana.
3) *Vārtika* by Uddyotakara.
4) *Tātparyaṭīkā* by Vācaspati.
5) *Pariśuddhi* by Udayana.

But the bibliography of the Buddhist Nyāyaśāstra, as known in China and Japan, is a long list. It attributes the first inception of the Nyāyaśāstra to Shok-mok or Mok-shok which, transliterated into Sanskrit, would be Akṣapāda.

The second author who treated of Nyāya is said to be Buddha himself. The third is Ryuju, who is said to have preached the Mahāyāna doctrines of Buddhism with great success. His *Hohbenshin-ron* is one of the polemical works against the heretics. It contains one volume on logic. The fourth is Mirok (Maitreya). The fifth is Muchak (Asaṅga), Mirok's disciple. Muchak's younger brother Seish (Vasubandhu) wrote three books on Logic—Ronki, Ron-shi-ki, and Ron-shin. After Vasubandhu, came Mahā-Diṅnāga and his disciple Śaṅkarasvāmī, whose works were translated into Chinese, by the great Hienth Sang. Hienth Sang had two great disciples—Kwei-ke in China, and Doh-Soh in Japan. Kwei-ke's "Great commentary" is the standard work on Nyāya in China and Doh-Soh is the first promulgator of Buddhist doctrines and Nyāyaśāstra in Japan. Since then there had been many distinguished teachers of Nyāya both in China and in Japan, and up to the present day Diṅnāga has a firm hold on the learned people both in China and

Japan. The European system of logic is a very recent introduction in Japan, where Diṅnāga is still studied.

In the two paragraphs given above, I have tried to give the bibliography of Brahmanic and Buddhistic logic of ancient India. Both attribute the invention of the science to one person, namely, Akṣapāda. The only clue given about this personage's chronology is that it was before Buddha. But no clue of his time can be found in Brahminical works. Mr. Justice Pargiter tells me that there is no such person as Akṣapāda mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*, which was in a nascent condition about the time of Buddha's birth. The Chinese attribute to him two things, namely, "Nine Reasons" and "Fourteen Fallacies", while the Hindus attribute to him the entire body of *Sūtras* divided into five *Adhyāyas*, ten lectures, eighty-four topics, five hundred and twenty-eight *sūtras*, seventeen hundred and ninety-six words, eight thousand three hundred and eighty-five letters. It may be said, in passing, that the Chinese people are doubtful about the "Nine-Reasons" being attributed to Akṣapāda. It may also be remarked that in the whole body of *Sūtras*, there is nothing which corresponds to the "Nine-Reasons" and "Fourteen Fallacies", which, we know from Chinese sources and which even Diṅnāga is said to have attributed to Soc-mock. An examination of the "Nine Reasons" reveals the fact, that it is historically prior to the invention of syllogism. It means an effort of the human mind to exhaust all possible forms of the relation between, what is now called the Major Term of a syllogism. In what light the later writers have seen this examination, and what conclusions may be drawn from it, need not trouble us here. Suffice it for a historical student to know, that this early effort is attributed to Soc-mock, universally known as the first writer of Nyāya. The theory of "Fourteen Fallacies" too, in their crude and undeveloped shape, shows signs of greater antiquity than the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

These two theories of Akṣapāda seem to have been the common property of Indian pandits before Buddha's time, as Buddha did not scruple to take advantage of these.

The *Nyāyasūtras*, as we have them, seems to be a much later production. Haribhadra, a Jain scholar of the 6th century A.D., says that it a sectarian work; that the sect, which either composed it or adherd to it, was a Śaiva sect. Now a Śaiva or Māheśvara sect existed long before Buddha. Soc-moc and the eighteen *gurus* of the sect. Nakulīśa and others, might have belonged to this sect, That the *Sūtras* were not composed by Akṣapāda appears to be almost certain. But it bears his name. How to explain this fact? The only explanation is that it belonged to that sect, of which he was thought to be one of the earliest representatives. I am not sure if the work *Nyāyasutras* had not gone through several redactions before it assumed its present shape. But it is pretty sure that from the time of Soc-mock to the period when the *Nyāyasūtras* were reduced to their present form, India was full of polemical writings, much of which has perished.

Though we know nothing from Brahmanical sources of the process of the development of Nyāya, we know some stages of the development from the Buddhists. Nāgārjuna and Maitreya wrote on Nyāya. In fact one of the volumes, I believe, the fifteenth of the great polemical work by Nāgārjuna on *Upāyakauśalya* is devoted to the exposition of Nyāya. Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu—all wrote on Nyāya. Then came the great Diṅnāga, the disciple of Asaṅga, whom the Japanese place between 400 to 500 A. D., and Kern between 520 and 600.

But in the meanwhile on the Brahminical side the *Sūtra* has been reduced to its present shape and a *Bhāṣya* has been composed when, nobody can say. If I am permitted to hazard a conjecture, both the *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* came after the development of the Mahāyāna School, i.e., both came after Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, say in the 2nd Century A. D. The Bhāṣyakāra, Vātsyāyana, though he does not even mention the Buddhists or even any Buddhist writers, pointedly refutes all the Mahāyānists doctrines of Transitoriness, of Void, of Individuality, and so on. Śavara, the Bhāṣyakāra of Mīmāṃsā, was liberal enough to speak of

refuting the Mahayānic theory that the whole is merely a collection of part and not in any way different from them. But Vātsyāyana is not so liberal. He would not name the Buddhists. There is another Vātsyāyana, however, who flourished about this time. He may be identical with or a relation of, or at least, have belonged to the same *gotra* with the Nyāya Bhāṣyakāra, on the supposition that families and clans rise into importance under one political circumstance and then disappear from history, both Vātsyāyanas may be said to have belonged to the same epoch. That Vātsyāyana is the celebrated writer on Erotics. He mentions some scandals about the Sātavāhanas who flourished by the middle of the 2nd Century A.D. And the geographical information gleaned from his book cannot refer to a period later than the rise of the Gupta family.

We glean one historical information from the Brahmanical sources, namely, that Diṅnāga severely criticised the Bhāsyakāra Vātsyāyana, and that the Vārtikakāra, who comments upon the *Bhāṣya*, defends Vātsyāyana's work against Diṅnāga.

The Modern Hindu idea is that the Buddhists believed in two of the *pramāṇas* only, namely, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, i.e., perception and inference. But this is not a fact, so far as early Buddhism and even early Mahāyānism are concerned. For we know distinctly from Chinese and Japanese sources that Analogy and Authority were great polemical instrumens in the hands of the early Buddhists, i.e., that all early Buddhists from Buddha to Vasubandhu were indebted to Akṣapāda for their *pramāṇas* or polemical instruments of right knowledge. Maitreya discarded Analogy, and Diṇnāga discarded Authority, and made Nyāya pure logic, in the English sense of the term.

The followers of Akṣagāda are sometimes called Yogins, and Yaugas, and the Buddhist tradition is that Mirock (Maitreya) introduced Yoga in the system of discriminating true knowledge from false (i.e., the system of Akṣapāda), some form of Yoga. And we find that at the second lecture, fourth chapter, of the *Nyāyasūtras*, there is a long section devoted to Yoga, and that Yoga is of a peculiar

character. How the section on Yoga was adopted into the Nyāyaśastra, it is difficult to say, because Yoga does not belong to the sixteen topics which Akṣapāda, in the first *sūtra.* promises to expatiate upon. Whether properly or improperly introduced, it forms a part of Hindu Nyāyaśāstra. and also of Buddhist Nyāyaśastra. The Buddhists say that Mirok introduced it, but the Hindus cannot say who introduced it.

I reserve the result of my examination of the Nyāyasūtras for the second instalment of this paper ; and I conclude this instalment with the remark that though Diṅnāga and the Buddhist system of Nyāyaśāstra is almost completely lost in India, so much so, that the discovery of the Tibetan translation of one of Diṅnāga'a works, was regarded by scholars as a matter of congratulation, it is still studied and commended upon in China, Japan, Corea and Mongolia. In Japan only, it has a rival in the European system. But I have been assured that the rivalry has only strengthened the position of the Hindu system. While the colleges study the European System, the monasteries study the ancient system with great zeal.

(JASB, 1906)

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

S. Kuppuswami Sastri

I. PRELIMINARY : LOGIC IN THE WEST AND IN INDIA

In the cultural history of Europe, over twenty-two centuries ago, thinking, like speaking, needed an ellucidative and regulative aid and found it in a distinct branch of investigation, which was founded and organised in Greece by Aristotle and which came to be designated Logic. It is significant that the name logic is etymologically connected with the Greek word *logos*, which denotes both 'thought' and 'word' or 'discourse'. The significance of this etymological connection can be adequately appreciated if it is remembered that logic, in its rise and development in the western world, particularly in Greece, was closely connected with rhetoric. Thus the name logic is of a tell-tale charater in its application to logic in the West ; and it may be taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, Western logic found itself in the firm grip of formalism and how it took more than twenty centruries for the scientific method underlying Aristotle's *Organon* to be redeemed, brought into prominence and implemented in the *Novum Organum* of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The term logic should not be taken to carry with it all these implications of European history when it is used in the phrase Indian logic. This phrase is usually rendered by the Sanskrit equivalent—*ānvīkṣiki nyāyavistara, nyāyadarśana, tarkaśāstra,* and *pramāṇaśāstra.* It is also usual to describe Indian logic by the anglicised phrase Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and it is usually described thus in this work. All these phrases are significant and appropriate in one way or other, particularly in view of the place which Indian logic occupies in the cultural history of India and of the manner in which it

arose and grew—not as a mere grammar of thinking, but as an orthodox (*āstika*) system of philosophy with a special stress on the science of methodical reasoning in both its inductive and deductive aspects, this science forming its dominant and distinctive part. Indian logic is *ānvīkṣikī* or *nyāyavistara* or *nyāyadarśana* in the sense that it is philosophical system, of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme; it is pre-eminently the science of ratiocination or *tarkaśāstra*; and in contrast with the *padaśāstra* or 'the science of grammar' (Vyākaraṇa) and with the *vākyaśāstra* or 'the exegetics' (Mīmāṃsā), it is described as the *pramāṇaśāstra* or the epistemological science, chiefly concerned with valid knowledge and its sources. That Indian logic is usually described as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is not because it is the result of the syncretism of the two opposing systems—Nyāya realism and Atomistic pluralism; rather it is so described because at a very early stage in the history of Indian logic, the Vaiśeṣika stress on the inductive phase of inference came to be synthesised with its deductive phase in the Nyāya theory of syllogistic reasoning. Those who are familiar with Western logic and desirous of studying Indian logic from a historical and comparative point of view will do well to bear in mind the fact that, while one may find striking parallels in the Indian and Western systems of logic, and should not be misled by such parallels and lose sight of the fundamental differences in respect of scope and method, which Indian logic discloses in its rise and development, as compared with Western logic.

II. ANTECEDENTS AND FORESHADOWINGS OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA AND NYĀYA

The story of India's quest for truth and of India's attempts to lay out suitable ways and approaches to truth is long and varied and it has been reconstructed with a consi-

derable measure of success by several eminent scholars, Indian and alien, from the ancient literary monuments of India, which are mostly in the form of Sanskrit works. In all this quest and these attempts, a careful student of the history of Indian philosophical thought may discern, almost from the very beginning, two tendencies—the intuitionistic and the rationalistic, and two chief aims—the achievement of Dharma and the realisation of Brahman. If one of the Ṛg-Vedic seers could be said to have boldly intuited the monistic absolute in the well-known verse. "That One breathed breathlessly by itself" (*ānīdavātaṃ svadhayā tadekam* : Ṛv. X. 129.2), it would not be far-fetched to find the rationalistic exhortation of another Ṛg-Vedic seer in the verse "Meet one another, discuss and understand your minds" (*saṃgacchadhvaṃ saṃvadadhvaṃ saṃ vo manāṃsi jānatām* : Ṛv. X. 191.2). These two tendencies came to exhibit themselves throughout the Vedic age, in close association with the two aims mentioned above. On one side, as a result of the influence of the rationalistic tendency on the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, ritualistic and exegetic doctrines, which, in due time, emerged as Jaimini's system of Purva-Mīmāṃsa, were developed. And, on the other side, the combined workings of the intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direction of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led to the emergence of the Upanisadic philosophy of Ātman. This philosophy was marked by a pronounced emphasis on the efficacy and value of intuition, which culminated in Bādarayaña's system of Vedānta. The dominant feature of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is its monistic absolutism, which led up, within the Upanisadic period itself, to rationalistic reactions of different types, representing collateral and casual phases of Upanisadic thought—some of them coming to be systematised later on in the dualism and realism of Kapila's Sāṃkhya and the allied discipline of Patañjali's Yoga, some other eventually giving rise to the pluralistic rationalism of Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika system and its complementary Nyāya of Gautama, and yet others emerging as

anti-Vedistic rebels in the form of the Jaina may-be-ism (*syādvāda*), the Bauddha idealism (*vijñānavāda*) and nihilism (*śūnyavāda*), and the Cārvāka materialism. All these post-Upanisadic systems came to be called *darśanas* (*darśanāni*). It should be noted here that the term 'system' is very inadequate as the English equivalent of the Sanskrit word '*darśana*'. While the former word brings into prominence the idea of systematisation, the latter word brings into relief the fact that the plenary intuition of truth or spirit *tattvadarśana* or *ātmadarśana*), which a gifted saint or seer came to have, lies at the root of evey system of Indian philosophy and forms its fruit also. A long-established and widely accepted tradition classifies these *darśanas* into *āstika* and *nāstika*. The history of the meaning of these two words throws some light on the manner in which the ground of classification happened to be shifted under varying circumstances. Pāṇini's *sūtra* 4. 4. 60 (*asti nāsti diṣṭaṃ matiḥ*) gives the derivation of the words *āstika, nāstika* and *daiṣṭika* : and according to Pāṇini, *āstika* is 'one who believes in the other world', *nāstika* is 'one who does not believe in the other world' and *daiṣṭika* is a 'predestinarian' or 'fatalist'. This is the oldest recorded explanation of these words. On the basis of this explanation, even Jainism, and Buddhism in some of its aspects, could be described as *āstika* systems. An old popular tradition would take the word *āstika* in the sense of 'one who believes in God.' If this should be accepted, Jaimini's Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Kapila's Sāṃkhya, which are usually included in the *āstika* list, ought to be dropped from that list, as they do not recognise Īśvara. A post-Buddhistic, but pre-Christian, tradition fixed the meaning of the word *āstika* as 'one who believes in the infalibility and the supreme authority of the Veda' and of the word *nāstika* as 'one who does not believe in it.' This tradition has been widely accepted for a long time. According to this, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are described as *āstika-darśanas*, and the Cārvāka, Jaina and Bauddha systems as *nāstika-darśanas*. In this context, whenever the

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terms orthodox and heterodox happen to be used as the English equivalents of *āstika* and *nāstika*, it should be remembered that they have reference to belief and disbelief in the authority of the Veda.

Though the first beginnings of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems are misty in certain respects, a careful student is not likely to miss the foreshadowings of the central doctrine of these systems in the Upaniṣads. In the well-known three-fold scheme of self-culture leading to self-realisation, as taught in the oft-quoted Upanisadic text "Verily, Maitreyī, the Spirit should be realised, heard, discussed and constantly contemplated upon" (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaś śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*—Bṛhad. IV. 5), it is generally accepted that hearing or initial comprehension (*śravaṇa*) represents the inaugural stage, investigation and discussion with the help of reason (*manana*) represent the central stage and constant contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) stands for the culminating stage. The grim spiritual teacher of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* Death (Yama), pulls up the rationalist of the Upanisadic age with the warning "Self-realisation cannot be got through ratiocination or *tarka*" (*naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā*—Kaṭha II.9). From these foreshadowings of deliberate attempts to exercise reason, when considered together with the fact that philosophical debates such as those that were carried on under the auspices of Ajātaśatru and Janaka were very common during the Upanisadic age, the inference is irresistible that, already during the period of the Upaniṣads, some logical doctrines should have not only begun to appear, but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.

III. HOW THE VAISEṢIKA AND NYĀYA SCHOOLS EMERGED AND WHEN THEIR DOCTRINES WERE REDACTED INTO *SŪTRAS*

Before the end of the Upanisadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the

results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and Upanisadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. This should have resulted in the development of the pre-Buddhistic Nyāya method in close association with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier use of the term Nyāya in the sense of 'the principles and the logical method of Mīmāṃsā exegetics.' This also accounts for the fact that, even after the disentanglement of the Nyāya logic from Vedic exegetics, the legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yājñavalkya emphatically recognised the importance and value of logical reasoning (*tarka*) in a correct comprehension of *dharma* as taught by the Vedas (Manu XII. 105 and 106 ; Yājñavalkya I. 3). Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedic religion and philosopny. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into the Sāṃkhya thought of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility of Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis and with a simple rationalistic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge—perception and inference (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). It is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of the pre-Buddhistic Sāṃkhya and the anti-Vedic logic and epistemology the pre-Buddhistic Vaiśeṣika paved the way for the development and systematisation of Buddhism. It may here be borne in mind that Buddhistic tradition, as preserved in ancient Chinese records, readily recognises the priority of the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika to Buddhism. (See Ui's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, pages 3 and 4).

About the fifth century B.C., when the anti-Vedic movements of Buddhism rose and began to spread, the exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt the need for

showing greater accommodation to rationālistic modes of thought. The rationalistic resources available for Vedic religion and philosophy had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive and offensive use, as against the impact from collision with *avaidika* developments. On the one side, it was found easy to disentangle from its Vedistic environment the logical method (Nyāya) of Vedic exegetics ; and on the other side, to bring the unfettered methods of reasoning and analysis known to the early Vaiśeṣika under the influence of the attempts for reapproachment made by the Vaidika thinkers turned out to be as easy task, chiefly as a result of the disquieting nihilistic excesses of early Buddhism. Thus, the Nyāya of the Vedic exegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika came to fraternise with each other and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning—the Vaiśiṣeka school mainly concerned with inductive observation and analysis, and the Nyāya school chiefly concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoing. These two schools should have appeared in a fairly definite form, with their characteristic methods of reasoning and metaphysics, by the middle of the fourth century B.C., though the chief doctrines of these schools came to be systematised and redacted in their basic *sūtras* at a relatively later date. This statement may receive good support from the following facts, if they could be taken to be conclusively established. Bhadrabāhu, a Jaina sage, whose activity as a Jaina logician may be assigned to about 357 B.C., was quite familiar with an old theory of ten membered syllogism. The Nyāya logic was known to Kātyāyana of the fourth century B.C., as Goldstucker has shown in his work on '*Pāṇini and his Place in Sanskrit Literature*'. Bādarāṇya's *Vedānta-sūtra* (II-ii 11 to 17) definitely presuppose the Vaiśeṣika. The Lalitavistara and *Milindapañhā* mention the Vaiśeṣika. Even the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, which were, in all probability, produced later than the middle of the fourth century B.C., do not controvert any of the Buddhistic doctrines, while Buddhistic tradition

generally recognises the pre-Buddhistic origin of the Vaiśeṣika. These considerations, which tend to show that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools came into being in a definite form before the middle of the fourth century B. C., cannot be lightly brushed aside.

The doctrines of these two schools were systematised and redacted in the form of the *Nyāya-sūtras* and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. The authorship of the former is ascribed to Gautama, and that of the latter to Kaṇāda. According to the geneally accepted Indian tradition, which goes back to the early centuries of the Christian era, Gautama is otherwise known as Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda is otherwise known as Ulūka and Kāśyapa. It will be obvious to those who are familiar with the traditions of ancient India that Akṣapāda was the personal name and Gautama and *gotra* name of the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and that Kaṇada and Ulūka are the personal names and Kāśyapa the *gotra* name of the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, in the same way as Pakṣilasvāmin is the personal name and Vātsyāyana the *gotra* name of the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Though the exact dates of Kaṇāda and Gautama are not known, the dates of their *sūtras* can be fixed within fairly definite limits. Jacobi, in his well-known article on the date of the philosophical *sūtras* (Journal of the American Oriental Society XXXI. 1911), endeavours to show that the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the *Brahma-sūtras* were redacted between 200 and 500 A.D., that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and *Mīmaṃsā-sūtras* were redacted at a somewhat earlier date, that the redaction of the *Yoga-sūtras* should be assigned to about 450 A. D. and that the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* were produced at a much later date, later than the fourteenth century. With regard to the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras*, it is generally accepted that they were composed later than the fourteenth century, though the *Tattvasamāsa*, which may be regarded as the nucleus of the basic *sūtras* of the Sāṃkhya system, is perhaps older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Christian era and is certainly older than the *Bhagavadajjuka*, a farce earlier than the seventh century A.D. (See Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. II.

pages 145 to 147). If the *Bhikṣu-sūtra* referred to in IV. iii. 110 of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *Brahma-sūtra* mentioned in XIII.4 of the *Gītā* could be taken to refer to Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*, it would be difficult to accept, without due reservations, Jacobi's argument in its application to the *Vedānta-sūtras*. The name Patañjali, borne by the author of the *Yoga-sūtras*, presents some difficulties to Jacobi, as the date of Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhaṣya*, is accepted to be the middle of the 2nd century B.C. But Jacobi would attempt to differentiate the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* from the author of the *Yoga-sūtras*, though, as a matter of fact, the ancient tradition identifyịng the two Patañjalis is sound and maintainable on reasonable grounds. The central point of Jacobi's argument relates to the internal evidences furnished by the nature of the Buddhist doctrines controverted in some of these *sūtras*. The *Nyāya-sūtras*, according to Jacobi, refute the nihilistic *śūnya-vāda* of Nāgārjuna (3rd century A.D. *circa*) and do not refute the idealistic *vijñāna-vāda* of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (middle of the 4th century A.D.). But, according to Vātsyāyana and Vācaspatimiśra, the *Nyāya-sūtra* IV. 2. 26 refutes the *vijñāna-vāda*. It should also be remembered here that the *śūnya-vāda* and *vijñāna-vāda* doctrines were not introduced in the world for the first time by Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and that, before these Buddhist teachers, these old doctrines had been in existence for a long time. Even if this line of argument adopted by Jacobi should be accepted as satisfactory, it does not touch the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and if the observe of this argument were to be applied to these *sūtras*, the logical result would be that they should be held to be pre-Buddhistic. *Kauṭalīya Arthaśāstra* mentions the types of thought comprising *ānvīkṣikī* in the statement :—*Sāṃkhyaṃ yoga lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī* (Vol I. page 27, Trivandrum edition). Though the date of the *Kauṭalīya* is not yet finally settled, the general trend of well-informed and unprejudiced opinion among Indian and alien Indologists is in favour of assigning that great work to 304 B.C. In this extract from the *Kauṭilya*, there is

not specific mention of Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika as such. Attention is drawn by Ui and Randle to noteworthy cases of parallelism between the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and *Nyāya-sūtras*, in which it would be more reasonable to say that the former *sūtras* were used in the composition of the latter (See Ui's '*Vaiśeṣika philosophy*', Introduction, page 16, note 1; and Randle's '*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*', Introduction, page 7, note 1). There is evidence to show that the sixth Jaina schism (18 A.D.) presupposes the Vaiśeṣika redaction ('Ui's *Vaiśeṣika philosophy*', Introduction, page 34). Chiefly, on these grounds, it is surmised by several scholars that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* should have been redacted in the pre-Christian era, subsequent to 300 B.C.; and that the *Nyāya-sūtras* should have been redacted about the time of Nāgārjuna and Deva, between 150 and 250 A. D. may be inferred from the fact that the *sūtras* 2. 2. 17-19 seem to pre-suppose the refutatory comments in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* on the realistic position regarding the relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (Ui's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, Introduction pages 84 to 86). Randle concludes that the "Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya were systematised between 200 B.C. and 210 A.D., the Vaiśeṣika being the earlier of the two"; and that "the indications, such as they are, point to the beginning of the first century A.D., as the latest date for the systematisation of the Vaiśeṣika." (Randle's '*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*', Introduction, pages 16 and 17).

These conclusions, based as they are on good grounds as far as they go, would appear to require reconsideration on a careful scrutiny of all the evidences available. That the redaction of the *Nyāya-sūtras* presupposes of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* may be readily admitted. It is not easy to establish that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* were redacted subsequent to 300 B.C., on the ground that the name Vaiśeṣika is not contained in the extract from the *Kauṭalīya* quoted above. Those who are sufficiently familiar with the use of the word *yoga* in its old sense of Vaiśeṣika, as it is found used, for instance, in Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 29, are not likely

to consider it a strained interpretation to take the word *yoga*, as used in the *Kauṭalīya*, in the sense of Vaiśeṣika. In fact, according to Vācaspatimiśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and the *Bhāṣyacandra* on the *bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 29, the word *yoga* may be taken in the somewhat comprehensive sense of Nyāya, including the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya being a philosophical school laying special stress upon *yoga* or *yukti* or reasoning (*yoga yuktiḥ pradhānatayā vidyate yeṣām*—*Bhāṣyacandra*). Further, in the extract quoted above from *Kauṭalīya*, scholars have generally overlooked one important point, to which sufficient prominence ought to be given in this connection. In chapter 2, the Vidyāsamuddeśa section of the *Kauṭalīya*, the chief branches of knowledge (*vidyā*), according to Kauṭalya, are stated at the outset. These are four :—*ānvīkṣikī* (logic and philosophy), *trayī* (the Vedic religion and philosophy of *dharma* and *adharma*), *vārtā* (the economic science and philosophy of wealth) and *daṇḍanīti* (the science and philosophy of polity). Then there is a reference to the view of the Mānavas (Manu's disciples or ancient legislators), according to which (*ānvīkṣikī* should be regarded as a special part of *trayī*. This view, it may be noted, is consistent with the spirit of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic age, when logic (Nyāya) had not yet been disentangled from its applications to Vedic religion and philosophy. There is also a further reference to the materialistic doctrine of the Cārvākas (the followers of Bṛhaspati), that *trayī* (including *ānvīkṣikī*) is only a pretension or imposture of one who knows the ways of the world and that only *vārtā* and *daṇḍaniti* should be reckoned with as the two real *vidyās*. The followers of Uśanas (the teacher of the Asuras) are afterwards referred to as recognising only one *vidyā*—viz.. the *daṇḍanīti*. At the end of this chapter, Kauṭalya reiterates his views about the four branches of learning and explains their nature and aim. In the concluding para of this chapter, he makes two important observations. One is to the effect that *ānvīkṣikī* consists of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. The other is that *ānvīkṣikī* is helpful to the world through its ratiocinative process in the investigation

of the soundness or unsoundness of the conclusions and doctrines of the different branches of knowledge.

Sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī. Dharmādharmau trayyām. Arthānarthau vārtāyām. Balābale caitāsāṃ hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā ānvīkṣikī lokasyopakaroti vyasane abhyudaye ca buddhimavasthāpayati ; prajñāvākyakriyāvaiśāradyaṃ ca karoti.

Pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām
Āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ śaśvadānvīkṣikī matā

(Pages 27 and 28 of Vol. I of the *Kauṭalīya*, Trivandrum edition.)

It is evident here that *Kauṭalīya* elucidates the two meanings of the term *ānvīkṣikī*. One is the general sense, philosophical enquiry or philosophy. In this sense, it is used in the first sentence of the above extract. As already pointed out, the word *yogaḥ* in this sentence refers to the Vaiśeṣika logic ; or even if it be taken in the special sense of the *yoga* discipline of Patañjali's system, the word *lokāyata* does not refer to the materialism of the Cārvākas, but very probably it refers to the logic of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya in its secularised form and as disentangled from its Vedic associations. It should be noted here that the view of the Cārvāka materialist is separately mentioned in the previous part of the same chapter and Kauṭalya rejects it and is not prepared to bring the Cārvāka doctine under any recognised *vidyā* or branch of learning. Vātsyāyana, in the concluding part of his *bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 1, amplifies the second sense of the word *ānvīkṣikī*, i.e.—'logic which investigates by means of rationalistic methods' (*hetubhiranvīkṣamāṇā*) and gives Kauṭalya's verse quoted above with its last quarter modified as "*vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā*." It is quite clear from this amended quarter of the verse, as given by Vātsyāyana, that he is quoting from the Vidyāsamuddeśa section of the *Kauṭalīya*. It is hardly necessary to point out that a careful consideration of the above extract from the *Kauṭalīya* in comparison with its striking parallel in Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 1 would make it very difficult to

believe that *ānvīkṣikī*, in the sense of 'system of logic', was not pre-supposed by the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya. Further, a careful consideration of the extract from Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, which Ui gives in pages 84 and 85 of his introduction to the '*Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*', in comparison with its parallel in the *Nyāya-sūtras* 2. 2. 17-19, would tend to show that Nāgārjuna is presupposing these *sūtras* and refuting the view embodied in them, rather than support Ui's inference in the reverse direction. Patañjali, at the end of his *bhāṣya* on Pāṇini's 3. 2. 123, remarks—"Other thinkers hold that there is nothing known as the present time" (*apara āha—nāsti vartamānaḥ kāla iti*) and gives five verses in support of this view: This portion of the *Mahābhāṣya* closes with the remarks "Another thinker holds that there is such a thing as the present time, and it is not perceived in the same way as the Sun's motion is not perceived" (*apara āha—asti vartamānaḥ kālaḥ*) and supports this view with one verse. Between this portion of the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Nyāya-sūtras* 2. 1. 40-44, there a is striking parallelism, which none can miss. A careful consideration of these two texts would lead to the impression that Patañjali is here using not only the ideas in the *Nyāya-sūtras* referred to, but also the phraseology in those *sūtras*, in his characteristically graphic narration of a discourse between two imaginary dialogists. All these considerations may reasonably lead to the conclusion that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and the *Nyāya-sūtras* were redacted between the middle of the fourth century and second century B.C., perhaps towards the end of the fourth century B.C., the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* being earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*.

IV. THE NAMES VAIŚEṢIKA AND NYĀYA; THE NATURE, AIM AND SCOPE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS

It is generally accepted that the names Vaiśeṣika-darśana and Nyāya-darśana are based upon the terms—*viśeṣa* and *nyāya*. It is not possible now to ascertain exactly what

these two terms signified to the early exponents of these two systems, who were responsible for devising and introducing these two names. According to an old tradition recorded by the Chinese Buddhists—Ci-tsān (549-623 A.D.) and Kwhei-ci(632-682 A.D.), Kaṇāda's works came to be called the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, since it excelled works of the other systems, more especially the Sāṃkhya, and it was differentiated from them, the term *vaiśeṣika* being taken in the sense of 'superior to' or 'distinct from' (See Ui's *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*—pp. 3 to 7). Indian tradition is in favour of connecting the name Vaiśeṣika with the doctrine of specialities (*viśeṣāḥ*), *viśeṣa* being regarded as the distinctive category of the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*—1. 1. 4—which practically represents the beginning of Kaṇāda's *sūtras* lays special emphasis, not upon any of the categories, but upon 'the comprehension of truth through similarities and disimilarities' (*sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānam*)—upon the striking out of the one in the many; and this amounts to an unmistakable stress on 'the analytic or inductive method of philosophical reasoning'. Gautama's Nyāya-darśana took its name from *nyāya*, which means 'the synthetic or deductive method of syllogistic demonstration'. Gautama's system lays particular stress on the synthetic method of syllogistic reasoning. One of the earlier meanings of the term *nyāya* is 'exegetic principle or maxim'; and after logical reasoning had been released from Vedic exegesis, the term *nyāya* developed the specialised sense of syllogistic reasoning, the appropriateness of using the term *nyāya*, in this specialised sense, as the name of Gautama's system lies not only in the historical connection between the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā systems; but it lies also in the fact that the term *nyāya* means illustration or example and that example (*udāharaṇa*) is the most important of the five members constituting Gautama's syllogistic expression. Thus it may be seen that the names *vaiśeṣika* and *nyāya* may be connected with the two aspects of sound reasoning—the analytic or inductive aspect which mounts up from particulars (*viśeṣa*) to the general or universal (*sāmānya*) and the synthetic or

deductive aspect which moves on from the universal (*sāmānya*) to the particulars (*viśeṣa*). In these logical notions, it would be in keeping with the history of Indian philosophical thought to recognise the basis of the names, *vaiśeṣika* and *nyāya,* rather than in the ontological doctrines of atomism and pluralistic realism. This would account better for the way in which the interrelation of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya came to be conceived of as two sister systems in spite of their differences on the metaphysical side.

The Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya, in their early and later phases, are not restricted in their scope and aim to logic in a narrow sense. Like other Indian systems, these two form self-contained philosophical disciplines of a complex character, with a distinctive central theme correlated to their special goal. The final cessation of all miseries (*apavarga*) is the goal of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya. The Vaiśeṣika stresses the analytical side of reasoning and furnishes the metaphysical background and the inductive basis of the Nyāya system. With the Vaiśeṣika material, suitably modified in minor details, the Nyāya builds up a complete system of epistemology and logic, combined to some extent with psychology, ethics, ontology and religion. Such a mixed composition of Indian philosophical systems is due not to any lack of appreciation of differences of value in different things, but rather to the cultural outlook of India, which is dominated by an intense desire to synthesise all the departments of knowledge in a scheme of progressive realisation of life's ends culminating in final emancipation (*mukti*) conceived of as the *summum bonum.* Methodical reasoning, involving a critical investigation of knowledge got through perceptual experience and verbal testimony, i.e., *anvīkṣā,* with the help of the five-membered scheme of syllogistic expression (*nyāya* or *pañcāvayavavākya*), forms the distinctive contribution of the Nyāya to philosophical thought. Since its first redaction, the Nyāya system has permanently secured for itself a position of importance in the Hindu scheme of Vedic religion and philosophy, chiefly by the ancillary role which it has assumed in its relation to the Veda and if

the Vaiśeṣika also is given a place among the *āstika* systems, it is due mainly to its fraternity with the Nyāya. Gokulanātha, a Naiyāyika of the 16th century A.D., suggests in his philosophical drama, called *Amṛtodaya*, that Ānvīkṣikī is the amazonian commander-in-chief of Śruti—the empress ruling over the empire of knowledge and emancipation. This poetic representation would be very helpful in appreciating the exact position of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system in the scheme of *āstika* schools of philosophy.

V. SYNCRETISM AND SYNTHESIS

It has now become usual among modern scholars, when speaking about the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems, to refer to the tendency to syncretism in these two schools. In chater II, part I of "*Indian Logic and Atomism*", Dr. Keith dwells upon what he describes as "the syncretism of the schools" and the "syncretist school". Syncretism, in its strict sense, means the tendency to reconcile and blend two opposing and irreconcilable systems, by minimising differences. In this sense, it would be correct to speak about syncretism in the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya only with reference to their condition before their redaction into *sūtras*, and even then, with due reservations. It may be said that, in the pre-Buddhistic age, rationalistic thinking came to have a schismatic split which resulted in two opposing types of rationalistic thought, one linking itself with Vedic tradition and the other antagonising it. As already pointed out, a *rapproachment* was effected between these two types of thought; and as a result of this, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya arose in the form of two sister schools. The tendency which led to the first redaction of these two schools in a fraternal relation, may be appropriately described as syncretism. Since their definite emergence as two distinct and allied systems about the fourth century B.C. to this day, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya have been treated as sister schools, fundamentally agreeing

with each other in respect of important metaphysical and logical doctrines and persistently showing some comparatively minor differences; and in this condition, they were never regared as opposing schools and it would not be quite accurate to speak of syncretism in them, in the strict sense o' the term. In the somewhat larger sense, however, of synthesis, one may well speak of syncretism in these two sister schools from and after their first redaction. In the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools were never regarded as rival schools. Nor were their differences ever forgotten: and till recently, separate Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika treatises continued to be written. In fact, even as late as in the seventeenth century A.D., separate handbooks dealing with the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, like Gaṅgādharasūri's *Kaṇādasiddhānta-candrikā* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. XXV), were written. It should be remembered here that Akṣapāda-Gautama, effected the momentous synthesis between the inductive (Vaiśeṣika) and deductive (Nyāya) types of rationalistic thinking, in his doctrine of five-membered syllogistic expression (*nyāya-prayoga*) hinging upon the example (*udāharaṇa*) as the central member. The Nyāya ontology is built upon the atomic theory and pluralistic realism of the Vaiśeṣika. The Nyāya epistemology, with its fourfold scheme of *pramāṇas* is distinctly pro-Vedic; and in this respect, it shows a sharp contrast with the Vaiśeṣika scheme of *pramāṇas* which consists of perception and inference and which betrays anti-Vedic leanings. Such points of contrast have only led to Vaiśeṣika gradually losing its hold and influence. Indian philosophical tradition recognises three important pairs of allied systems (*samānatantrāṇi*)—viz., the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, and the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Vātsyāyana, in his *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.1.22), speaks of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya as *samānatantra.* It is noteworthy that, while the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta grew as two pairs of allied systems, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya came to be more closely knit together and grew as twin systems, chiefly as a result of

the complete synthesis which the Nyāya effected in its logical method.

VI. AFTER THE *SŪTRAS* TO UDAYANA

The extant early works, forming the basic source-books of the Vaiśeṣika system, are Kaṇāda's *sūtras* and Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, better known under the name of *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. According to Udayanācārya's *Kiraṇāvalī*, as interpreted by Padmanābhamiśra in his *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* (Benaras Sanskrit Series, *Kiraṇāvalī*, page 5), Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* is a comprehensive epitome of the Vaiśeṣika system which presupposes an extensive *Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya*, known as *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, and attributed to an ancient philosopher called Rāvaṇa. At page 278 of the manuscript of the commentary called the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* on Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, Rāvaṇa's *bhāṣya* on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is cited, (See p. 491 to Pt. of the edition of this work in the Madras University Sanskrit Series). *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* is earlier than 13th century A.D. An interesting confirmation of the tradition about *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is contained in the *viṣkambha* to the fifth Act of the *Anargharāghava* (Niranyasagara edition, page 161). There is evidence to show that this drama must be earlier than the latter part of the ninth century A.D. In this connection, attention is invited to my paper on the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, which appears in volume III of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, pages 1 to 5. In this paper, it is indicated that it may not be unreasonable to conjecture that the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* was perhaps dominated by atheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as were quite in keeping with the text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the Vaiśeṣikas as *ardhavaināśikas* (semi-nihilists) while the work of Praśastapāda gave a theistic turn to the Vaiśeṣika system and presented its doctrines in an anti-Buddhistic *āstika*

setting. There is conclusive proof to show that Praśastapāda should be earlier than Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārtika*, who flourished in the latter part of the six or the beginning of the seventh century A.D. Professor Ui, in his introduction to the '*Vaiśeṣika-Philosophy*', draws attention to the evidences showing that Praśastapāda should be earlier than Paramārtha and Dharmapāla. Though Keith emphatically asserts in his '*Indian Logic and Atomism*' that Praśastapāda's indebtedness to Dignāga is undoubted, it must be said that Praśastapāda's debt to Dignāga has not yet been proved. If, on the other hand, Praśastapāda could not be taken to be presupposed by Vātsyāyana on the ground relied upon by Mr. Bodas in his introduction to the *Tarkasaṃgraha* (Bombay Sanskrit seris, No. LV), Dignāga, who presupposes Vātsyāyana, must be later than Praśastapāda. The two most authoritative commentaries on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* are Śrīdhara's *Kandalī* and Udayanācārya's *Kiraṇāvalī*. Śrīdhara's date is given as 991 A.D. in his *Kandalī* and Udayana's date is given as 984 A.D. in one of his works—*Lakṣaṇavalī*. Śrīdhara's reputation is restricted to his Vaiśeṣika work; but Udayana holds a far higher place in Indian philosophy and he is held in high esteem as the Nyāyācārya *per excellence*.

The extant basic works of Nyāya are Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras*, the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana, otherwise known as Pakṣilasvāmin, and the *Nyāyavārtika* by Uddyotakara. In the *Nyāya-vārtika* and other works, there is sufficient evidence to show conclusively that Dignāga, the famous Budddhistic logician, adversely criticised the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. Vasubandhu, the famous teacher of Dignāga, criticised *Nyāya-sūtras* and *Nyāya-bhāṣya* does not reply to Vasubandhu's criticisms. From these facts, it would be reasonable to conclude that the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* is earlier than about the middle of the fourth century A.D., which is the date for Vasubandhu. Vātsyāyana suggests alternative interpretations to some of the *sūtras*, as for instance, in his *Bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5. This may lead to the inference that Vātsyāyana wrote his *Bhāṣya*, long after the Sūtrakāra, perhaps

at a time when the meaning of some of the *sūtras* had already become a matter for speculation. There has been some controversy among scholars as to whether there was any commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras* before Vātsyāyana, and whether the aphoristic statements, which the Bhāṣyakāra introduces in the course of his exposition, are really quotations from some earlier commentary on the *sūtras*. Professor Windisch and several others are inclined to think that such aphoristic statements are citations from an earlier commentary. Professor Randle discusses this question in his recent work. "*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*" (pages 19 to 24) and concludes that these aphoristic statements are not citations from any author but should be viewed as forming "the heritage of the school and as carrying an authority only less than that of the *sūtras* themselves". Indian tradition, however, is wholly against any speculation of this kind in regard to the aphoristic statements in the *Bhāṣya* above referred to. In Śāstra literature, more specially in old works like the *Bhāṣyas* on the various systems, it is a common stylistic device to put forward a main thesis or argument in the form of a terse aphoristic statement and amplify it in an expository note. Several old Bhāṣyakāras have adopted this device and hundreds of instances can be given from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣyas* on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* and the *Brahma-sūtras*. In fact, the aphoristic statements which Vātsyāyana makes at the beginning of his expository sections form integral parts of Vātsyāyana's own composition; and it would be as absurd to ascribe such statements to any author different from Vātsyāyana, as it would be to ascribe the aphoristic statement, "Since there is no difference from cattle and other lower animals" in Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras* (*paśvādibhiścāviśeṣāt*—1. 1. 1.) to some author different from the Bhāṣyakāra, who amplified that statement in the following expository paragraph beginning with the words *yathā hi paśvādayaḥ*. Students of Indian logic will do well to remember that Vātsyāyana is the earliest known writer who drew pointed attention to the reason why Gautam's

Nyāya came to be regarded as the science of epistemology and logic (Pramāṇaśāstra, Ānvīkṣikī or Nyāya-śāstra). It is worth remembering, in this connection, that Vātsyāyana indicates in the very first sentence of his Bhāṣya how valid thinking (*pramā*) and fruitful doing (*arthakriyā*) serve as each other's axle in each other's wheelings and how they constitute real living with all its complexity in the pluralistic universe of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. It is also worth noting that it is Vātsyāyana who first explained how the entire epistemological scheme of Pramāṇas could be synthesised in a valid syllogistic expression, (vide pages 30 to 42 of his *Bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 1, Chaukhamba edition) and how, for this reason, logic proper justly came to exercise a profound influence over the whole realm of philosophical thought in India.

About the end of the sixth century A.D., or in the former half of the seventh century, Uddyotakara wrote his *Nyāya-vārtika*, the earliest extant commentary on the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*. Some scholars like Dr. Keith maintain that Uddyotakara was a contemporary of the Buddhistic logician Dharmakīrti. Hiuentsang (629-645 A.D.) does not speak of Dharmakīrti, while I-tsing (671-695 A.D.) refers to him. The reference in the *Nyāya-vārtika* to a *Vāda-vidhi* (page 117, line 21, Chaukhamba edition) is the only argument relied upon for showing that Uddyotakara is not earlier than Dharmakīrti. This argument assumes that Dharmakīrti is the author of the *Vāda-vidhi*. Sufficient evidence has not been adduced in support of the view that the *Vāda-vidhi* is one of Dharmakīrti's works. Chinese tradition definitely lends support to the identification of the *Vāda-vidhi* with one of Vasubandhu's works. Further, in the *Vārtika* on 1. 1. 4, Dignāga's definition of perception is criticised ; and it is generally accepted by Brahmanical and Buddhistic authorities alike that Dharmakīrti was responsible for the introduction of the additional word *abhrānta* in that defiinition, chiefly with a view to meeting the objections raised by Uddyotakara against it. These considerations tend to show that it would be reasonable to assign Uddyotakara to the end of the sixth or the

beginning of the seventh century A.D. and to assign Dharmakīrti to about the third quarter of the seventh century A.D. Uddyotakara's great service to Nyāya consists in his successful endeavour to lift it up from the slough into which it was thrown by Dignāga's confutation of Vātsyāna's *Bhāṣya.* After Uddyotakara, the philosophical contest between the anti-Vedic and pro-Vedic sides of the Nyāya thought was keenly carried on by great Buddhistic logicians like Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Ratnakīrti and eminent Brahmanical logicians like Vācaspatimiśra, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajña and Udayana. Vācaspati has himself given 841 A.D. as the date of composition of his index to Gautama's *sūtras,* called *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.* Vācaspati is famous for his polymathic learning and dispassionate philosophical outlook. He is the author of many important and authoritative treatises, mainly in the nature of expository and critical commentaries, on almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. His *Brahmatattasamīkṣā* on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Brahmasiddhi* and *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* represent the Advaita system; his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* and *Yoga-bhāṣya-vaiśāradī* represent the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system; and his *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* and *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* represent the Nyāya system. There is evidence to show that *Bhāmatī* should have been his latest work. In his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā,* he renders intelligible the difficult portions of the *Nyāya-vārtika* and incidentally discusses several obscure portions of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* and the *Nyāya-sūtras,* in accordance with the Nyāya tradition handed down to him by his Nyāya-teacher—Trilocana. For the monumental contribution which he made to Nyāya in his *Tātparya-tīkā,* he came to be known as the *Tātparyācārya* in Nyāya literature. He justly claims, in his *Tātparya-tīkā,* special credit for having redeemed from oblivion Uddyotakara's work, which came to be regarded very old and nearly forgotten in the ninth century A.D. Jayantabhaṭṭa, who presupposes Vācaspati in his work and refers to Ānanda-vardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* (Vide page 48, lines 21 to 25, *Nyāyamañjarī,* Benares), should be taken to be later

than the middle of the ninth century A.D. ; and with the help of the particulars furnished by Jayanta's son, Abhinanda, in the *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, Jayanta may be assigned to the third quarter of the ninth century A.D. Jayanta's chief contribution to Nyāya is his *Nyāymañjari*. This work is of the nature of an elaborate *vṛtti* (expository gloss) on select *sūtras* of Gautama. Jayanta hmself says that the *Nyāya-mañjarī* was so well appreciated by his contemporaries that he came to be recognised as the Vṛtti-kāra of Nyāya. Bhāsarvajña, who flourished perhaps about the beginning of the tenth century A.D., is the author of an important Nyāya work called *Nyāya-sāra* ; and the distinctive feature of his work is its epistemology which deviates in certain respects from established Nyāya tradition, as for instance, in discarding *upamāna* as a distinct Pramāṇa and in recognising six *hetvābhāsas* including *anadhyavasitā*. Udayanācārya is the greatest Naiyāyika of the tenth century A.D. At the end of one of his works, *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, he has given 984 A.D. as the date of his composition. Besides his erudite commentaries on Praśastapāda's *Bhāśya* and Vācaspati's *Tātparya-tīkā*—*Kiranāvalī* and *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*, he wrote three important Nyāya works—the *Prabodhasiddhi*, otherwise called *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* the *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, otherwise called *Bauddha-dhikkāra* and the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*. The first of these three works contains an elucidative and illustrative exposition of rhe subtleties of *jāti* (futile respondence) and *nigrahasthāna* (vulnerable points) in accordance with the dialectics of early Nyāya. The *Ātma-tattva-viveka* is a brilliant exposition of the Nyāya metaphysics with particular reference to the Nyāya conception of the self (*jīva*) and contains a forcible refutation of the Buddhistic doctrines of momentariness (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*) and voidness (*śūnya*), The Kusumāñjali is Udayana's masterpiece. It is devoted to a refutation of the anti-theistic theories maintained by the Vedistic, Sāṃkhya, nihilistic and naturalistic schools of his age and to the amplification and vindication of the Nyāya theism, chiefly on the basis of the creationistic view of causation. Udayana's theistic argument consists of

two main parts :—one part arguing towards values, design and causation in the sense of creation and the other part arguing to God from values, design and creation. His monumental contribution to Indian theism has secured for him the high rank of Nyāyācārya. From the references given on page 21 of the Sanskrit introduction to the *Kandālī* (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series), it may be safely concluded that Udayana was a contemporary of Śrīdhara.

VII. AFTER UDAYANA TO ANNAMBHAṬṬA

Śivādityamiśra's *Saptapadārthī* is a short and simple manual setting forth the essentials of the Vaiśeṣika system chiefly in accordance with Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya.* It also makes use of the Nyāya material in Bhāsarvajṇa's *Nyāya-sāra*, to some extent. Śivāditya's text giving his scheme of six fallacious types of probans with *anadhyavasita* corresponding to *asādhāraṇa* (uncommon probans) as a distinct type, is practically a reproduction of the corresponding text of Bhāsarvajña (Compare page 23, *Saptapadārthī*—Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, with page 25 in the *Nyāyasāra*—Poona Oriental Book Agency). A careful comparison of Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* with Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī* would lead one to believe that the *Saptapadārthī* utilised the material in the *Kiraṇāvalī.* For instance, the definition of darkness on page 71 of *Saptapadārthī* appears to presuppose Udayana's remarks about darkness on pages 111 and 112 of the *Kiraṇāvalī* (Bibliotheca Indica) ; the definition of *jāti* on page 70 of the *Saptapadārthī* appears to presuppose Udayana's enumeration of *jātibādhakas* on page 161 of the *Kiraṇāvalī* and the definition of *lakṣaṇa* (definition) found on page 192 of the *Kiraṇāvalī* is reproduced on page 35 of the *Saptapadārthī.* Śrīharṣa, the author of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, and Gaṅgeśa, the author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, undoubtedly refer to Śivāditya. (Vide introduction to the *Saptapadārthī*—page 2) On these grounds, it would not be unreasonable to assign the *Saptapadārthī* to the eleventh century A.D.

(*circa*). The importance of the *Saptapadārthī* lies in the fact that later writers like Annaṃbhaṭṭa used it as their model for their primers of Nyāya, as may be unmistakably made out from the close correspondence between several portions in the *Saptapadārthī* and primers like the *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

The greatest Nyāya work, which was written after Udayana, is the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. In this monumental work, Gaṅgeśa utilised all the constructive, expository, critical and polemical material in the earlier works on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and gave the final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of Nyāya. In treating the various topics of Nyāya, the earlier writers usually adopted the categoristic method, which was inaugurated by Gautama. This method as expounded by Vātsyāyana, consists in enumeration and classification (*uddeśa* and *vibhāga*), definition (lakṣaṇa), careful investigation and discussion (*parīkṣā*). Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣā* (1100 A.D. *circa*) is the latest important work on Nyāya, which adopts the old categoristic method in accordance with the *Nyāya-sūtras* and *Bhāṣya*. It was Gaṅgeśa who replaced this old method by what may be described as the epistemological method or the *pramāṇa* method, which definitely shifted the emphasis from the categoristic treatment of the topics (*padārthāḥ*) of Nyāya to the epistemological treatment of the four means of valid cognition (*prāmāṇāni*) recognised by the Naiyāyikas. Thus, the Nyāya-śāstra, which had remained hitherto a mere *padārtha-śāstra*, for all practical purposes, was turned into a full-fledged *pramāṇa-śāstra* in Gaṅgesa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*; and in this partly lies the epoch-making character of this monumental work on Nyāya. That the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* serves the basic work on which the whole literature of what is commonly known as *navya-nyāya* (modern Nyāya) rests is also another reason for regarding it as an epoch-making work. The *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, or the *Maṇi* as it is popularly known, consists of four main divisions represented by the four chapters (*khaṇḍa*) on perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), assimilation in the

sense of analogising (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*śabda*). In the course of an elaborate elucidation and discussion of the nature and objective reach and content of these four Pramāṇas, the relevant topics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system are considered in the *Maṇi* in comparison with the kindred topics of other philososophical systems. The language of Gaṅgeśa's *Maṇi* is also an epoch-making type. Such of the modern students of Nyāya literature as are not equipped with the required control over the terminology of *navya-nyāya* are apt to indulge in the ill-conceived criticism that the language of the *Maṇi* and the connected works is spoiled by a huge over-growth of inflated and hair-splitting logic-chopping. The key to *navya-nyāya* is its terminology. Those who have controlled this terminology are sute to find in the *Maṇi* and allied works a discipline of unique subletly and value. The history of philosophical thought shows that lack of precision in expression seriously hampers its progress. In Indian thought, this defect was sought to be remedied by Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśopādhyāya through several thought-measuring devices, which chiefly consisted of formulas in Sanskrit constructed with the aid of terms like *avacchedaka* (the delimitor), *avacchedya* (the delimited), *nirūpaka* (co-forming), *nirūpya*(co-formed), *anuyogin* (containg correlate) and *pratiyogin* (the other correlate or counter-correlate). All the Indian dialecticians, who wrote after Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, were influenced by the thought-measuring formulas used by Gaṅgeśa. By using such formulas, it was possible for later dialectics in Indian philosophical literature to achieve a remarkable degree of quantitative precision in measuring the extent (temporal and spatial, content and intent (purpose and potency) of cognition (*jñāna*).

Gaṅgeśa quotes Śrīharṣa (the Khaṇḍanakāra) and refutes his view (page 233 of the *Maṇi-anumāna*, Bibliotheca Indica). There is sufficient evidence in favour of assigning Śriharṣa to 1136 A. D. *circa*. Pakṣadharamiśra, otherwise known as Jayadeva, wrote a commentary called *Āloka* the *Maṇi*. This Jayadeva, is believed to be identical

with Jayadeva, the author of the *Prasannarāghava.* A verse from this drama (*kadalīkadalī* etc. I. 37) is quoted in the *Sahityadarpaṇa,* as pointed out by Mr. P. V. Kane in his introduction to the latter work. Thus Pakṣadhara-miśra, alias Jayadeva, must have been considerably earlier than the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (1300 A.D. *circa*). These facts will show that it would not be reasonable to assign Gaṅgeśa to any date much earlier than 1200 A.D. and that he may be assigned to the former half of the thirteenth century A.D.

Vardhamānopādhyāya, the only son of Gaṅgeśa according to tradition, was also a raputed Naiyāyika of this period. He wrote several learned and illuminating works, generally known as *Prakāśa,* in the form of commentaries on Udayana's treatises, Gaṅgeśa's *Maṇi* and Vallabhācārya's *Nyāyalīlāvatī.* Jayadeva's pupil, Rucidatta, was a logician of considerable repute and was the author of well-known commentary called *Makaranda* on Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa.*

The end of the fifteenth century, as also the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, may well be described as marking the hayday of Nyāya dialectics in Nuddea (Navadvīpa, Bengal). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma was the greatest Naiyāyika who flourished about the end of the 15th and the earlier part of the 16th century. He had the unique privilege and glory of having taught Nyāya to four of the greatest personalities of the 16th century : viz.—Caitanya, the greatest Vaiṣṇava teacher and reformer of Bengal in the 16th century ; Raghunātha, otherwise known as Tārkika-śiromaṇi (the crest-jewel of all logicians) ; Raghunandana, a famous Bengal lawyer ; and Kṛṣṇānanda, a reputed *tāntrika.* who was a great authority on the different forms and charms of the Śākta cult. Raghunātha (Tārkika-śiromaṇi) was admittedly the greatest logician of the sixteenth century. He wrote several treaties on Nyāya, mostly in the form of commentaries and the greatest and the most famous of the works is the *Dīdhiti,* an expository and critical commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *maṇi.* Mathurānātha was the most famous of Raghunāthaśiromaṇi's puplils and wrote authoritative commentaries on the *Maṇi* and the *Dīdhiti.* Jagadīśa and

Gadādhara were the greatest exponents of *navya-nyāya* as represented by the *Maṇi* and the *Dīdhiti*, and flourished in the earlier part of the seventeenth century. Jagadīśa is famous as the author of the commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, popularly known as *Jāgadīśī*, the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*—an independent treatise on the speculative Semantics of Nyāya, a short manual called the *Tarkāmṛta* and a commentary called the *Bhāṣya-sūkti* on the *Bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda. Gadādhara is famous as the author of the commentary, popularly known as the *Gādādharī*, on the *Dīdhiti*, the commentary called the *Mūlagādharī* on portions of the *Maṇi*, commentaries on Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*, and fifty-two dialectic tracts and treatises—such as the *Vyutpatti-vāda* and *Śaktivāda* (dialectic treatises on the speculative Semantics of Nyāya). The more important works of Jagadīśa and Gadādhara are still studied carefully by those students who seek to specialise in *navya-nyāya* and they are regarded as constituting an indispensable discipline of high value to every scholar who wishes to be recognised as a sound *śāstrin*. The dialectic literature of later Nyāya is a vast banyan tree, which had its roots struck deep and its huge trunk fully developed in Mithila in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, had its immense branches and foliage stretched out and ramified in the *Dīdhiti* in Nuddea, and bore fruit in the rich fruitage of *Jāgadīśī Gādādharī*, which formed the colossal monument of Indian dialectics in the seventeenth century. If Raghunātha is regarded as the crest-jewel (*śiromaṇi*) of logical dialecticians. Gadādhara may well be characterised as the prince of Nuddea dialecticians, who wears the diadem inlaid with this brilliant crest-jewel.

In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Nyāya scholars interested themselves chiefly in the interpretation of the earlier and later works on Nyāya and in the production of introductory hand-books. Three of such scholars may be mentioned here—Śaṃkara-miśra, Viśvanātha-pañcānana and Annambhaṭṭa. Saṃkara-miśra wrote a commentary on the *Jāgadīśī* and a comprehensive commentary called the *Upaskāra* on Kaṇāda's *sūtras*. Viśvanātha-pañcānana

wrote a commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras* in 1634; and he is famous as the author of the popular hand-book of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, called the *Bhāṣāparicceda* or *Kārikāvalī*, which consists of 168 easy verses. The *Kārikāvalī* is accompanied by the author's own commentary called the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*. According to the traditional methods of study, the *Muktāvalī* is widely studied by students of Nyāya, immediately after finishing the study of Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṃgraha* and *Dīpikā*.

Annambhaṭṭa was an Andhra scholar who flourished in the latter part of the seventeenth century. He was a versatile scholar and a reputed polymath. He wrote several learned works on almost all the important branches of the Sastric learning. In this connection, attention may be invited to some of Annambhaṭṭa's known works. In the sphere of Pūrvamīmāṃsa and Vedānta, he is known as the author of the massive commentary called the *Rāṇakojjivanī* on Bhaṭṭa Someśvara's *Nyāya-sudhā*, otherwise known as Rāṇaka, and of a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. In Vyākaraṇa, he is famous as the author of an easy commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and of an extensive commentary called *Uddyotana* on Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*. In the sphere of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, he wrote a learned commentary called *Siddhāñjana* on Jayadeva's *Maṇyāloka*, as also the most popular hand-book of Indian logic called the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and its expository and supplementary gloss called the *Dīpikā*. The name *Tarkasaṃgraha* is interpreted by Annambhaṭṭa himself as a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika system, which are accepted by Nyāya. These two works—the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and the *Dīpikā*—fulfil the object mentioned in the concluding verse of the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and are described by some as miniature Gādādharī (Bālagādādharī), in the sense that they, taken together, miniature the later Nyāya dialectics also.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system originated in the rationalistic

tendency of the Upanisadic age, The original current of rationalistic thought came to be broken into two streams, the Vedistic Nyāya and the anti-vedistic Vaiśeṣika. After some time, there was a reapproachment between these two schismatic developments. The Vaiśeṣika emphasis on the inductive side of reasoning, together with its realism and pluralism, served as the basis for the development of the Nyāya theory of deductive reasoning through a well-defined scheme of syllogistic expression. All along, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya have been treated as sister systems (*samāna-tantra*) with a common rationalistic stress and realistic background, in spite of certain epistemological and onto-logical differences. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a self-contained system of philosophy. Its roots strike deep into its pluralistic realism. Its scheme of external relation, its theory of truth and error, and its creationistic view of causation (see Part III) constitute its mainstay. Its thought-measuring devices and precise formulas from its ever-spreading and never-fading foliage. Its fruit is the virile, though negativistic, doctrine of *abhāva* (non-existence) and *apavarga* (final liberation). Its chief solace and comfort is in its rationalistic theism, with its demiurgic omnipotent and omnicient Īśvara. Its chief boast is its logical and dialectic machinery, which the believers and the heretics, the Āstikas and the Nāstikas alike, cannot do without. Whoever knows Nyāya, knows the *pramāṇa*—is a *pramāṇavit*, a philosopher in the strict sense, according to Indian tradition.

(*A Primer of Indian Logic*, Madras 1951)

INDIAN ATOMISM

H. Jacobi

In the oldest philosophical speculations of the Brahmins as preserved in the Upaniṣads, we find no trace of an atomic theory ; and it is therefore controverted in the *Vedānta Sūtra,* which claims systematically to interpret the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Nor is it acknowledged in the Sañkhya and Yoga philosophies, which have the next claim to be considered orthodox, i.e. to be in keeping with the Vedas ; for even the *Vedānta Sūtra* allows them the title of Smṛtis. But the atomic theory makes an integral part of the Vaiśeṣika, and it is acknowledged by the Nyāya, two Brahmanical philosophies which have originated with, or at least been favoured by secular scholars (*paṇḍits*), rather than by divines or religious men. Among the heterodox it has been adopted by the Jains, and, is stated in the *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā,*[1] also by the Ājīvikas. It seeems to have been unknown to original Buddhism ; for the well-known Pali scholar, Professor Franke, states that no mention is made of it in the Pali canonical books. It is different, however, with the Northern Buddhists ; for the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas were adherents of the atomic theory, while the Madhyamkas and Yogācāras opposed it, as they declared the external world not to be real.

The speculations of the sects and philosophical schools just mentioned may be arranged in three groups. The first is represented by the Jains ; the second by the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* on the latter by Vātsyāyana, and, on the other hand, by the Northern Buddhists ; while the last phase of the theory is that which

1. The passage is quoted. s.v. '*Aṇu*', in a Buddhist dictionary now (1908) being printed in Calcutta, for the proofs of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallee Poussin.

appears first in the *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, the oldest systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika system, and has since been generally adopted by the combined Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

I. We place the Jains first, because they seem to have worked out their system from the most primitive notions about matter. These may be taken to be the following. Matter is an eternal substance, undetermined with regard to quantity and quality, i.e. it may increase or diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles, and it may assume any forms and develop any kind of qualities. Material substances may coalesce into one substance, and substance may divide into many.

Now, the Jains maintain that everything in this world, except souls and mere space, is produced from matter (*pudgala*), and that all matter consists of atoms (*paramāṇu*) Each atom occupies one point (*pradeśa*) of space. Matter, however, may be either in the gross state, (*sthūla*, *bādara*), or in the subtle (*sūkṣma*). When it is in the subtle state innumerable atoms of it occupy the space of one gross atom. The atoms are eternal as regard their substance; each atom has one kind of taste, smell, and colour, and two kinds of touch. These qualities, however, are not permanent and fixed for the several atoms, but they may be changed and developed in them. Two or more atoms which differ in their degree of smoothness and roughness, may combine to form aggregates (*skandha*). The figures formed by the arrangement of the atoms into groups are manifold, and are precisely described in the *Bhagavatī*; every thing is believed to be formed of groups of one kind only. The atom may develop a motion of its own, and this motion may become so swift that by means of it an atom may traverse in one moment the whole universe from one end to the other.

It is evident, from what has been said, that there are not different kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; but though it is not explicitly stated, still we may assume that the atoms, by

developing the characteristic qualities of the elements, differentiated and thus form the four elements. For the latter are presupposed by the belief in elementary souls: earth-souls, water-souls, fire-souls, and wind-souls, i.e. souls in various phases of development, which are embodied in particles of earth, etc. The elements must accordingly to be regarded as the bodies, or even corpses, of particular living beings; at any rate they are not without beginning and end.

We must mention the opinion of the Jains concerning *karma*, i.e. merit and demerit, in its bearing on the atomic theory. Karma according to them is of material nature (*paudgalika*). The soul by its commerce with the outer world becomes literally penetrated with material particles of a very subtle kind. These become *karma* and build up a special body, the *kārmaṇaśarīra*, which never leaves the soul till its final emancipation. Thus the atoms of which the *karma*-matter is composed are believed to be invested with a peculiar faculty which brings about the effects of merit and demerit. The opponents of the Jains understood this theory to mean that karma is the property of atoms and produces a motion in them so that they combine to form the body, and that the internal organs enters it.[2]

II. In our second group the conception of atoms has been combined with that of the four elements in the following way: There are four distinct kinds of atoms corresponding to the four distinct kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind; and the distinctive qualities of the latter are already found in the several atoms. Now, the belief that all material things are made up of four elements, singly or jointly, was current in India probably long before the philosophical systems of which we are speaking came into existence. We first meet it in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (vi. 2 ff.) There

2. Vātsyāyana. p. 191, and Vācaspati's remark in the footnote, and *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 448.

it is said that the Ens absolutum created fire, fire created water, and water created earth (*anna*), and that the three elements combining produce all existing things. In other places, wind (*vāyu*) is regarded as an element, and at last space (*ākāśa*) was reckoned as the fifth element; for it seemed proper that there should be five elements corresponding to the five organs of sense.[3] This theory of the five elements has been adopted in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and there it has been further developed by distinguishing two sets of elements, subtle (*tanmātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*). The elements in Sāṅkhya are, however, not atomic or eternal, but are developed from primeval matter (*prakṛti*) by a process which need not be detailed here. Of these traditional five elements, the fifth, *ākāśa*, has a peculiar character of its own, as it is not considered to enter into combination with the other elements, but to be a simple, i.e. an infinite and continuous substance; nor did the Buddhists even reckon it among their elements (*mahābhūtā*). And the Vaiśeṣikas also, who distinguished space (*diś*) from *ākāśa*, the substratum of sound, count the latter among the simple and infinite substances (*vibhu*), together with space, time, and the souls. Accordingly, both Brahmanical and Buddhistic atomists admitted only four atomic substances, viz. earth, water, fire, and wind. But in other details their opinions vary.

As we have as yet but defective and second-hand information about the atomic theories of the Buddhists, we shall first describe that of their opponents, the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

I. Vaiśeṣika being chiefly concerned with physics, and Nyāya with metaphysics and dialectics, the physical side of the atomic theory was more the province of the former, and the metaphysical of the later system. Hence it may be supposed that the atomic theory is more intimately connected

3. This subject is treated at some length in Dr Sukhthankar's dissertation, 'Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja' in Wiener Ztschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenl, xxii.

with the Vaiśeṣika system, and indeed Bādarāyaṇa regards it as their cardinal tenet.[4]

The opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on atoms and their qualities, as well as the arguments connected therewith, are epitomized in a few aphorisms of the 4th and 7th chapters of the *Vaiśeṣika/Sūtra* by Kaṇāda. They reasoned in the following way: Things that exist and are not produced from a cause are eternal; they may be inferred from (the fact that all known things are) products. Besides, as we call everything we perceive non-eternal, this idea of non-eternity presupposes eternity (iv. i. 1-4). And finally the fact that we do not perceive the ultimte, i.e. uncaused, causes of things, constitute our ignorance, and thus we are forced to assume that these ultimate causes are eternal.

But there is another interpretation of the last *sūtra* (iv. 1. 5), which consists only of one word, 'ignorance'; i.e. as we can imagine no other cause of the destruction of its causes, it follows that the last causes must be eternal.

For the interpretation of the *sūtras* here given the writer relies not so much on the modern commentaries (for there is no old one in existence), as on their refutation by Śaṅkara, which shows us what was the meaning attached to them more than a thousand years ago. It is to be understood that these eternal things, the causes of the non-eternal ones, are the atoms; but they are not visible. For the *sūtra* goes on to declare that a great thing may be visible, if has many constituent parts and possesses colour (iv. i. 6). The next *sūtra* (not in our text, but as quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika*, p. 233) states that the atom is invisible, because it is not composed of material parts. Now a thing is great if it is composed of many constituent parts or if the parts themselves are great, or if they are arranged in a peculiar way (VII. i. 9, not as in our text, but as

4. *Vedānta Sūtra*, II. ii. 11 ff., and Śaṅkaras remark's on II. ii. 1 f.

quoted by Śaṅkara on *Ved. Sūt.* II. ii. 11). The reverse of this holds good with the small *aṇu* (i. e. atom); that is to say, the atom is not composed of parts.

The discussion, carried on the next *sūtras* (10-20), comes to this. The expressions 'great, small, long, short,' as used in common parlance, are relative terms, the same thing being called great with reference to one thing and small with reference to another. These expressions refer to great (or long) things only, since only such are visible, and therefore they are used in a secondary meaning. In their primary sense 'great' and 'small' are not relative terms, but denote distinct kinds or genera dimension (just as red and blue are different kinds of colour). For otherwise we should speak of great or small greatness, i.e. we should attribute qualities (great or small) to a quality (greatness), which would be against the principle that qualities have no qualities. Greatness and smallness are non-eternal in non-eternal things; in eternal things they are eternal, i. e. absolute or infinite. The absolutely small is called globular (*parimaṇḍala*).

About the other properties of the atoms we have the following statements. The qualities of earthen and other things—colour, taste, smell, and touch—vanish on the destruction of the thing itself; accordingly they must be eternal in eternal things, i.e. in atoms. And so they are in the atoms of water, fire, and wind. In earth, however, as well as in atoms of earth, (some) qualities are *pākaja*, i.e. changeable by heat (VII. i. 1-6). Different atoms may come into conjunction (IV. ii. 4). In the beginning of creation the atoms are set in motion by *adṛṣṭa*, i.e. merit and demerit of creatures in the past period (V. ii. 13). The internal organ also is an atom (VII. i. 23).

This is all the information about atoms we can gather from the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*. But, short though it be, it is enough to show us the actual state of the atomic theory at the time of Kaṇāda and the arguments used by him in establishing that theory. Two things deserve to be noticed.

Firstly, the word for 'atom' used in our text, and, it may be added, in the *Nyāya Sūtra* too, is *aṇu*; only in the *sūtra* quoted in the *Nyāya Vārtika* do we meet with *paramāṇu*, the usual form with all later authors; but this may be a mistake of the Vārtikakāra, who quoted from memory. Secondly, the argument for the existence of atoms, which is based on the impossibility of unlimited division of a thing, was not yet made use of by the author of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.*

2. In the *Nyāya Sūtra* by Gautama, and especially in the *Bhāṣya*, or old commentary on it, by Vātsyāyana, who wrote in the 5th cent. A.D. or earlier, some aspects of the atomic theory are discussed, and objections raised to it by opponents are refuted. Gautama shared the opinions of the Vaiśeṣikas on the physical properties of the atoms described above. For, since he incidentally remarks (IV. i. 67) that the black colour (or earthen atoms) is not eternal (though existing from eternity), it follows that he considered the properties of water, fire, and wind to be eternal. The metaphysical questions, however, relating to atoms are fully discussed by Gautama, and further explained by Vātsyāyana. In the two places (II. i. 36 and IV. ii. 14 ff.) where they occur, they are brought in at the end of the discussion of the 'whole and its parts.' The Naiyāyikas maintain that the whole is something more than its parts; it is a different thing (*arthāntara*), not separated from its parts, but rather something in addition to them. We perceive the whole thing as such, e.g. a tree though we see only the front parts, and not the middle and back ones; and thus we see a thing though we cannot see the atoms of which it consists. The question of atoms is then discussed in this way. A thing consisting of parts is called a whole, but each part must again be considered as a whole, and so the parts of a part, and so on ad infinitum. If we never could come to last parts, we could not conceive the idea of the whole, and so the whole be dissolved into nothing. But the division reaches its limit in the atom, which cannot be divided any further, as we assume it to be absolutely small.

Another proof is the following. If the division into parts had no limit, the mote (*truṭi*) would not differ in size from the highest mountain, because both would have the same number of parts (IV. ii. 1 f.). The text then proceeds to refute objections raised against the notion of atoms as indivisible smallest things without parts. *Ākāśa* ('air'), as the Vaiśeṣikas assert, is a simple all-pervading, and infinite substance: the question is put whether it penetrates the atoms or not. If it does, the atom must have parts; if not, *ākāśa* would not be all-pervading. The reply is that the atom has no exterior or interior, nor is in hollow inside, but it is a simple, not a compound thing. It is further objected that, since the atom has a form, being globular, and since the form of a thing consists in the disposition of its parts, the atom must have parts. And again, when three atoms are in juxtaposition, that in the middle touches the one to the left with its right side, and that on the right with its left side; and when the atom is surrounded on all sides, we can distinguish six sides of the atom which must be considered its parts. And if the six sides were reduced to one (i.e. if the atom were a mere point), then the aggregate of the seven woud take up no more space than one atom and consequently a jar could be reduced to the size of an atom, and hence become invisible. These arguments are met by the declaration that the division of the atom into parts is not real, but a mode of expression only.

The following are some opinions on atoms, which are mentioned in the *Nyāya Vārtika* (6th cent. A.D.), but the authors of which are not named. Some thought that the mote which is seen in a ray of the sun entering a window is an atom. Others believed that atoms do not occur singly (*asaṃhata*), but always in aggregates (p. 234). Some, apparently Buddhists, maintained that the atoms were not eternal, because they possess motion. The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vaiśeṣikas that the atoms are set into motion by

adṛṣṭa, i.e. merit and demerit, but expressly state that God (Īśvara) directs the action of the atoms.[5]

3. The chief opponents of the Naiyayikas, who held different views on atoms, were Buddhists of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, as we said at the beginning. The Vaibhāṣikas maintained that external things can be directly perceived, the Sautrāntikas that they can only be inferred. Śaṅkara, who comprises both under the name of Sarvāstivādin, describes their opinions on atoms in his commentary on *Ved. Sūt.* II. ii. 18 thus :

> 'These Buddhists acknowledge the four elements, earth, water, fire, and wind, with their properties and products, including the organs of sense ; the four elements are atomic ; the earth atoms have the quality of harshness the water-atoms that of viscidity, the fire-atoms that of heat, and the wind-atoms that of motion ; in combination these atoms form earthly things,' etc.

More details we learn from the work of the Tibetan *ḥjam yaṅ bśad pa*, of which Wassilieff has given an abstract[6] from the *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, a work of the idealistic school Yogācāra (for a transcript of which the present writer is indebted to the courtesy of Prof. de la Vallee Poussin), and from Prajñākaramati's commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (ix. 8 f., 95 f.).

The Vaibhāṣikas admitted that an atom had six sides, but they maintained that they made but one, or, what comes to the same, that the space within an atom could not be divided. Their opinion has been disputed by the Naiyāyikas in an old verse quoted in the *Nyāya-Vārtika* (p. 521). They further asserted that atoms were amenable to sense-knowledge, though they were not visible apart, just as a dim-sighted man sees a mass of hair, though he cannot see a single hair. This view, too, was disputed by the Naiyāyikas, who maintained that the atom

5. *Nyāya-Vartika*, p. 461 ff.
6. *Der Buddhismus*, pp. 298, 307f, 337 of the German translation.

is transcendental (*atīndriya*), not perceptible to sense (*aindriyaka*).[7]

The Sautrāntikas seem to have regarded the aggregate of seven atoms at the smallest compound (*aṇu*).[8] Their opinion seems to have been that the (globular) atoms did not touch one another completely, but that there was an interval between them ; but some held different views. All agreed that the atom is indivisible, though some admitted that it might be regarded as having parts, viz. eight sides. Both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas declare that atoms are not hollow, and cannot penetrate one another.

Most points in the Buddhistical opinions which we have related are also discussed in the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Vārtika* ; all the speculations on atoms we have dealt wlth in this our second group (the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* perhaps excepted) must, therefore, be regarded as having been current in the same period, i.e. in the beginning of our era down to the 6th cent., and later.

III. The latest improvement of the atomic theory consists in the assumption of *dvyaṇukas*, etc. It was first taught by Praśastapāda (p. 28), and is plainly referred to by Udyotakara ;[9] it was received as a tenet in all later works of what may be called the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika The fusion of these two schools began early, and seems to have been complete at the time when the *Nyāya-Vārtika* was written ; for in this work the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* is several times quoted simply as the *Sūtra* or *Sastra*, and once (p. 222) its author is called Paramarṣi, a title accorded only to the highest authority. From that time *dvyaṇukas* are quite familier in Sanskrit writers. It is assumed that two atoms (*paramāṇu*) form one binary (*dvyaṇuka*) and that three or more[10] *dvyaṇukas* form one *tryaṇuka*, which is 'great' and perceptible by the eye. From *tryaṇukas* are

7. *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. I. 36. iv. 2. 14 ; cf. *Nyāya-vārtika*, p. 232.
8. Cf Hiuen Tsiang, Si-yu-ki i. 60. In Pauranic measures, eight *paramāṇu-s—para-sūkṣma* (Wilson. *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* i. 93n).
9. *Nyāya-vārtika* p. 448.
10. Śrīdhara p. 32.

produced all things. Modern writers further assume *caturaṇukas*, formed of four *tryaṇukas*, etc. The reasoning that led to this highly artificial theory is the following.[11] The rule that the quality of the product is derived from the corresponding quality of the cause does not apply to *dvyaṇukas* and *tryaṇukas*. For in that case the 'small' *dvyaṇukas* would produce a 'small' *tryaṇuka*, not a great one as required. And if the smallness of the *dvyaṇukas* were produced from the like quality of the *paramāṇus*. it would be of a higher degree, just as two great things produce one greater thing ; but the *paramāṇu* is that than which nothing smaller can be imagined. Therefore it is not the dimension of the cause, viz. of the parts, which produces the peculiar dimension of the *dvyaṇuka* and *tryaṇuka*, but another quality : number. The number of the *dvyaṇukas* in the *tryaṇuka* has the effect of producing, on the latter, greatness, a dimension which differs in kind from that of its parts. *Dvyaāukas* have been assumed for the following reason. As great things are of two kinds, eternal (viz. the infinitely great ones, e.g. space) and non-eternal so both kinds must be found in 'small' things. Eternal small things are, of course, the atoms. Non-eternal ones must therefore consists of atoms ; they are the *dvyaṇukas*.[12] Now number is produced by the 'notion which refers to many unities' (*apekṣābuddhi*) ; and such a notion presupposes an intellect to form it ; in our case it must be the intellect of one who perceives all the atoms and *dvyaṇukas*, and who therefore must be omnicient—that is, God. Without him in whose intellect the notion of duality in *dvyaṇukas* subsists, there would not be any *dvyaṇukas* or any *tryaṇukas*, and consequently there would not be anything whatever. This strange idea, found *in nuce* already in Prasaśtapāda was brought forward by Udayana (12 cent.) as a proof of the existence of God.

Having passed in review all forms of the atomic theory which are known to us at present, we must now inquire

11. Athalye's Note to *Tarka-saṃgraha*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, p. 123.
12. Praśastapāda p. 133 & Śrīdhara p. 133.

into the origin of that theory. Two points appear to be of chief importance for our inquiry, : firstly, that the name of atom is *aṇu*, 'small', or *paramāṇu*, 'absolutely small'; and secondly, that 'small' was generally considered to differ, not in degree but in kind, from 'great'. In accordance with this notion which is shared by all, even by the opponents of the atomic theory, the small, or, as we had better called it, the infinitesimal, had to be assumed as existing, and needed no further proof. The idea of the infinitesimal in this sense seems to have already been current in the time of the Upaniṣads, where we frequently meet with the statement that Brahman is smaller than the small, and that the self (*ātman*) is small (*aṇu*). In order to arrive at the conception of the atom, the idea of the infinitesimal had not only to be applied to matter, but it had, at the same time, to be joined to the idea of its indestructibility. Reasoning from analogy apparently came in to help; as the absolutely great, e.g. space, is acknowledged by all to be eternal, so the absolutely small, the atom, must also be assumed to be eternal. At any rate, the notion of the infinitesimal led, by easy steps, to the conception of the atom. It was probably in this early stage of development that the Jains took up the idea of the atom and made use of it in their metaphysical speculations. But in India the inventors of a new theory have generally been forgotten, and the fame attached to it went to those who succeeded in defending the theory against all opponents and in thus putting it on a base of firm reasoning. This task seems to have been performed by the Vaiśeṣikas. For the atomic theory makes an integral part of their system, and in their *Sūtra* we find the outlines of the arguments used to establish it. Moreover, when the atomic theory is discussed in the *Vedanta Sūtra*, it is there ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas, and at the same time treated as one of their cardinal tenets; we may therefore conclude that the author of the *Vedānta Sūtra* looked on the Vaiśeṣikas as the principal upholders, if not the authors, of the atomic theory.

When once firmly established, the atomic theory must

have had much persuasive power with many philosophers; for it put in place of the primitive conception of matter as an eternal but quite undefined substance the more rational notions which offered an intelligible explanation of the perpetual change of things while still maintaining the eternity of matter. The Northern Buddhists adopted it, though they had to deny the eternity of atoms, according to the fundamental tenet of Buddhism that there are no eternal things. Even some adherents of Yoga admitted *paramāṇus*, defining them as the smallest particles in which the three *guṇas* are present.[13] The Mīmāṃsakas are said by Prajñākaramati to have acknowledged eternal atoms ;[14] and the same holds good with the Ājīvikas, as stated above.

It must, however, be mentioned that Dr. W. Handt[15] has maintained the Buddhist origin of the atomic theory. 'Starting', he says, 'from the fundamental view of original Buddhism, which looked on the *saṃsāra* as continual springing into existence and perishing, they regarded the whole material world as an aggregate of non-eternal atoms, just as the spiritual one was produced by the aggregate of the five *skandhas*.' But non-eternity seems to reverse the idea of the atom as it is generally understood. And if, as Handt asserts, the Buddhists, in order to explain the perpetual flow of existence, 'naturally hit on the assumption of non-eternal atoms which are divided into four classes according to the four elements,' still it would seem not to have sufficed them even for that purpose. For the *Sautrāntikas* have brought forward their famous theory of the momentariness of all things (*kṣaṇikavāda*). Every thing, according to this theory, exists but for a moment, and is in the next moment replaced by a facsimile of itself, very much as in a kinematoscopic view. The thing is nothing but a series (*santāna*) of such momentry existence (*kṣaṇa*). Here time is, as it were, resolved into atoms. This theory explains perfectly well the perpetual change of

13. *Nyāya-vārtika* p. 251f & *Yoga-sūtra* i. 40.
14, Commentry on *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ix. 127.
15. *Die atomistische Grenflage der Vaiśeṣika Philosophie*, Rostock 1900.

things, and apparently was invented for that purpose. Still, the Sautrāntikas retained the atomic theory alleged by Dr. Handt to have been invented by the Buddhists for the same purpose. We shall therefore not err in supposing that the Buddhists did not invent the atomic theory as a prop for their fundamental dogma, but advocated it because it belonged to the stock of physical and metaphysical ideas which passed current during the early centuries of the Christian era in Northern India.

LITERATURE.—Handt, *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣikaphilosophie*, Rostock, 1900. A full discussion of the Atomic Theories is lacking. The original works are :—
I. *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, by Umāsvātī, translated in Zeitschrift d. deutsch. morgenl. Ges. vol. lx. p. 512 ff.
II. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* and *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya Sūtra* with *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika*.

(ERE, Vol ii)

HISTORY OF NAVYA-NYĀYA IN BENGAL AND MITHILĀ

M. Chakravarti

In the mediaeval period Bengal pundits specialised in five branches of knowledge—in religious Tantra, in the practical Medicine, in the semi-practical Smṛti and Grammar, and in pure speculation of Navya Nyāya. In fact, to scholastic India outside Bengal, this land is chiefly known by its developments in the Indian neo-logic. Even now students from Mithilā, Benares, Mahārāṣṭra, and Draviḍa visit Navadvīpa for learing the highly abstruse branch of Indian thought.

Unfortunately very little is known of the scholars whose efforts raised the study of Navya-Nyāya to such high pre-eminence. For this want of historical knowledge two causes among others may be mentioned. Firstly, the scholars themselves in their own works neglected to give any detailed information about themselves or about their times. Secondly, like the schoolmen of Europe in the Middle Ages they loved to speak so much in technicalities and subtle distinctions that beyond a vague wonder their studies created no ferment in the world outside, and hence did not give rise to any historical account by outsiders. If we compare the Gauḍīya Nyāya with the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism which took birth at the same time, we find a striking contrast. On account of the wide popular interest produced by Vaiṣṇavism the history of its literature in Gauḍa is much fuller in information, while a larger amount of personal and historical details are available from the Vaiṣṇava writers, though in intelligence and subtle thinking they were much inferior to the Naiyāyika pundits.

The object of this paper is mainly two-fold ; firstly, to ascertain the works of the notable writers in Mithilā and

Bengal, and secondly, to ascertain their times, in order that there may be established the chronological sequence, so necessary for tracing out the gradual development of ideas in this branch of knowledge in Eastern India. The subjcct will be discussed under three heads :

A. The Introductory.
B. The Maithili School.
C. The Gauḍīya School.

The result of discussion as to the times of the Naiyāyika and other philosophical writers is summarised below :—

	The Authors	*Their Approximate Times*
A.	*The Introductory*	
1.	Vācaspati Miśra (Senior)	... Second quarter of the ninth century (841 A.D.)
2.	Jayanta	... Second half of the ninth
3.	Śrīdhara	... 991 A.D.
4.	Udayanācārya	... Fourth quarter of the tenth century (984 A.D.)
5.	Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa	... Second half of the eleventh
6.	Śrīharṣa	... Third quarter of the twelfth
7.	Halāyudha Bhaṭṭa	... Fourth quarter of the twelfth
8.	Pūrṇānanda Kavicakravarttī	... Older than the middle of the fourteenth century
9.	Raghunātha Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya	... Older than the middle of the fifteenth century
B.	*The Maithili School*	
1.	Gaṅgeśopādhyāya or Gaṅgeśvara.	... Fourth quarter of the twelfth century
2.	Varddhamānopādhyāya	... First quarter of the thirteenth
3.	Jayadeva Miśra	... Third quarter of the thirteenth

	The Authors		*Their Approximate Times*
4.	Vāsudeva Miśra	...	Fourth quarter of the thirteenth
5.	Rucidatta Miśra	...	Do
6.	Bhagīratha or Megha Ṭhakkura	...	Fourteenth century
7.	Maheśa Ṭhakkura	...	Do
8.	Śaṅkara Miśra	...	Second and third quarters of the fifteenth century
9.	Vācaspati Miśra (Junior)	...	Third and fourth quarters of the fifteenth
10.	Misaru Miśra	...	Third quarter of the fifteenth
11.	Durgādatta Miśra	...	The sixteenth century
12.	Devnātha Ṭhakkura	...	Third quarter of the sixteenth
13.	Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura	...	Do

C. *The Gauḍīya School*

1.	Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭāchārya	...	End of the fifteenth century
2.	Jāṅakīnāth Bhaṭṭāchārya Cūḍāmaṇi	...	First half of the sixteenth
3.	Raghunātha Tārkika Śiromaṇi.	...	First quarter of the sixteenth
4.	Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya	...	Do
5.	Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭāchārya Cakravartī	...	Second quarter of the sixteenth
6.	Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Third quarter of the sixteenth
7.	Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvvabhauma Bhaṭṭacārya	...	Third quarter of the sixteenth
8.	Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Third or fourth quarter of the sixteenth
9.	Rāmabhadra Sārvvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Fourth quarter of the sixteenth

The Authors		*Their Approximate Times*
10. Jagadīśa Tarkalaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Last decade of the sixteenth, and the first quarter of the seventeenth
11. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
12. Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya	...	First quarter of the seventeenth
13. Gaurīkānta Sārvvabhauma Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
14. Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
15. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	First and second quarters of seventeenth
16. Viśvanātha Siddhāntapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
17. Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Second quarter of the seventeenth
18. Govinda Śarmmā	...	Do
19. Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
20. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
21. Nṛsiṃha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Third quarter of the seventeenth
22. Ramadeva Cirañjīva Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Do
23. Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya	...	Fourth quarter of the seventeenth

A. *The Introductory*

At the outset it is necessary to bear in mind that Navya Nyāya is based on an amalgam of old Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. The standard works in both the systems were constantly used and referred to by these later writers. Hence some mention of these older works may help the

general reader in understanding the numerous commentaries mentioned herein,

In the Nyāya system, the main authorities are (1) the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama, (2) its gloss by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin, the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* in four *adhyāyas*, and (3) the annotations on both by Pāśupatācārya Udyotakara Bhāradvāja, the *Nyāya-vārtika.* The notes by the last two are brief, and generally on special points only.

The first real commentator was Vācaspati Miśra. He wrote in five *adhyāyas* the *Nyāya-varttikatātparya-ṭīkā*, which gives fairly full and detailed explanation of the *sūtras* and their *vārttika*, with remarks of his own, and which was composed to meet the attacks of the other systems (including Bauddha and Jaina). Vācaspati Miśra wrote his *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* in 898 (Vikrama) year or A.D. 841[1] So his time falls in the second quarter of the ninth century. Three more works on Nyāya are attributed to him, viz., the *Nyāya-ratna-ṭīkā* or *Prakāśā*, the *Nyāya-tattv-āvaloka*, and the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra.* Vācaspati Miśra's works have been found on five philosophical systems but none on the Vaiśeṣika, an omission which is curious.

Vācaspati's sub-commentary was commented on by Udayanācārya in his *Nyāya-vārttika-tatparya-pariśuddhi.* This was further supplemented by Udayana in a separate commentary on the *sūtras* themselves entitled *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa*, or *Nyāya* supplements. Udayana treated Nyāya from the standpoint of Vaiśeṣika and should therefore be considered as the direct predecessor of the Maithili School.

In the Vaiśeṣika system, the foundation lies on (1) the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda, (2) its *Bhāṣya* or *scholia* by Praśastapāda, the *Padārtha-dharma-saṅgraha*, in six sections, (3) Vallabhācārya's *Nyāya-līlāvatī*, and (4) Śivāditya Miśra's *Sapta-padārthī* in which he added to the six categories of older writers, a seventh the *abhāva* or negation.

1. The *Nyāya-śūci-nibandha*, pr. ed., p. 26, end verse. His *Bhāmatī* is quoted as an authority in Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* a work of the second half of the ninth century.

The other six categories are *dravya* (substance), *karma* (action), *guṇā* (attribute), *smānya* (genus) *viśeṣa* (species) and *samavāya* (combination).

Śrīdhara of Bhūriśreṣṭha in Rāḍha (Modern Bhursut in Howrah (district), wrote in Śaka 913 the *Nyāya-kandalī*[2] a sub-commentary on the *Bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda. He acknowledged only six categories. His work was, however, little used by the Maithili or Gauḍīya school. On the other hand, his contemporary Udayanācārya's *Kiraṇāvalī*, another sub-commentary on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* in *two* sections (*dravya* and *guṇa*) powerfully influenced the Navya Nyāya Schools. In this commentary he speaks of only six categories. But in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* (on definitions) he divides categories under two heads, the *bhāva* with the six categories and *abhāva* (the seventh), thus agreeing with Śivāditya's classification.

Besides these, Udayanācārya wrote two polemical treatises which were frequently used in the later Nyāya literature. They are—

(1) the *Ātma-tattva-viveka* or a discussion about the truths on soul. From its attack on Buddhistic philosophies it is also called *Bauddhadhikkāra* or condemnation of Buddhism.

(2) The *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali*, shortened now and then to *Kusum-āñjali*, or a handful of Nyāya flowers, in five *stavakas* or bunches. It consists of 71 *kārikās* or verses on the existence of God, with a commentary of his own, the *Kusum-āñjali-prakaraṇa*. In this work Udayana attacked the views of Saugatas, Digambaras, Cārvākas, Mīmāṃsakas Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntists. Some of the verses breathe noble ideas ; for example, the seventeenth verse of the fifth bunch.[3]

"Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though thus washed by the repeated inundations of ethics and vedic texts ; yet still in time, oh Merciful

2. The *Nyāya-kandalī* is printed in the Vizianagram series.
3. Cowell's translation of the *Kusum-āñjali*, p. 85.

One. Thou in thy goodness canst save even those who oppose our proposition and make them undoubting in their conviction of Thy existence."

Udayāna wrote the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*[4] in the expired Śaka year 906 or 984 A.D. He therefore flourished in the fourth quarter of the tenth century. His home is as yet unsettled. But from the use of the Śaka year and from the great influence his works exercised on the Maithilis, it is not improbable that he was a Maithili. The Nyāya gloss *Kiraṇāvalī* is later than the above two polemical works which it quotes, and is eartier than the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* where its introductory verse is quoted at the end.

The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍā-khādya* ('The Sweets of refutation) Śrīharṣa had also a hand in moulding the views of the Navya Nyāya Schools. In four *pariecchedas* it criticises vigorously the principal Indian schools of philosophy, and points out that the first principles and the fundamental definitions in every system contain defects leading to the rejection of that system, the only fact surviving is the fundamental assumption that we know (the *cegito ergo sum* of Descartes). He says : "The only difference between us and the Saugatas is that they maintain that everything is inexplicable while we maintain that everything is inexplicable except the mere fact of knowing", and again, "We, in fact, desisting from any attempt to establish the existence or non-existence of the external world, are perfectly contended to rest all our weight on the one Brahma, identical with thought, established by its own evidence".[5]

The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* was criticised by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and commented upon by his son Varddhamāna. Hence it must be older than these. Some verses of his *Naiṣadha-caritam* are quoted in the *Sūkti-karṇ-āmṛta*, and must therefore be older than 1206 A.D., the date of that anthology. The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* quotes from the rhetorical work, the *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahima Bhaṭṭa, and from the *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali* of Udayanācārya. It must

4. The *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, pr. ed , p. 3, the last but one verse at the end.
5. Cowell's translation, J.A.S.B., 1862, p. 389.

therefore be later than tenth century. Furthermore, according to Rājaśekhara Sūri's *Prabandha-kośa* (1348 A.D.), Śrīharṣa flourished in the court of king Jayantacandra, who is evidently identical with the king Jayacandra of Kanauja, crowned in 1170 A.D., and killed by Sahabuddin in 1194 A.D. In the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* itself Śrīharṣa speaks of having received an *āsana* and a pair of betels as prize from the king of Kanyakubja. Śrīharsa also wrote a *Gauḍorv-īśa-kulapraśasti*, which, according to the commentator Gopinatha, was composed in praise of the king Vijaysena. According to the *Puruṣaparīkṣā* of Vidyāpati[6] Śrīharṣa lived in Gauḍaviṣaya, a fact that explains the origin of the above poem. So his time falls in the third quarter of the twelfth century.

B. *The Maithili School*

1. GAṄGEŚOPĀDHYĀYA

The founder of the Navya Nyāya School. He wrote the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* or the thought-jewel of truths. Accepting Gotama's four-fold classification of proofs (*pramāṇa*), the work is divided into the following sections:—

1. *Pratyakṣa* or perception :
2. *Anumāna* or inference with a special subsection on Īśvarānumāna or the inference about God ;
3. *Upamāna* or comparison.
4. *Śabda* or affirmation.

These sections are further sub-divided into *vādas* or discussions, *pratyakṣa* having twelve, *anumāna* seventeen, *śabda* sixteen, and *upamāna* having none.

Gaṅgeśa passes in review the whold field of Nyāya, and defends it against the attacks of other systems, whose

6. See the *Puruṣa-parīkṣā, Medhāvi-kathā.*

views he criticises vigorously and often with novel and original remarks. The Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are criticised least ; but the Mīmāṃsakas, specially its two schools, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, are unsparingly slashed. Two views and opinions are quoted either generally in a vague way, under *kecit, kaścit, kvacit, anye, apara, itare, ucyate, vadanti, tad-uktam, ity-uktam,* or simply as *navyāḥ, navīnāḥ, atinavīnāḥ,* or occasionally under schools as *Mīmāṃsakāḥ Guravaḥ Prābhākarāḥ, Bhāṭṭāḥ, Vaiśeṣikaḥ, Vedāntaḥ, Śābdikāḥ Tāntrikāḥ, Tridaṇḍinaḥ, Sampradāyavidaḥ, Prāñcaḥ,* and so on.

Names are given very rarely, e.g., *Khaṇḍana kāra* (iia. 3.233) Jayanta *jaran-naiyāyika* (III 61), Maṇḍana or Maṇḍanācārya (IVb. 11, 587, 14, 847), Ratna-kośa-kāra (11a. 15.585, IVb, 13,830), Vācaspati Miśra (I, 3,537, IIb, 81), Śivāditya Miśra (I, 830), Śrīkara (IIc, 186), besides the *Mahā-Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa.* Verses of Udayanācārya's *Kusum-āñjali* are quoted, viz. its III. 15 (in IVa 1,91.2), and its V.8 (in IVb. 13,820-1) while according to Mathurānātha's commentary the quotation in I. 2,424 is from the Ācarya-caraṇa's *Bauddha-dhikkāra.*[7]

In the final colophon Gaṅgeśa is given the title of *Upādhyāyaya* (modern Ojha), a class of Brahmans who with the Miśras and Ṭhakkuras practically monopolized Sanskrit learning in Mithila. Varddhamānopādhyāya calls himself son of Gaṅgeśvara.

The anterior limit of Gaṅgeśa is fixed by his criticising an opinion of *Khaṇḍana-kāra.* His work should therefore be later than the third quarter of the twelfth century. He must have preceded by a generation his son Varddhamāna, whose time falls approximately in the first quarter of the thirteenth century A.D. Gaṅgeśa may therefore be placed in the fourth quarter of the twelfth century during the overlordship of Lakṣmaṇasenadeva.

7. The references are to the Bib. Ind. ed. of the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi.*

2. VARDDHAMĀNOPĀDHYĀYA

He wrote mainly commentaries, and is the oldest commentator known on Udayana's works and on Śrīharṣa's Vedāntic work. His commentaries bear generally the suffix *prakāśa.*

He wrote in Nyāya—

i) the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa*,[8] a commentary on his father's work, to be distinguished from a work of the same name by Rucidatta ;

ii) the *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa*, a commentary on Udayacārya's *Nyāya-vārttika-tatparya-pariśuddhi,* quoted in his own No. vi ;

iii) the *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa,* a commentary on Udayanācārya's *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa,* quoted in his own No. vi. and in Jayadeva's *Āloka* ;

iv) the *Prameya-nibandha-prakāśa*, which may be the same as the *Prameya-tattva-bodha,* quoted as his by Rucidatta in the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali-prakāśa-makaranda* ;[9]

in Vaiśeṣika—

v) the *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa,* a commentary on Udayanācārya's work, in two sections, *Dravya* and *Guṇa* ;

vi) the *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-prakāśa,* a commentary on Udayana's famous polemical wcrk ; quoted by Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya in his *Kusum-āñjali-ṭīkā* and commented upon by Rucidatta.

vii) the *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa,* a commetary on Vallabhācārya's work ; quoted in Jayadeva's *Āloka* ;

in Vedānta—

viii) the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya-prakāśa,* a commentary on Śrīharṣa's famous work, referred to in Pragalbhācārya's commentary (the *Khaṇḍan-oddhāra*).[10]

8. For a MS, see the Benares College *Catalogue*, 193.
9. The Bib. Ind. ed., the *Kusum-āñjali-prakāśa,* I. p, 384.
10. Sans. Coll. Cat. III. 199, No 314.

Varddhamāna calls Gaṅgeśvara his father and preceptor,[11] and is in the final colophons given the title Upādhyāya. No other personal information of him is at present available.

Varddhamāna Mahopādhyāya is named in the *Sarvva-darśana-saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya, under no. xiii, Pāṇini-darśana. So he must be older than the second half of the fourteenth century. He must be older than Jayadeva, who commented on two of his Vaiśeṣika works. Jayadeva's time cannot be later than the third quarter of the thirteenth century. He speaks of Varddhamāna reverently as *Mahāmahopādhyāya-caraṇāḥ* ;[12] and so a fair interval must have elapsed between the two Varddhamāna's time thus falls probably in the first quarter of the thirteenth century.

His *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-prakāśa* mentions, and therefore must be later than his *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* and *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa.*

By his commentaries Varddhamāna considerably facilitated the study of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, and helped largely in establishing on a solid basis the Navya Nyāya School of his father. It is a pity nothing authentic is known of the personal lives of these two famous scholars. He should be distinguished from the later jurist of the same name.

3. JAYADEVA MIŚRA

A well-known commentator, best known by his—

i) *Tattva-cintāmaṇyāloka,*[13] or briefly the *Āloka* or light, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's work, in four *khaṇḍas.* His notes are brief and mainly on points deemed difficult. He notes some different readings in the text of the *Cintā-maṇi.*

11. The *Līlāvatī-prakāśa.* Ind. Off. Cat., p. 668, No. 2080, introd. verse 2.
12. The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi,* Bib. Ind. ed., I. 6.674. Besides writing commentaries on Varddhamāna's works, Jayadeva also mentioned his *Kusum-āñjali-prakāśa* in his *Āloka.*
13. Portions of the *Āloka* have been printed in the Bib. Ind. ed., of the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi.*

He also sub-commented on two Vaiśeṣika commentaries of Varddhamāna,[14] viz.—

ii) the *Dravya-padārtha*, on the *Dravya-kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa*, and

iii) the *Līlavātī-viveka*, on the *Līlāvatī-prakāśa*.

He was the nephew and pupil of Hari Miśra. He was surnamed *Pakṣadhara*, and apparenly to distinguish him from other Jayadevas, is often called by that name alone. He is given the title of *Tārkika-cūḍāmaṇi* in the printed edition of the *Āloka* and in some of the MSS. He had as pupils Vāsudeva Miśra (his nephew) and Rucidatta Miśra.

He must be older than La sam 159, Sravana, 6, the date of MS. of his *Pratyakṣ-āloka*, or older than 1278 A.D.[15] His anterior limit is fixed by Varddhamāna, whose work he sub-commented upon. He might be placed in the third quarter of the thirteenth century.

4. VĀSUDEVA MIŚRA

He wrote a commentary on the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* of Gaṅgeśa.[16] In the final colophon he is described as nephew of Pakṣadhara Miśra, and is given the title *Nyāya-siddhānta-sarv-abhijña*, expert in the essence of logical conclusions. He wrote for the understanding of those who found fault in the words of his *guru* Jayadeva. As nephew of Jaya-

14. See for the *Dravya-padārtha*, Ind. Off. Cat., p. 665. No. 2072, and for the *Līlāvatī-viveka*, Ind. Off. Cat. p. 668, Nos. 2081, 2082.

15. R. Mitra, Notices, V. p. 299, No. 1976. The date is written curiously and runs thus :—
Here the figure after *śakābda* has been apparently dropped, while in the figure after La. sam. a dot is put in between 15 and 9, evidently to signify decimal figure. Such insertions of dots to indicate decimal and centesimal figures are not uncommon in MSS. In the Plate I of the Notices, the characters appear to be Maithili and archaic, e.g., the character k is denoted by a wavy line only.

16. The *Cintā-maṇi-ṭīkā* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 632, No. 1939), introd. verse 2 and the final colophon of the *Anumāna-khaṇḍa*.

deva his time falls in the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century.

5. RUCIDATTA MIŚRA

Two commentaries of his are extant, viz.,—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-prakāśa*,[17] a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's work in Nyāya ; and

ii) the *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-prakāśa-makaranda*, a sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary on Udayanācārya's Vaiśeṣika work.

Rucidatta was son of Devadatta and Reṇukā and brother of Śaktidatta and Matidatta. The family belonged to Sodarapurakula, to which belonged other later writers as Kṛṣṇadatta and Hṛdayanātha. He was a pupil of Jayadeva.[18]

He must be older than Śaka 1292 or 1370 A.D. the date of a MS. of his *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-prakāśa*, *pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa*.[19] As a pupil of Jayadeva he may be placed in the fourth quarter of the thirteenth century.

6. BHAGĪRATHA OR MEGHA ṬHAKKURA

Three of his Vaiśeṣika sub-commentaries are extant, all on Varddhamāna's work, viz.,—

i) the *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-prakāśikā* ;

ii) the (Nyāya) *Kusum-āñjali-prakāśa-prakāśikā* ; and

iii) the (Nyāya) *Līlāvatī-prakāśa-vyākhyā*.

The titles have generally the suffix *prakāśikā*. He was elder brother of the next writer Maheśa, and younger brother of Mahādeva, whom he praises highly.

17. The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-prakāśa*, *Śabda-khaṇḍa* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 633, Nos. 1946-7), the end verse 2.

18. Sans. Coll. Cat., III. 544. The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-prakāśa*, introd. verse 2 and the final colophon.

19. For this old MS. see Peterson's sixth *Report*, p. 76, No. 190.

7. MAHEŚA ṬHAKKURA

He wrote a sub-commentary on the commentary of Jayadeva on Gaṅgeśa's work, named *Āloka-darpaṇa* or the mirror of the light.

He was son of Dhīrā and Candra or Candrapati, and younger brother of Mahādeva, the above-named Bhagīratha and Dāmodara.[20]

The *Darpaṇa* is quoted as an authority in Śaṅkara Miśra's *Tri-sūtrī-nibandha-vyākhyā*.[21] Its time lies therefore between Jayadeva and Śaṅkara Miśra or between 1270 and 1450 A.D. The time of the two brothers may be placed tentatively in the fourteenth century.

8. ŚAṄKARA MIŚRA

He wrote both on Smṛti and on Darśana, chiefly Vaiśeṣika. His extant philosophical works are as follows—

i) The *Ātma-tattva-viveka-kalpa-latā*, a commentary on Udayanācārya's polemical treatise.

ii) The *Ānanda-vardhana*, pleasure-increase, a commentary on Śrīharṣa's Vedāntic *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, which is referred to in Pragalbhācārya's commentary thereon.

iii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-mayūkha*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's famous work in Nyāya.

iv) The *Tri-sūtrī-nibandha-vyākhyā*, a sub-commentary on Udayanācārya's *ṭīkā* on the first three sutras of Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtra*. It professes to be a supplement to the *vyākhyā* of the authors of *Prakāśa* (Rucidatta), *Darpaṇa* (Maheśa) *Udyota* (Vāhinīpati).

20. *Anumān-āloka-darpaṇa* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 631, No. 1389), end verses 1 and 2.

21. H. Shastri, Notices, Vol. III, p. 89, No. 136, introd. verse 2.

v) The *Nyāya-līlāvatī-kaṇṭh-ābharaṇa*, a commentary on the authoritative Vaiśeṣika work on Vallabhācārya.

vi) The *Bheda-prakāśa* or *Bheda-ratna-prakāśa*, a criticism of the non-dualistic Vedānta. The only original work in philosophy of Śaṅkara as yet found. It is criticised in its turn in the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka* of Sarvajñātman (ii. I).

vii) The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtr-opaskāra*, a commentary on the *Kaṇāda-sūtras*, in ten *adhyāyas*, each with two *āhnikas*. It is the popular commentary on the original *sūtras*, and has been printed in the Bibl. Ind. edition.

The three Smṛti works of his have been discussed in my article on the Smṛti in Mithila. He wrote also, apparently in his younger days, a small comedy on the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī, the *Gaurī-digambara-prahasanam*, which was played at the instance of his father.[22]

Śaṅkara was son of Bhavanātha and nephew of Jīvanātha. His father was a learned man, as Śaṅkara in the introductory verses of several of his works refers to his father's instructions.

Śaṅkara must be older than 1462 A.D., in which year a MS of the *Bheda-prakāśa* was copied.[23] As *guru* of the jurist Varddhamān-opadhyāya he cannot be much older than this time. He may be placed in the second and third quarters of the fifteenth century.

9. VĀCASPATI MIŚRA

He is best known as *smṛti*-writer. But in his last work the *Pitṛ-bhakti-taraṅginī*, he speaks of having composed some ten works in the (*darśana*) śāstra. Of these, four at least can be traced[24]—

22. H. Shastri, *Notices*, Vol. III, p. 52. No. 83.
23. The *Bheda-prakāśa*, Samvat 1519 (Hall).
24. See my article on *Smṛti in Mithilā*, J.A.S.B. 1915, not yet printed.

i) The *Anumāna-khaṇḍa-ṭīkā*, a commentary (probably on Gaṅgeśa's), giving the essence of the views of Gotama (Nyāya) and Jaimini (Mīmāṃsā).

ii) The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍ-oddhāra*, a commentary on Śrī-harsa's famous critique.

iii) The *Nyāya-sūtr-oddhāra*, a commentary directly on Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtras*.

iv) The *Śabda nirṇaya*, on words. No MS. yet found, quoted in his Smṛtic *Dvaita-nirṇaya*.

Vācaspati Miśra lived in the time of the kings Bhairavendra and Rāmabhadra, and was their *Pariṣad*, or court officer. His time falls in the third and fourth quarters of the fifteenth century.

10. MISARU MIŚRA

He wrote the *Padārtha-candra*, on the categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.

Like his Smṛtic work the *Vivāda-candra*, it wās attributed to Lachimadevi, wife of Candrasiṃha, the younger step-brother of the Mithila King Bhairavasiṃhadeva.[25] His time therefore falls in the third quarters of the fifteenth century, if not earlier. He should be distinguised from one Misaruka, the author of the *Nyāya-dīpaka*.

With Śaṅkara and Vācaspati disappear the notable Nyāya writers of Mithila. Navadvipa in Bengal now rose into importance and soon eclipsed Mithila. In the sixteenth century we still come accross in Mithila a few Nyāya writers, showing that its study was not entirely negletced in that period.

11. DURGĀDATTA MIŚRA

The author of the *Nyāya-bodhinī*[26] who discusses therein

25. R. Mitra, *Notices*, IX. 12. no. 2901, introd. verse 2.
For the other Misaruka, see *Notices*, X, p. 196, No. 4065. Aufrecht places Misaru in the latter half of the fourteenth century, or a century earlier.

26. Mittra. *Notices*, V. p. 84, No. 1764, IX, p. 129, No. 3029; H. Shastri, *Notices*, III, p. 75, No. 116.

some of the elementary principles of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. His time is uncertain, probably of the sixteenth century.

12. DEVANĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

He wrote the *Tattva-cintā-maṇy-āloka-pariśiṣṭa*, a supplement to Gaṅgeśa's work and Jayadeva's *Āloka* thereon. A MS. of his work was copied in La. samvat 443 or 1562 A.D. by order of the author himself. So Devanātha should be placed in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

13. MADHUSŪDANA ṬHAKKURA

He wrote the *Tattva-cintā-maṇy-āloka-kaṇṭak-oddhāra*,[27] a commentary refuting the objections to Jayadeva's *Āloka*. He must be older than La. samvat 491 or 1610 A.D., the date of a MS. of his work, and must be later than Vācaspati Miśra on whose *Dvaita-nirṇaya* he wrote another *Kaṇṭak-oddhāra*. His time thus falls roughly in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

C. *The Gauḍīya School*

Of philosophical studies in old Bengal practically nothing is known. Along with Buddhism and Jainism some of their philosophical systems were, no doubt, studied. Of the Hindu philosophical systems signs exist that the Mīmāṃsā was regularly studied. Udayanācārya in his *Kusumāñjali-prakaraṇa* and Gaṅgeśvara in his *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* mentions distinctly the *Gauḍa-Mimāṃsakāḥ*. There still exist Bhavadeva Bhaṭṭa's *Tautātita-mata-tilakam* and Halāyudha Bhaṭṭa's *Mīmāṃsā-sarvvasva*. The former is a commentary on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* and was considered an authority

27. Pūrṇānda's *Tattvva-ṃuktāvalī* is quoted under the *Rāmānuja-darśana* of Sāyaṇācārya's *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, and must therefore be earlier than the middle of the fourteenth century.

in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Other systems, if not studied regularly, do not appear to have been altogether neglected. The Vaiśesika system was represented by the commentary of Śrīdhara, the *Nyāya-kandali,* also considered an authority. The Vedānta was represented of its sceptic non-dualistic side by Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya,* and on its dualistic side, (Vaiṣṇavism) by Pūrṇānānda Kavicakarvarttī's *Tattva-muktāvalī.* The Sāṅkhya was also not neglected, judging from Raghunātha Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya's *Saṅkhya-tattva-vilāsa,* a MS. of which is dated 1448 A.D. It is in the Nyāya alone that the vestiges of its studies have been left behind. In fact it is very doubtful if Nyāya was at all studied regularly in old Gauḍa.

Then the Turks came and burst on the land, sweeping away all Hindu centres of learning and forcing the pundits to disperse to other lands. For a century and half Bengal knew little peace. It was not until Ilyas Shah had brought the greater part of Bengal under one rule that some settled form of government with its attendant culture could become possible. During the reign of his dynasty Hindu Bengal recovered slowly and gradually and in the following century began the Hindu Revival. The comparative peace induced some of the adventurous students to travel to Mithila, Benares and other old seats of learning. This Navya Nyāya branch appears to have attracted the minds of the more cleaver and quick-witted students, and its study was soon transplanted from Mithila to Navadvīpa, then the main centre of Sanskrit learning in Bengal. The young plant soon became so high and vigorous that it ultimately overshadowed the parent plant. From sixteenth century downwards Navadvipa became and is still the great place for learning the Indian non-logic system. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during a period of 150 years, Navadvipa was adorned by a galaxy of philosophical stars, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi to Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the products of whose brains rivalled in acuteness of reasoning and subtlety of thought those of the best schoolmen of Mediaeval Europe.

From the seventeenth century downwards the new school

spread outside Bengal, first to Benaras, and then to other parts of India. After the eighteenth century Bengal ceased to produce any notable writers, and the bulk of the sub-commentaries and discussions were written by non-Bengalis. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's voluminous works seem to have been studied specially in South India.

1. HARIDĀSA NYĀYALAṄKĀRA BAHṬṬĀCĀRYA

Several of his commentaries are extant,[28] viz.—

i) The *Kusum-āñjali-vyākhyā*, or a commentary on Udayana's verses.

ii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-prakāśa*, a commentary on Gaṅgesa's famous work ;

iii) The *Maṇy-āloka-ṭippanī* or *vyākhyā*, a sub-gloss on Jayadeva's commentary, the *Āloka*.

Haridāsa Nyāyalaṅkāra must be older than Śaka 1521 or 1599 A.D., in which year a MS. of his *Maṇy-āloka-ṭippaṇī* (*Śabda*) was copied. How much older he was there are no data to decide. According to the late Pandit Chandrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra he was older than Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. I have come accross no facts going against this conclusion. He might be placed in the fifteenth century towards the end, if not earlier.

2. JĀNAKĪNĀTHA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CŪḌĀMANI

He wrote the *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī*, an elementary

28. The first has been printed, edited by Cowell. It names only one work, the *Prakāśa* (of Varddhamāna) in p. 1, and occasionally prefers the views of the older writers to even Udayanācārya's e.g., see under V. 14, with the remark.
For the second work (*śabda*) see Peterson's sixth Report No. 218, with an extract on page 16 for the third work, R. Mittra, *Notices*, VIII, pp. 290-1, No. 2851 (*Anumāna*) and 2852 (*Śabda*). The last has in the final colophon the date Śaka 1521.

treatise on the four kinds of proof. This work was widely read, and had been commented upon in more than a dozen commentaries. Its references are very few, Śivāditya Miśra, Murāri Miśra and the *Cintā-maṇi* only being named.

Jānakīnātha calls himself simply Śarmmā. In the colophons, he is often given the title Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi, but in some of the MSS, his title is given as *Nyāya-cuḍāmaṇi.*[29]

The *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī* must be considerably older than Samvat 1717 or 1660 A.D., the date of a MS. of a commentary on the work, the *Siddhānta-mañjarī-tippaṇam* of Śiromaṇi Bhaṭṭācārya.[30] How much older the work was there is no means at present of knowing. But from its wide popularity before the third quarter of the seventeenth century, and from its non-mention of the famous Raghunātha Śiromaṇi or of his works, its author would seem to have been a near contemporary of the Raghunātha. He might be placed tentatively in the first half of the sixteenth century, if not earlier.

3. RAGHUNĀTHA TĀRKIKA ŚIROMAṆI

The real founder of the Gauḍīya school of Navya Nyāya. He wrote a number of works, but his fame rest mainly on two, viz.—

I) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti.* This is not only a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's work, but also a running criticism on the various topics of Nyāya given in that treatise, with some additional topics as *Nañ-vāda* or negative particles. Familiarly known as *Śiromaṇi.*

References to works and authors are rare.[31] Besides the

29. For the title *Nyāya-cūḍāmaṇi,* see Sans. Coll. Cat. III. p. 233, No. 382.

30. Peterson's fifth *Report,* p. 241, No. 211.

31. The *Anumāna-dīdhiti* has been printed in Calcutta (Samvat 1905) and certain sections thereof, the *Nañ-vāda,* and the *Ākhyāta-śakti-vāda* have been printed as appendices in the Bib. Ind. ed., vol. IV. The references are to these printed works.

vague *kaścit*, *kecit*, and only a little less vague, the *Prācām* and *Prāñcaḥ*, the *Navīnāḥ* and *Navyāḥ*, *Sampradāyaḥ* or *Sampradāya-vidaḥ*, and the various systems, we come across *Ācaryāḥ* (?Udayanācarya) *Upādhyāyaḥ*, *Ṭīkākār-ānuyāyinaḥ* (Vācaspati Miśra and followers), *Tātparya-ṭīkāyām...... Miśraiḥ*, *Nyāyacāryāḥ*, *Maṇḍana-mat-ānuyāyinaḥ* (followers of Maṇḍana Miśra's views) and *Ratnakośa-kṛt*.

The *Dīdhiti* poured new wine into the old bottle, and created a ferment in Bengal that lasted for not less than a century and a half. Manuscripts of the work, specially of its *Anumana-khaṇḍa*, are found scattered not only in Bengal but in various other parts of India. It was sub-commented by many writers, at least a dozen and half, of whom the majority came from provinces outside Bengal.

II) The *Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇam* or *Padārtha-khaṇḍanam*. This is an acute criticism of the categories given in the Vaiśeṣika system and is highly controversial in nature. It was closely studied in later times, and was commented upon by more than half a dozen Ṭīkākāras, chiefly Bengalis.

In addition Raghunātha wrote—

III) The *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa-dīdhiti*, or *ovivṛti*, in two parts. *Dravya* and *Guṇa*, giving a running criticism on the Vaiśeṣika work of Udayanācārya. It was sub-commented by about half a dozen Bengali writers.

IV) The *Buddha-dhikkara-dīdhiti*, a commentary on Udayanācārya's *Ātma-tattva-viveka*, sub-commented by Gadādhara.

V) The *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti*,or *ovistārikā* a sub-commentary on Vallabhācārya's Vaiśeṣika work, with a running criticism of Varddhamāna's commentary thereon. It was commented upon by half a dozen Bengali writers, Rāmakṛṣṇa, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Guṇānanda, Rudra and others.

VI) The *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya-dīdhiti* a commentary on Śrīharṣa's critique.

Raghunātha is given the title *Tārkika-cūḍamaṇi* in Hall's

Index wrongly. In the MSS., he is given the title *Tārkika-śiromaṇi* or simply *Śiromaṇi*. The title *Bhaṭṭācārya* Śiromaṇi is used in one of the oldest commentaries of the *Maṇi-dīdhiti* the *Bhavānandī* of Bhavānanda Siddhānta-vāgīśa.[32]

Unfortunately nothing authentic is known either of Raghunātha personally or of his ancestors. In the final colophon of a MS. dated Śaka 1658 (1736 A.D.) he is described as *Bhaṭṭācāry-ātmaja*, son of Bhaṭṭācārya,[33] but no name of the father is given. According to tradition he was a pupil of Vāsudeva Sārvvabhauma, the preceptor of Caitanya, the Vaiṣṇava preacher. But of this there is no authentic confirmation. In later days he came to be known as *Kāṇa Śiromaṇi*, or the one-eyed.[34]

Raghunātha must be much older than Śaka 1524 or 1602 A.D. in which year a MS. of Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvva-bhauma's sub-commentary on his *Ānumana-dīdhiti* was copied. He must be considerably older than Mathurānātha Tarka-vāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, who sub-commented on his *Maṇi-dīdhiti* and *Līlāvati-prakāśa-dīdhiti* and who in his commentary the *Cintāmaṇi-rahasya* even mentions the followers of the *Dīdhiti*, *Dīdhityanuyāyinaḥ*.[35] How much older Raghunātha was there is no means at present of knowing. His time may be tentatively placed in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

From Raghunātha started a Navya Nyāya school which was, as noticed above, mentioned as early as Mathurā-nātha's time. Their destructive criticisms of the view of the Maithili school evoked opprobrious remarks from Yaśovijaya Gani, the Jaina writer on Nyāya.[36] Mahādeva Puntamkara

32. The *Bhavānandī*, Sans. Coll. Cat., III. p. 173, No. 269, end (also Mittra, Notices, II, p. 186, No. 781).
33. R. Mitra, *Notices*, III, p. 28, No. 1052, the final colophon :-
34. The Jaina *Khaṇḍana-khādya* of Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, fol. 437 (quoted by Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, J.A.S.B. 1910, p. 466) :-
35. The *Cintā-maṇi-rahasya*, Bib. Ind. ed. I. 2. 277.
36. See the above note 3, and Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusana's quotation from the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrī-vivaraṇa*, J.A.S.B., 1910, p. 466.

in his *Nyāya Kaustubha* calls them the modern *Dīdhiti-kār-ānuyāyino Navyāḥ*. This school comprised all the notable writers on logic at Navadvipa, and powerfully moulded subsequent studies in Navya Nyāya.

4. KAṆĀDA TARKAVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote :—[37]

(i) The *Maṇi-vyākhyā*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*, of which only MSS. on the *Anumāna-khaṇḍa* had been yet found, with fragments thereof, e.g. on *Avayava* (the terms of a syllogism) and on *Vāyu* (air).

ii) The *Bhāṣā-ratnam*, on the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika system.

iii) The *Apa-śabda-khaṇḍanam*, another Vaiśeṣika work.

Nothing authentic is known of this writer. According to tradition Raghunātha and he were co-pupils of Vāsudeva Sārvvabhauma.[38] According to tradition therefore his time would fall in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

In the introductory verse of the *Bhāṣa-ratnam*, Kaṇāda salutes one Cūḍāmaṇi. Is he the *Tārkika-cūḍāmaṇī* Jayadeva ?

5. RĀMAKRṢṆA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTTĪ

He wrote :—[39]

i) The *Guṇa-Śiromaṇi-prakāśa*, a sub-commentary on the *Guṇa-prakāśa-didhiti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. the second part of his *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāsa-dīdhiti* (Vaiśeṣika).

37. For the *Maṇi-vyākhyā*, see. R. Mitra, *Notices*, IV. p. 167, Sans. Col. Cat. III, p 327, No. 582 (Śaka 1705), and H. Shastri, *Notices* IV. p. 13, No. 14. For the *Bhāṣā-ratna*, see R. Mittra, *Notices*, IV, p. 119, No. 1531, introd. verse 11. For No. iii, see Peterson's sixth *Report*, p. 74. No. 173.

38. For some traditionary account of Kaṇāda, see H. Shastri's introd. to his *Notices*, vol. I. p. xviii.

39. For (i), see Ind. Off. Cat., p. 664, Nos. 2068-2069 ; for (ii) see H. Shastri, *Notices*. vol. II. p. 97, No. 117 (Śaka 1737).

It is not certain, but the above writer may have written the following work :—

ii) The *Nyāya-dīpikā*, on some general topics of Nyāya. The author is entitled here *Tarkāvataṃsa Bhaṭṭācārya.*

Hall says that he was son of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Of this there is no proof. On the other hand, he calls Śiromaṇi his *guru* or preceptor.[40]

He must be older than Samvat 1660 or 1663 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Guṇa-śiromaṇi-prakāśa.*[41] As pupil of Śiromaṇi he would be later than the first quarter of the sixteenth century. He might be placed in the quarter of the same century.

He should be distinguished from another Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, surnamed Udīcya (the northerner) who later wrote a series of works on Sāṅkhya and Smṛti entitled *Kaumudī.*

6. MATHURĀNĀTHA TARKAVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He is best known for—

i) the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-rahasya* or °*Phakkikā*,[42] the standard commentary on Gaṅgeśa's work, familiarly known as Māthurī. It is full and clear in its elucidation. Its references to other works and writers, though not many, are somewhat larger. It mentions such vague words as *Abhinava-Vaiśeṣikāḥ, Abhinava-Mīmāṃsakāḥ, Ucchṛṅkhalāḥ, Uttāhāḥ, Jaran-Naiyāyikā-naye, Navīna-naye, Navyāḥ, Naiyāyika-navyāḥ Naiyāyik-ottānāḥ, Prābhākara-navyāḥ, Prācām, Prācīnagranthāḥ, Prācīna-Naiyāyikānām, Prācīna-matam, Prācīna-Mīmāṃsaka-granthāḥ, Prācīna-Mīmāṃsaka-matam, Prācīnaiḥ, Sampradāya-matah, Samprdāya-vidaḥ, Sāmpradāyikāḥ, Svatantrāḥ* and so on. Among actual names we find :—

40. Ind. Off. Cat. No 2068, introd. verse 2.
41. Ind. Off. Cat., No. 2069.
42. The bulk of this commentary (*Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda*) has been printed in the Bib. Ind. edition.

Udayanācarya, Ācarya of
Ācarya-caraṇaiḥ
Ācary-ānuyāyinaḥ
Upādhyāyāḥ
Upādhyāy-ānuyāyinaḥ
Ṭīkā-kārāḥ
Dīdhiti
Dīdhiti-kṛt
Dīdhity-anuyāyinaḥ
Dravya-kiraṇāvalī
Durgā-Māhātmya
Padārtha-khaṇḍana
Bauddha-dhikkāra
Bhaṭṭācāryāḥ
Bhaṭṭācāry-ānuyāyinaḥ
Maṇḍana
Maṇi-kāra or °kṛt
Mahārṇava
Miśrāḥ (Vācaspati)
Miśr-ānuyāyinaḥ
Ratna-kośa-kāra
Līlāvatī-kāra
Sondaḍopādhyāya
Harināthopādhyāya
He quotes also his own *Guṇaprakāśa-rahasya*, *Dīdhiti rahasya* and *Siddhānta rahasya*.

ii) The *Tattvacintā-maṇy-āloka-rahasya* or *°phakkikā*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka*.

iii) The *Dīdhiti-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's commentary, quoted in his *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-rahasya* and *guṇa-prakāśa phakkikā*.

iv) The *Siddhānta-rahasya*. No MS. found. Quoted in (i).

In Vaiśeṣika he wrote—

v) The *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-phakkikā* or *°vivṛti*,[43] a sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary on Udayanācārya's work. It quotes in the beginning the *Anumāna-dīdhiti-rahasya* (No. iii).

vi) The *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on Varddhamāna's *Prakāśa*. It mentions his *Dīdhiti-rahasya* (No. vii).

vii) The *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti-rahasya*, a sub-commentary on the sub-commentary *Dīdhiti*. It is quoted in No. vi.

43. In one MS. (H. Shastri, *Notices*, I. p. 88, No. 92) the final colophon ascribes the *Guṇa-prākāśa-vivṛti*, the second half of Mathurānātha's No. v. wrongly to Vidyāvāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya (Guṇānanda) giving a wrong name *Guṇa-vivṛti-viveka*.

viii) The *Bauddha-dhikkāra-rahasya* or *°vivṛti*, a sub-commentary on Udayanācārya's *Ātma-tattva-viveka.*

Mathurānātha is said to have written also in astrology—

ix) The *Āyur-daya-bhāvana*, a commentary on the *Āyurdaya*, treating of the calculation of human life.

And the Smṛti :—

x) The *Pāṇigrah-ādi kṛtya-viveka*, on marriages and the appropriate times thereof, with a discussion of the *mala-māsa* or intercalary month.[44]

Mathurānātha was son of Śrīrāma Tarkālaṅkāra who is said to have made a bridge over the sea of Nyāya[45] He does not name his preceptor. According to tradition he was a pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. But if this had been the fact Mathurānātha would have likely mentioned such a famous name. One verse suggests that his father might have been his *guru.*[46]

Mathurānātha must be older than Śaka 1597 or 1675 A.D., in which year a MS. of his *Līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti-rahasya* was copied.[47] How much older he was there are at present no data to go upon. He must have been considerably later than Raghunātha, whose two works he commented upon (Nos. iii and vii), and whose followers he mentioned in his No. 1. At present he might be put tentatively in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

He should be distinguished from the later Mathurānātha Śukla,[48] who is credited with numerous works on Smṛti, Yoga, rhetoric, etc.

44. For (ix) see R. Mittra, *Notices*, VI. p. 302, no. 2241 ; for (x) see Do., IX, p. 244, No. 3164.
45. See the beginning of the *Tattva-cintā-maṇī-rahasya.*
46. The *Anumāna-dīdhiti-rahasya* (R. Mittra, *Notices*, III, p. 127, no. 1673), the introductory verse 2.
47. See the MS. of the *Līlāvatī-dīdhiti-rahasya* (R. Mittra, *Notices*, III. p. 56, No. 1089, see the head note for the year).
48. In the Benares *Catalogue of sanskrit MSS.* for 1912-13, the hymn *Kālikā-stuti*, composed in Śaka 1545 or 1623 A.D., is attributed to the Naiyāyika Mathurānātha wrongly, instead of two Mathurānātha Śukla.

7. KṚṢṆADĀSA SĀRVVABHAUMA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote :

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī*,[49] a sub-commentary of Raghunātha's famous commetary.

ii) The *Anumān-āloka-prasāriṇī*, a sub-commentary of Jayadeva's *Āloka*, *Anumāna-khaṇḍa*. No MS. yet found. Quoted in his No. i.

Nothing is known of him personally. He must be older than Śaka 1524 or 1602 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Anumāna-dīdhiti-prasāriṇī*.[50] As he notes different readings of the *Dīdhiti*, he must be considerably later than Raghunātha. His time falls roughly in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

8. GUṆĀNANDA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote works generally ending in *viveka*.

i) The *Anumāna-dīdhiti-viveka*, a commentary on Raghunātha's famous work. No MS. found. Quoted in his *Ātma-tattva-viveka-dīdhiti-ṭīkā* (No. ii).

ii) The *Ātma-tattva-viveka-dīdhiti-ṭīkā*, a sub-commentary of the *Dīdhiti* commentary on Udayanācārya's work.

iii) The *Guṇa-vivṛti-viveka*, or the *Tātparya-sandarbha*, a sub-sub-commentarory on Varddhamāna's commentary and Raghuātha's sub-commentary thereon.

iv) The *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-viveka*, a commentary on the *Kārikās* or verses of Udayana's work.

v) The *Nyāya-līlāvatī-prakāśa-dīdhiti-viveka*, a sub-sub-commentary of Raghunātha's sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary on Vallabhācārya's Vaiśeṣika work.

vi) The *Śabd-āloka-viveka*, a sub-commentary of Jayadeva's *Āloka*, Śabda-khaṇḍa.

49. This work is being printed in the Bib. Ind. Series. For (ii) see p, 8.
50. Ind. Off. Cat., p. 627, no. 1927.

Nothing personal is known of Guṇānanda. He is criticized (in the (*Nyāya-khaṇḍana-khādya*) by the Jaina logician Yaśovijaya Gaṇi, whose time is given as 1608-1688 A.D. and a MS. of whose *Upadeśa-rahasyāni* (with *vṛtti*) is dated Samvat 1713 or 1656 A.D.[51] The Jaina author came across Guṇānanda's works probably when studying at Benares, i e., in his younger days. So Guṇānanda must be older than 1630-40 A.D. Further, he must be older than Śaka 1534 or 1612 A.D. in which year a MS of his *Gnṇa-vivṛti-viveka* was copied.[52] How much older he was there are at present no data to go upon. But he must be considerably later than Raghunātha, four of whose works he commented upon. His time may be placed roughly in the third or fourth quarter of the slxteenth century.

9. RĀMABHADRA SĀRVVABHAUMA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Dīdhiti-ṭīkā*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's commentary, of which fragments only have been found, viz. *Vāyu-vāda* (*Anumāna*), *Nañ-vāda* and *Samāsa-vada* (*Śabda*).

ii) The *Nyāya-rahasya*, a commentary on Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtra* itself, quoted in Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra's *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā*.

And in Vaiśeṣika :—

iii) The *Guṇa-rahasya*, a commentary on the *Guṇa-kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya.

iv) The *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā*, a commentary on Udayanācārya's verses, in which he mentions the *Prakāśa* (of Varddhamāna) and the *Makaranda* (of Rucidatta), written according to his father's interpretations.

v) The *Padārtha-viveka prakāśa*, a commentary on the *Padartha-khaṇḍana* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

51. JASB, 1910, p. 468. and for Yaśovijaya's date, p, 463. For the dated MS., see Peterson's sixth *Report*, MS. No. 77, p. 141.
52. Ind. Off. *Cat*, p. 666, No. 2074.

And in Tantra :—

vi) The *Ṣaṭ-cakra-krama-dīpikā* describing the six circles of the Tāntric system in six sections viz., *sṛṣṭi, pañcabhūta, daśendriya-guṇa, sapta-pātāla-sthāna,* and *cakra-bheda.*

Hall says he was a son of the famous Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. But of this there is no proof. On the other hand he calls himself son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī, and praises his father's teachings as better than those contained in the *Prakāśa* and the *Makaranda.*[53] His *ṭol* must have been well-conducted, for it produced two such highly learned scholars as Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya and Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya.

He must be older than Samvat 1670 or 1613 A.D., when a MS. of his *Padārtha-tattva-vivecana-prakāśa* (No. v) was copied.[54] As the preceptor of Jagadīśa and Jayarāma, he should be older that the seventeenth century. He must be much later than Raghunātha, on whose works he commented. He might be placed tentatively in the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century, if not earlier.

He should be distinguished from the two Rāmabhadra Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācāryas, both older than him, one a grammarian and the other a jurist.

10. JAGADĪŚA TARKĀLAṄKĀRA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

A famous writer. He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā*, a sub-commentary of Raghunātha's work, a standard commentary familiarly known as the Jāgadīśī. It was widely read, was commented upon by half a score of writers and was criticized by Candranārāyaṇa.

ii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-mayūkha*, a commentary directly on Gaṅgeśa's work, of which only portions have survived.[55]

53. The *Kusum-āñjali-vyākhyā*, Sans. Coll. *Cat.*, MS. III, 318, introd. verses 2 and 3.
54. Sans, Coll. *Cat.*, III p. 241, No. 399, final colophon :—
55. H. Shastri, *Notices*, I. p. 211. No. 213.

iii) The *Nyāy-ādarśa* or *Nyāya-sārāvalī*, dealing with the doctrine of causality.

iv) The *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā*, on the force of words, etc., a grammatico-philosophical treatise. It contains an elaborate discussion of words and their grammatical relations from the standpoint of Nyāya. Among grammars and Grammarians it names *Phaṇi-bhāṣya-kṛt*, the *Vākya-padīya*, Bhartṛhari, Pāṇini, Śrīkara, Kaumārāḥ, Bopadeva, Kalāpaḥ, *Vārtika-kṛt*, the *Bhaṭṭi*, *Cūrṇi*, *Bhāguri* Bābhaṭa, Āpaśalīyaḥ Jayāditya. Among others we get Navyāḥ, Vṛddhāḥ Maṇḍanācarya, Śiromaṇi, the *Nyāya-rahasya*, the *Ek-ākśara-kośa*, *Cintā-maṇi* or *Maṇi-kṛt, the Maṇi-bhāṣya*, Pakṣadhara Miśra, the *Guṇa-kiraṇavalī*, Ācārya, the *Kiraṇāvalī*, Varddhamāna, the *Mimāṃsā-mahārṇava*, Vatscavara, Sondaḍa, the *Maṇi-dīdhiti*. It is quoted in the grammatical *Śabda-rahasya* of Rāmakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and was commented on by two other writers.

And in Vaiśeṣika,—

v) The *Tark-āmṛta*,[56] an original treatise on the elementary principles of Vaiśeṣika in four sections (the four kinds of proof). It was widely read and was commented upon by Mukunda Bhaṭṭa and Gangarama Jarin.

vi) The *Dravya-bhāṣya-ṭīkā* or *Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya*, a sub-commentary of Praśastapāda's gloss on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇa-bhakṣya-muni ; the *dravya* sections as yet found.

vii) The *Nyāya-lilāvatī-dīdhiti-vyākhyā*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's commentary.

In Smṛti some works are attributed to him, but without sufficient reasons.

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra calls himself the pupil of a Sārvvabhauma who should be identified with Rāmabhadra Sārvvabhauma, as Jagadīśa quotes his *Nyāya-rahasya* with the remark that it was his *guru's*.[57]

56. Printed in Calcutta (Śaka 1769), and in Benaras.
57. The *Maṇi-mayukha*, Sans. Coll. Cat. III, p. 32', No. 575, introd.

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra must be older than Samvat 1688 or 1631 A.D., the date of copying a MS. of his *Tarkāmṛta.*[58] His anterior limit is fixed by his *guru* Rāmabhadra Sārvvabhauma. He might be placed tentatively in the last decade of the sixteenth and the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

He should be distinguished from Jagadīśa Tarkapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya who wrote commentaries on the poems *Ānanda-laharī*, *Bhagavad-gītā. Mahimna-stava*, and on the rhetorical *Kāvya-prakāśa.* A MS. of the last commentary was copied by a pupil of the Tarkapañcāna in Śaka 1579 or 1657 A.D.[59]

11. RĀMABHADRA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote :—

The *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā-prabodhinī* or *°subodhinī*, a commentary on Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra's work.

He calls Jagadīśa his *guru*, and in the final colophon he is called *Navadvīpīya*, a resident of Navadvipa town.[60]

As pupil of Jagadīśa, his time falls roughly in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

12. JAYARĀMA NYĀYA PANCĀNANA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-gūḍh-ārtha-vidyotana*, a sub-commentary of Śiromaṇi's *Dīdhiti.*

verse 2. Cf. Madras *Catalogue* No. 3022, and H. Shastri. *Notices*, I. p. 212, no. 213. For his *guru's* work, see the *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā*, pr. ed. Cal. p. 25.

58. The Deccan College *Catalogue* No. 386 or 1881-2. A MS. of Jayadeva's *Śabd-āloka* was copied in Śaka 1516 or 1594 A.D. by one Jagadīśa Śarmā (R. Mittra, *Notices*, V. p. 299, no. 1975). Is he the same as Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra ?

59. R. Mittra, *Notices*, IV. p. 224. No. 1651. Aufrecht, and following him the editor of the Benares edition of the *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* have confounded the two. For some traditionary account of Jagadīśa see H. Shastri's Notices, vol. I. introd. p. cvii.

60. Sans. Coll. Cat., III. p. 266, No. 461, introd. verse 2 and the final colophon (in R. Mittra, No. 194).

ii) *Tattva-cintā-maṇy-āloka-viveka*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka*.

iii) The *Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā*, a commentary on the first 4 to 7 *sūtras* of Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtra*.

iv) The *Śabd-ārtha*, on *Śabda* or words.

And in Vaiśeṣika—

v) The *Guṇa-didhiti-vivṛti*, a sub-commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, the sub-commentary of Varddhamāna's commentary on Udayanācārya's *Kiraṇāvalī*.

vi) The *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā*, a commentary on Udayanācārya's *karikās*, verses.

vii) The *Padārtha-maṇi-mālā*, or *Padārtha-mālā*, an original treatise examining the categories of the Vaiśeṣika. It was the beat-known of his works and was commented upon by Janārdana Vyāsa and Laugākṣi Bhāskara.

And in rhetorics :—

viii) *Kāvya-prākaśa-tilaka*, a philosophical commentary on the rhetorical work of Mammaṭa.

Jayarāma was a pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvvabhauma.[61] His title *Nyāya-pañcānana* was sometimes shortend to Pañcānana and sometimes changed wrongly to Nyāya-vacaspati. The gods of his invocatory stanzas varied, now Śambhu, then Kṛṣṇa, sometimes *Cid-ātman*. Of his pupils, Janārdana Vyāsa wrote a commentary on his No. vii and another, name not given, wrote a commentary on the *Śakti-vāda* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.[62]

Jayarāma with Devanātha Tarkapañcānana is mentioned as an authority in the rhetorical *Eka-ṣaṣṭhy-alaṅkāra-prakāśa* and in the *Alaṅkāra-sāra-sthiti* of Bhīmasena Dīkṣita, composed in Samvat 1712 during the rule of Ajitasimha in Jodhapura.[63] He should be older than Samvat 1716 or

61. The *Anumāna-didhiti gūḍh-ārtha-vidyotana* (Ind. Off. Cat., p. 620, no. 1900, and Peterson's 6th *Report*, p. 15), introd. verse 1.
62. Madras *Catalogue*, No. 4303, introd. verse 2 :—
63. R. Mitra, *Notices*, X. p. 209, No. 4084.

1659 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Padārtha-mālā*. His anterior limit is fixed by his *guru* Rāmabhadra. His time falls roughly in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

13. GAURĪKĀNTA SĀRVVABHAUMA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā*, a commentary on the *Tarka-bhāṣā*, an elementary treatise of Nyāya by Keśava Miśra. In this commentary are named the *Dīdhiti* (occasionally criticized), the *Tarka-bhāṣāprakāś-kāra* (Govardhana) and Balabhadra, two other commentators of the original work. Gaurīkānta is named several times and is criticized in Mādhavadeva's commentary, the *Tarka-bhāṣā-sāra mañjarī.*

ii) The *Sad-yukti-muktāvalī*, No. MS. found yet. Quoted in No. i.

And in other branches :—

iii) The *Ānanda-laharī-tarī*, a commentary on Śaṅkarā-cārya's poem to Śakti.

iv) The *Vidagha-mukha-maṇḍana-viṭīkā*, a commentary on Dharmadāsa's work on rhetorical enigmas.

Gaurīkanta was of Gauḍīya Rāḍha family, born in the northern part of Gauḍa. He got favours of the king by composing many *nibandhas.*[64]

He must be older than Samvat 1771 or 1714 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Ānanda-laharī-tarī*, and older than his critic Mādhavadeva, a MS. of whose *Nyāya-sāra* is dated Samvat 1751 or 1694 A.D. He must be later than the Tāntrik Pūrṇānanda, whose *Śyāmā-rahasya* is quoted in the said *Tarī* and who wrote the *Śākta-krama* in *Śaka* 1493 (571 A.D.) and the Tāntrik *Tattva-cintā-maṇi* in Śaka 1499 (1577 A.D.). He is also later than Govardhana Miśra

64. The *Ānanda-laharī-tarī* (R. Mittra, *Notices*, VII, p, 245, no, 2490) end verse and colophon.

(the *Prakāśa-kāra* quoted in his No. i), whose elder brother Padmanābha composed the *Vīra-bhadracampū* in 1578 A.D.[65] Gaurīkānta's time thus falls roughly in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

14. BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA (BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA)

He wrote :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā*, a sub-commentary of Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti.* It was a standard work, familiarly known as *Bhavānandī.* It seems to have been used more at Benares and other places outside Bengal, and was commented upon by outsiders like Kṛṣṇamittra, Dinakara and Mahādeva, and criticized by Vajraṭaṅka, a southerner. In fact Mahādeva distinctly alleges that the work had not been appreciated by the pundits of Gauḍa.[66]

ii) The *Pratyakṣ-āloka-sāra-mañjarī*, a sub-commentary of Jayadeva's *Āloka.*

iii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-ṭīkā*, a commentary directly on Gaṅgeśa's work.

iv) The *Kārak-ādy-artha-nirṇaya*, or *Kāraka-vivecana*, treating of the case-endings and other grammatical terms, said in the colophon to be part of a longer work, the *Śabda-khaṇḍa-sāra-mañjarī* on the philosophy of grammar.

Bhavānanda is in some MS. given a wrong title *Bhaṭṭācārya Tarkavāgīśa.* His grandson Rudra Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, son of Rāmeśvara, wrote a commentary on his No. iv. Bhavānanda was the preceptor of Rāghavendra Śatāvadhāna Bhaṭṭācārya, the father of Rāmadeva Cirañjīva.[67]

Bhavānanda as preceptor of Rāghavendra must be a generation older than him. Rāghavendra having compiled

65. Peterson's 6th *Report*, No. 323 ; and 4th *Report* No. 448.

66. Mahādeva's *Bhavānandī-prakāśa* (Ind. Off. *Cat.*, p. 622. Nos. 1906-10) introd. verse 7.

67. The *Vidvan-moda-taraṅgiṇī* of Cīrañjīva, introductory verses.

the simple work *Rāmaprakāśa* attributed it to his patron Kṛparāma, who is said to have been favoured by the Delhi Emperors Jehangir and Shahjehan.[68] So Bhavānanda's time falls in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

15. RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :-

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśa*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's Dīdhiti, quoted in his *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā* (No. iii).

And in Vaiśeṣika :-

ii) The *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa-vivṛti-prakāśa* or *Bhāva-prakāśika*, a sub-commentary on Raghunātha's sub-commentary.

iii) The *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā*, a commentary on Raghunātha's polemical work.

And in poetry :-

iv) The *Bhāva-vilāsa*, a poem in praise of the prince Bhāvasiṃha, son of Mānasiṃha, the Rajput Governor of Bihar and Bengal.

v) The *Bhramara-dūtam*, on Rāma's message to Sītā during separation through a bee.

vi) The *Vṛndāvana-vinoda-kāvya*, in praise of Kṛṣṇa, and of his early sports in Vṛndāvana.

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and grandson of Vidyā-vācaspati who had been honoured by the king of Gauḍa.[69] Viśvanātha Siddhanta-

68. The *Rāma-prakāśa* (Ind. Off. *Cat*, p. 502, No. 1600-2). introd-verses 4 and 6. Pandit H. Shastri would bring Cirañjīva's date a century later (see p. 33, note 4).

69. The *Bhramara-dūtam* (H. Shastri, *Notices* II, p. 135, No. 153), end verses 1 and 2; H. Shastri, the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, JASB, 1910, p. 312. Vidyā-vācaspati is named as a Smṛtic writer in Raghunandana's *Durgotsava-tattva*; while Vidyānivāsa compiled a Smṛtic work, the *Dvādaśayātrā-prayoga*, on the twelve festivals of Jagannātha.

pañcānana was his younger brother, and Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravarttī was his son.

Rudra must be older than Samvat 1670 or 1613 A.D. When a MS. of his *Pratyakṣa-maṇi-dīdhiti-vyākhyā* (No. i) was copied.[70] By order of his father Vidyānivāsa copies of the *Kalpa-taru*, the Smṛtic digest of Lakṣmīdhara (Naiyatakālika and Dāna Khaṇḍas), were copied in Śaka 1510 or 1588 A.D.[71] So Rudra must be later than this date. His time is further fixed by the poem composed in honour of Bhāvasiṃha, whose father Mānāsiṃha was governor of Bengal from the 38th to 50th year of Akvar's reign or from 1503 to 1605 A.D. Rudra's time thus falls in the last decade of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth.

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati should be distinguished from the later Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya, son of Rāmeśvara and grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, who wrote a number of philosophical works familiarly known as *Raudrī*.[72]

16. VIŚVANĀTHA SIDDHĀNTAPANCĀNANA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :-

i) The *Alaṅkāra-pariṣkāra*, on the nature of verb and the meaning of tenses and moods.

ii) The *Nañ-vāda-ṭīkā*, a commentary on Raghunātha's negative particles.

iii) The *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, a commentary on the original work of Gautama, in five *Adhyāyas*.

iv) The *Suvartha-tattva-āloka* or *Kāraka-cakra*, on the function of cases.

70. R. Mittra, *Notices*, IV, p. 127, No. 1547, final colophon.
71. For the *Naiyatakālika* MS., see R. Mittra, *Notices*, VI. No. 2183 ; and for the *Dāna* MS., Ind. Off. *Cat.*, p. 409, no. 1385.
72. As pointed out by Pandit H. Shastri, Aufrecht has confounded the two (JASB, 1910, p. 314).

And in Vaiśeṣika :-

v) The *Nyāya-tantra-bodhinī* or *Nyāya-bodhinī.*

vi) The *Padārtha-tattv-āloka,* a commentary on Raghunātha's *Padārtha-khaṇḍana.*

vii) The *Bhāṣā-pariccheda,* an elementary treatise in verse of the Vaiśeṣika system with a commentary of his own, the *Nyāya-siddhanta-muktāvalī.* shortened to *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* or simply *Muktāvalī.* This work was widely read and was sub-commented upon by half a score of writers.

And in meters,—

viii) The *Piṅgala-prakāśa* a commentary on the Prākṛta *Piṅgala chandaḥ-sutra.*

Viśvanātha was son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya and younger brother of Rudra Nyāyavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya.

He composed the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* in Saka 1556 or 1634 A.D. at Vṛndāvana.[73] So his time falls in the first and second quarters of the seventeenth century.

17. GOVINDA ŚARMMĀ

He wrote :—

i) The *Nyāya-saṃkṣepa,* an elementary treatise of Nyāya based on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra,* in *kārikas* or verses with a commentary ;

ii) And possibly the *samāsa-vāda,* a short tract on compound words.

And in Vaiśeṣika,—

iii) The *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-vyākhyā,* a commentary on Raghunāth's critique.

Govinda Śarmmā calls himself in the *Nyāya-saṃkṣepa* son of *Nyāya-vācaspati,* who can be no other than the above named Rudra, the son of Vidyānivāsa.[74] In the

73. JASB, 1910, p. 313.

74. The *Nyāya-saṃkṣepa* (Ind. Off. *Cat.* p. 644, No. 1983), introd. verse 3.

other two works the final colophons ascribe them to Govinda Bhaṭṭācārya Cakravartti who may or may not be identical with the son of Rudra.

As son of Rudra, Govinda's time falls roughly in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

18. HARIRĀMA TARKAVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-ṭīkā*, a commentary on Gaṅgeśa's work, found in fragments only, with the suffix *vicāra*, or *vāda*, at the end. It was quoted by Gadādhara (Hall).

ii) The *Ācārya-mata-rahasyam*, on Udyanācārya's theory of syllogism.

iii) The *Ratna-kośa-vāda* or *ovicāra*, criticizing that Vaiśeṣika work.

And in Mīmāṃsā,—

iv) The *Sva-prakāśa-rahasya* or *Bhaṭṭa-mata-siddhānta*, a discussion of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's views.

The title of Harirāma is in MSS. changed now and then to *Tarkālaṅkāra*, *Tarkālaṅkara-vāgīśa* or *Nyāyalaṅkāra Tarkavāgīśa*. He was *guru* of Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya and according to Hall, of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa must be older than Samvat 1711 or 1644 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Vāda-buddhi-vicāra*, a section of No. i (Hall). As the *guru* Raghudeva, he might be placed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Whether this Naiyāyika is identical with grammarian Harirāma, author of the *Kātantra-vyākhyā-sūtra*,[75] I have not sufficient information to decide.

19. RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLAṄKĀRA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi gūḍh-ārtha-dīpikā*, a commentary

75. Ind. Off. *Cat.* p. 200, No. 753 ; H. Shastri, *Notices*. p. 49, No. 52.

on Gaṅgeśa's work, familiarly known as *Raghudevī*.

ii) The *Navīna-nirmāṇa*, a later and revised commentary on the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*.

iii) The *Dīdhiti-ṭīkā*, of which only fragments exist such as *Nañ-vāda*, *Akhyāta-vāda*, etc., including discussions thereof.

And in Vaiśeṣika,—

iv) The *Nyāya-kusum-āñjali-kārikā-vyākhyā*, a commentary on the verses of Udayanācārya.

v) The *Dravya-sāra-saṅgraha*, a commentary on Udayanācārya's *Kiraṇāvalī* (*Dravya* section).

vi) The *Padārtha-khaṇḍa-vyākhyā*, a commentary with occasional criticism of Raghunātha's polemical treatise.

Raghudeva calls his *guru* *Tarka-vāgīśvara*,[76] probably to be identified with Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, whom he follows now and then almost verbatim.

Raghudeva must be older than Samvat 1733 or 1676 A.D., the copying date of a MS. of his *Anumiti-parāmarśa-vāda*. He is older than Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-1688 A.D.) who quotes him in his *Aṣṭasāhasrī-vivaraṇa*. His anterior limit is fixed by his *guru* Harirāma. He may be placed in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

20. GADĀDHARA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

A famous commentator. He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-prakāśikā*, an exhaustive sub-commentary of Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti*. It practically superseded all previous commentaries on the *Dīdhiti*. The work was so voluminous that complete copies are not found. MSS. of the different sections (called *vādas*) are found scattered not only in Bengal but in various other

76. The *Nañ-vāda-vyākhyā* (Madras *Catalogue*, No. 4254), introd. verse 1.

parts of India, specially in South India. They are familiarly known as *Gādādharīs*. They were commented, criticized and defended by dozens of writers, mostly non-Bengalis.

ii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇī-vyākhyā*, a commentary directly on Gaṅgeśa's work.

iii) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇy-āloka-ṭīkā*, a sub-commentary on Jayadeva's *Āloka*, also called *Gādādhārī*.

iv) The *Muktāvalī-ṭīkā*, a commentary on the *Sadyukti-muktāvalī* of Gaurīkānta Sārvvabhauma.

And in Vaiśeṣika,—

v) The *Ratna-kośa-vāda-rahasya*, a criticism of that Vaiśeṣika work.

Gadādhara is in some MS. given the title *Nyāya-vagīśā Bhaṭṭācārya*, and is given by Hall the title *Nyāya-siddhānta-vāgīśa*. Hall makes him a pupil of Harirāma (Tarkavāgīśa) but quotes no authorities. In the final colophon of a MS. he is described as resident of Navadvipa and in another as *Gauḍadeśīya*.[77]

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya must be older than Samvat 1732 or 1675 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Vyutpatti-vāda*. His *Śakti-vāda* was commented upon by a pupil of Jayarāma.[78] He cannot therefore be much later than that writer. He might be placed in the second quarter of the seventeenth century.

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the Naiyāyika, is probably to be distinguished from Gadādhara Cakravarttī Bhaṭṭācārya, who wrote a commentary on the rhetorical *Kāvya-prakāśa*.[79]

21. NṚSIMHA PANCĀNANA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-bhūṣā*, a commentary on Jānakīnātha's work.

77. JASB., 1910, p. 468.
78. Hall, *Index*, p. 56. Some traditional stories about Gadādhara are given by Pandit Haraprasad Shastrī in his *Notices*. Vol. I., Introduction, p. xvii.
79. Sans. Coll. *Cat*. III. 558, and Ind. Off. *Cat*., p. 617. No. 1895.

Nṛsiṃha Pañcānana must be older than Samvat 1730 or 1673 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Bhūṣā*. He praises highly his father Govinda,[80] who may be Govinda, the son of Rudra. Anyhow his time falls in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, if not earlier.

22. RĀMADEVA CIRANJĪVA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote :—

i) The *Vidvan-moda-taraṅgiṇī*, a poem in eight *taraṅgas* or waves, in which the principal philosophical systems are reviewed, with a leaning towards Nyāya. It quotes his father Rāghavendra's *Mantr-ārtha-dīpa* and *Rāma-prakāśa*.

And in other lines,—

ii) The *Kāvya-vilāsa*, on poetics, in two *bhaṅgīs*.

iii) The *Mādhava-campū*, a story of Kṛṣṇa, in prose, not verse.

iv) The *Vṛtta-ratnāvalī*, on metres, the illustrative verses of which are mainly in praise of Yaśovanta Siṃha, son of Kṛparāma.

In the long list of authors discussed in this paper Cīrañjīva is the only one that gives some account of himself and of his family.[81] His family belonged to Kāśyapagotra Kulins, residents of Rāḍhapura, Gauḍa. In that *gotra* arose Kāśīnātha, who for his skill in prognostications from omens and signs got the title Sāmudrikācārya. Kāśīnātha had three sons—Rājendra, Rāghavendra and Maheśa. The second was the favourite of his father, and at the age of sixteen got for his memory the title *Śatāvadhāna Bhaṭṭācārya*. In his young days Rāghavendra was a pupil of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa. From Rāgha-

80. The *Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī-bhūṣā*, introd. verse 2 (Ind. Off. *Cat.* p. 641, No. 1976) and the final colophon.

81. See the introductory verses of the first *taraṅgiṇī* of the *Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī*.

vendra was born the writer who was given the name of Rāmadeva by his father but Ciranjīva by his elders. He went to Benares and there studying the Śāstras, began to teach them. He speaks of having composed poems, works in Nyāya and in other Śāstras. The author is generally known by his title Ciranjīva.

Ciranjīva must be older than Samvat 1760 or 1703 A.D., the date of a MS. of his *Kāvya-vilāsa.*[82] His anterior limit is fixed by his father Rāghavendra Śatāvadhāna, who wrote the Smṛtic digest *Rāma-prakāśa,* and attributed it to his patron Kṛparāma favoured by Jehangir and Shahjehan.[83] His father therefore flourished in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. His son Ciranjīva's time thus falls in the third quarter of the same century.[84]

23. RĀMARUDRA TARKAVĀGĪŚA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

He wrote in Nyāya :—

i) The *Tattva-cintā-maṇi-dīdhiti-ṭīkā,* a sub-commentary of Śiromaṇi's work.

ii) The *Vyutpatti-vāda-vyākhyā,* a eommentary on Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's sectional work.

iii) The *Kārak-ādy-artha-nirṇaya-ṭīkā,* a commentary on his grandfather Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa's philosophical grammatical work.

And in Vaiśeṣika,—

iv) The *Dinakarīya-prakaśa-taranginī,* a sub-sub-com-

82. The *Kāvya-vilāsa.* Ind. Off. *Cat.*, p. 344, No 1192.

83. The *Rāma-prakāśa,* Ind. Off. *Cat*, p. 502, Nos. 1600-2, introd. verse 6.

84. Pandit Haraprasad Shastri says that Yaśovantasiṃha, the patron of Ciranjīva, was the Naib Dewan of Dacca, under Sujauddaula Nawab and was a resident of Western Bengal (*Notices*, III introd. p. xxiii) I have been unable to find any verification of these statements. The date in the Pandit's MS, śaka 1653, appears to me to be the date of its copying than of its composition.

mentary of Dinakara's sub-commentary of Viśvanātha's commentary, the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī.*

v) The *Tattva-saṅgraha-dīpikā-ṭippaṇī,* a sub-commentary of Annam Bhaṭṭa's own commentary.

vi) The *Siddhānta-muktāvalī-ṭīkā,* a sub-commentary of Viśvanātha's own commentary on his *Bhāṣā-pariccheda,* familiarly called the *Raudrī.*

Rāmarudra, or shortened to Rudra, was the grandson of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, and son of Śrirāma or Rāmeśvara. He was probably pupil of Madhusūdana.[85] In one MS. the title *Tarkavāgīśa* is given to him.

His time must be later than Gadādhara, and later than Dinakara *alias* Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa.[86] As grandson of Bhavānanda he cannot be much later. His time falls probably in the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century, if not earlier.

(JASB, 1916)

85. The *Siddhānta-muktāvalī-Raudrī* (Ind. Off. *Cat.*, p. 674, No. 2111) introd. verse 2.

86. Mahādeva's son Divākara composed the *Vṛtta-ratn-ākar-ādarśa* in Samvat 1770, or 1713 A.D. (Ind. Off *Cat.*, p. 304, No. 1095).

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